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Abstract
Cryptographic operations are more and more popular because unencrypted information are a
security leakage in many application areas. To read or manipulate encrypted communication
by a third party, either the secret key has to be found by brute force attack, but this is mostly
impossible for current algorithms, or by extracting the secret key from the device. This is called
side channel attack. A possible way to get the secret key is the misuse of test and debug facilities.
These interfaces allow a reading and writing access to all internals of the ASIC. Typically they
are not protected against a misuse by a third party.
In this thesis a new countermeasure against side channel attacks on scan chain and debug
interfaces is proposed. The countermeasure for the scan chain interface, as well as the one for
the debug interface, use the same approach, but every interface has its own security component.
The approach designed and investigated in this thesis is based on a key matching method, which
is resistant against reverse engineering. It is necessary from the user side, to test and debug the
device, to write the secret key in an OTP. The “golden” key is embedded in specially designed
units, which are used to compare the golden key with one provided in the OTP. After testing
or the debugging, the key in the OTP is deleted. Even if this key is known to an attacker, it
is not possible to rewrite the value into the OTP. The unit which contain the golden key and
compare logic is made of digital standard cells. The cells are not modified, but the wiring has a
novelty. Small isolation elements from the analog circuit design are used to implement a “0” or
a “1” as value for the golden key. The security feature is the resistance against optical reverse
engineering because both types of the golden key and compare unit have the same footprint.
Finally 128 of these units compose the 128 bit golden key.
The scan chain solution is suitable for any IP core, independent of whether it is a standalone
cryptographic component, a microcontroller or a very complex system on a chip. The additional
area is very small and the timing of the circuit is not influenced. For the scan chain test the test
pattern generated by the scan pattern generator can be used without any modification. The only
requirement is that before the test, the secret key has to be written into the device, and after the
test, the secret key has to be deleted.
For a debug interface the same problem exists as for the scan chain interface. An access to the
device is an open door for an attacker. As the debug interface is used in different development
stages the approach is to implement several OTP lines - one per development stage for example.
Additionally a mechanism for different access levels is offered. Depending of the access level
different address spaces are unlocked. If required, the implementation can be adapted to specific
requirements, e.g., with respect to the number of entries in the OTP or the address spaces.
As shown in this thesis, the solutions for a secure scan and debug interface are easy to inte-
grate into an existing design, while area, timing and power is not influenced significantly. The
additional area for a microcontroller is less than 1 % and the power consumption is increased by
an additional leakage of 0.2 % only. The scan or debug process have to be changed only slightly
and the test coverage is not affected and defect analysis is possible. To summarize in this thesis a
novel and innovative approach to protect scan and debug interfaces against side channel attacks
was designed and evaluated.
v
Zusammenfassung
Kryptografische Verfahren werden zunehmend eingesetzt, da unverschlüsselte Informationen in
vielen Anwendungsbereichen ein Sicherheitsrisiko darstellen. Damit ein Dritter diese verschlüs-
selten Daten mitlesen oder gar manipulieren kann, muss er im Besitz des privaten Schlüssels
sein. Diesen bekommt er entweder per Brute-force-Angriff oder versucht diesen mittels Seit-
enkanalangriff aus dem Gerät zu extrahieren. Ein möglicher Ansatz den geheimen Schlüssel
zu erhalten, ist der Missbrauch von Test- und Debugschnittstellen. Diese Schnittstellen bieten
einen lesenden und schreibenden Zugang zu allen internen Speichern eines ASICs und sind
in der Regel uneingeschränkt, d.h. auch durch unbefugte Dritte, nutzbar. Somit können auch
Schlüssel für kryptografische Verfahren darüber ausgelesen werden.
In dieser Arbeit wird eine neuartige Gegenmaßnahme gegen Seitenkanalangriffe auf Test-
und Debugschnittstellen vorgestellt. Der Ansatz basiert auf einem identischen Schlüsselpaar.
Um den Chip zu testen und zu debuggen muss des Nutzer den geheimen Schlüssel in einen OTP
Speicher schreiben. Dieser wird mit dem goldenen Schlüssel verglichen, welcher im Gerät in
speziell entworfenen Einheiten gespeichert ist. Sind beide identisch, wird der Zugriff auf die
Schnittstelle gewährt. Nach dem Abschluss von Test oder Debug, wird der Schlüssel im OTP
gelöscht. Selbst wenn einem Angreifer nun dieser geheime Schlüssel bekannt sein sollte, ist es
nicht möglich diesen nochmals in den OTP zu schreiben. Die Einheiten, welche den goldenen
Schlüssel und die Vergleichslogik enthalten, sind mit Hilfe von digitalen Standardzellen konstru-
iert worden unter Verwendung einer besonders ausgeführten Verdrahtung. Dazu wurden kleine
Isolationselemente aus der analogen Schaltungstechnik eingefügt. Mit diesen wird bestimmt, ob
die Einheit eine 0 oder 1 enthält. Da beide Einheiten gleich aussehen, ist ein Reverse Engineer-
ing mit optischen Mitteln nicht möglich. Insgesamt werden 128 dieser Einheiten in einen Chip
eingebaut, so dass der geheime Schlüssel 128 Bit lang ist.
Der Schutzmechanismus kann gleichermaßen für das Scan Chain Interface als auch für die
Debugschnittstelle benutzt werden. Jedoch hat jede Schnittstelle eine eigene Schutzeinheit. Die
Scan Chain eines jeden Designs und IP Cores kann geschützt werden, unabhängig davon ob
es ein kryptografisches Modul ist, ein Microcontroller oder ein komplexes System-on-Chip.
Die dafür notwendige zusätzliche Fläche ist klein, die Taktfrequenz und die Leistungsaufnahme
werden nicht nachhaltig beeinflusst.
Die Debugschnittstelle eines Microcontrollers wird in verschiedenen Entwicklungsphasen
genutzt. Dazu hat der OTP mehrere Einträge, so dass der Schlüssel mehrmals gesetzt werden
und die Debugschnittstelle aktiviert und deaktiviert werden kann. Darüber hinaus gibt es einen
adressbasierten Mechanimus für die Steuerung von Zugriffsrechten.
In der Arbeit wird gezeigt, dass die entwickelte Lösung für eine sichere Test- und Debug-
schnittstelle leicht in bestehendes System integriert werden kann. Für einen typischen Microcon-
troller wird dafür weniger als 1 % zusätzliche Fläche benötigt. Im Betriebsmodus ist die Leis-
tungsaufnahme nahezu unverändert. Lediglich der Leckstrom wird um 0,2% erhöht. Außerdem
hat der Schutzmechanismus keinen Einfluss auf die Testabdeckung oder die Funktion der De-
bugschnittstelle. Zusammengefasst wird in dieser Arbeit ein neuer und innovativer Ansatz zum
Absichern der Test- und Debugschnittstelle vor Seitenkanalangriffen vorgestellt und evaluiert.
vi
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Dependability, maintainability and security are important subjects of Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs). Cryptographic algorithms are involved in the data handling today, because it is required
to keep data secret and to ensure the data integrity, during wireless transmission.
Many WSNs are in publicly accessible areas, so anyone can steal a sensor node. In case of
a stolen sensor node and an extracted secret key for communication purposes, the whole sensor
network is at risk. An attacker can get the secret key in different ways; for example Simple Power
Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Attack (DPA), social engineering or reverse engineering, or
even the use of scan chain and debug interfaces. Per default scan and debug interfaces are not
protected and a perfect starting point for attackers. A simple microcontroller is sufficient to start
attacks on these types of interfaces. The behavior of scan chain and debug interfaces can be well
implemented with a microcontroller. So, it is useful to develop a protection mechanism for it.
Especially the requirements of a WSN are the focus of this thesis. Of course, this problem exists
in any application area where encryption is used.
Both types of cryptographic algorithms, symmetric and asymmetric, are vulnerable against
stolen keys. For example, with the secret key of a symmetric cipher algorithm, all encrypted
data can be decrypted. Cryptographic systems are only secure, if the secret key is kept secret.
Furthermore, the access to intermediate results of a cryptographic operation should be prevented
as well, since such data may be used to reconstruct the secret key. In the best case, the crypto-
graphic component is a black box with well-defined input and output ports and non-interruptible
operations. However, this contradicts with the requirements in respect to test, where the access
to internal states is mandatory, e.g. via scan interface, to reach a sufficient fault coverage.
The requirements of a secure scan and debug interface are given, because an unprotected
circuit puts security at risk for all parties. Interfaces like GPIO or SPI have access to some
registers or internal signals only, so that an attack does not have influence to the data, but the
scan chain as well as the debug interface controls the ASIC completely. The debug and scan
interface have in common, that the attacker needs physical access to the device. Since sensor
nodes distributed e.g. onto a field for a farming area, they can get stolen by anyone. Nobody will
notice, if one or two missing sensor nodes of a whole network are missing. In a lab, the attacker
can prepare the sensor node for his own purpose and re-integrate it back into the network. For
this reason, a security mechanism for both interfaces is necessary. In the best case an ASIC has
two independent security mechanisms, which are based on the same principal to save effort in
development. Due to the fact, that test and debug are two independent tasks, which are performed
of independent users, each interface should be accessible separately.
The high number of different debug interfaces in different configurations causes that a design
independent approach to secure it, is difficult to develop. In fact, a generic solution such as an
additional component is feasible, which controls the access to the debug unit.
In this thesis I developed a new type of protection mechanism for a scan as well as a debug
interface for processors, because none of the existing solutions fulfills the requirements. Either
they are vulnerable, inflexible, or use to much silicon area or come with severe timing penalties.
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Although the solution in this work was developed with focus onto WSNs, it can be used for any
other ASIC.
1.2 Imperative of Test and Debug
An ASIC, which is well tested before shipment is necessary because of the complexity of devices
today. Several millions of transistors in a simple ASIC are usual, so that a simple functional test
after production does not have high test coverage. To reduce manufacturing cost, and to increase
the life of the product, a post-production test is indispensable. It took several decades to establish
the post-production test as default in ASIC production process. This technical progress should
not be stopped, although the first attacks onto ASICs using the scan chain interface are published
several years ago.
In the area of microcontrollers almost all devices have a so called “debug interface”, but it
is used for more than debugging. The second function “in-circuit programming” is required
to write a boot loader or an application program to the internal NVM (e.g. flash or FRAM).
Without this interface the device cannot be programmed and, so, it is useless. This causes, that
a debug interface is an integral part of most processors, which are used in the area of sensor
networks. It allows access to a sensor node or even to a completed sensor node network. An
unprotected debug interface is easy to use for an attacker and the misuse of the interface is hard
to detect. Possible scenarios are the reading out of embedded secret keys or updated selected
functions, e.g., simple switch off the encryption mechanism, or even the replacement of the
complete operating system.
1.3 Contributions
The objective of this thesis is to introduce a security mechanism for scan and debug interfaces
with a high security level. The here proposed solution is resistant against non-destructive attacks
and destructive attacks are very hard to perform. The access to the internal data is difficult, even
if the device is re-engineered or modified at gate level in a Focused Ion Beamer (FIB). In many
known solutions for a secure scan or debug interface a single weak point exists. A single bit
(e.g. a fuse) can be repaired or a needle probe influences a signal value to enable the desired
functionality.
The approach proposed in this thesis for a secure scan chain interface, is based on the system,
which is shown in Figure 1 and it is called “secure scan chain interface” (SSCI). A wrapper
contains a security controller, a set of combined golden keys and compare units and memory to
store the “secret” key (OTP). The security controller has a programming interface and is used to
perform “set” and “delete” of the secret key in the OTP.
To enable access to internal data a matching key pair is required. The golden key has 128 bit
and it is stored in the device. Each bit of the golden key is combined with a compare unit, which
checks the corresponding bit from the secret key.
The key features of this security mechanism for a scan chain are a secured scan chain interface
with a small size and low power consumption. The storage of the golden and the secret key is
done on its own secure way. The critical timing of the ASIC is not influenced and the security
modules are distributed throughout the layout. The proposed security mechanism of this thesis
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Figure 1: Sketch of the secure scan chain system. A wrapper around the core contains the se-
curity mechanism, which is implemented as matching key pair with a key length of
128 bit. Consider the modification of the core. The single bit input of scan_enable
signal is replaced by 128 bit bus.
is distributed onto the whole die without a single point of vulnerability and it offers a high secure
solution. A reverse engineering is hindered because the golden key is stored in a new developed
manner. A set of digital standard cells, with a special wiring, combines one bit of the golden key
and the compare logic for corresponding the secret key bit, set by the user. Two different sets
are necessary: one for the golden key with logical value “0” (CMP0) and one with the logical
value “1” (CMP1). Although CMP0 and CMP1 have a different behavior; the layout of both
types is almost identical. Only with heavy equipment like a FIB and Transmission Electron
Microscopy (TEM) a reverse engineering is possible.
The secure debug interface (SDI) bases on the same approach of a set of golden key and
compare units in connection with the OTP. Since a debugging and programming of an ASIC
consists of several iterations, the OTP memory was enhanced to set of entries for the secret
key. After a finished programming session, the secret key in OTP is deleted and no further
programming is possible. As long as free entries in the OTP are available, the secret key can be
written into one of them and the program can be updated.
As result of this thesis a new concept of protection mechanism was developed, based on a
matching key pair. The compare units which contain the golden key are resistant against reverse
engineering. A well prepared implementation allows a fast and safe integration of the protection
mechanism in any design. A complex analysis of the impact onto the secured design ensures the
expected security level. It was done from transistor level up to system level.
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1.4 Publications
For dedicated circuits of this thesis two patents are pending.
• F. Vater, R. Barth, P. Langendörfer, Chr. Wittke; Patent application 102014226602.5:
Halbleiterlogikbauelement mit verschleierter Vergleichslogik; 2014 [84]
The patent describes a comparator logic, called “compare units” in this thesis built from
digital standard cells. Independent, whether the input is tested onto logic “0” or logic “1”
the used cells, placement and visual appearance are the same. A MIM structure is used to
design the different functionality of the compare units. This MIM element is not visible
and so reverse engineering based on optical inspection is impossible. To get a suitable
level of security, a set of compare units has to be used.
• F. Vater, P. Langendörfer, Chr. Wittke; Patent application 102014226606.8: Sicherheits-
bauelement zum Zugriffsschutz; 2014 [85]
The patent describes a security mechanism for access control. Into an OTP memory the
secret key is written and the data output of it is connected to the compare units. If the
input of all compare units is as expected the access is granted. When the access is no
longer required, the key stored in the OTP memory is deleted. Any further access to the
protected circuit is not possible, because it is the nature of the OTP that it can be written
only once.
1.5 Structure of Work
Chapter 2 introduces the technical background in a wide range. A description of different types
of attackers and different types of attacks is given. Furthermore a selection of memory types and
camouflaging structures is described. This is the basis for the protection mechanism for scan
chain interface as well as debug interface. In Chapter 3 test strategies for ASICs are explained,
followed by attacks and possible countermeasures. A similar examination is given for the pro-
gramming and debug interface. The secure scan chain interface is proposed in Chapter 4 with
a detailed explanation and evaluation. A comprehensive security analysis verifies the security
mechanism is resistant against different types of attacks. In Chapter 5 the developed counter-
measure for the scan chain interface is applied onto the programming and debug interface. This
thesis is closed with a conclusion and an outlook for future work.
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2 Technical Background
2.1 Attacker Classification
In this section attackers are classified in general. If an ASIC is in the focus of an attacker, it does
not matter, in which way the attacker reaches the goal; either reverse engineering by delayering
the device and extracting the netlist from taken photographs, or using a scan chain, or debug
interface to get some secret information.
Based on an attacker classification the countermeasures can be categorized. For example, an
unprotected scan chain can be abused very easily, already by a beginner, to extract information
from the device.
1. Beginner - For any reasons the beginner is motivated to get information which is not avail-
able in a direct way or to modify hardware for a misuse. This class requires a very detailed
description how to perform the attack. The equipment is restricted to cheap commercial
devices, like microcontroller boards or JTAG programmer.
2. Independent - The independent has a restricted budget in most cases, but is highly mo-
tivated. Its motivation comes from possible honor, and so the effort of the required work
plays an insignificant role. The restricted budget does not imply that he does not have
access to expensive measuring equipment. E.g. he could have access to a laboratory at a
university or at work for high-end measuring devices.
The reverse engineering of the MIFARE payment system and the successful breaking of
the used cryptographic system [30] is an example for an attack of such class.
3. Business - This class is simply driven by finance. In case that the reverse engineering of a
product is cheaper than the own development, it is justified that the company uses this way
of “product development”. Furthermore the reverse engineering is applied on competitive
products to search for patent violations.
In [73] a type of reverse engineering is described, in which an AWACS radar synchroniza-
tion circuit is replaced. The electronic components on the original PCBs were no longer
available, so the whole system was remodeled. The costs for remodeling were 75 % lower
than the estimated costs for manufacturing the original PCB.
4. Government - The government becomes a hacker, if the national security is at risk. The
security has a high priority so that the financial budget might be limited, but the limit is
very high. Mainly the decryption of cipher text might be the main focus of this type of
attacker. Time would be a limiting factor because after a certain time the information is
not required anymore.
2.2 Test and Tamper-resistant Hardware
The FIPS140-3 document [57] describes the certification process and its security requirements
for cryptographic modules and four security levels are introduced. Cryptographic modules are
defined as hardware, hardware and firmware, or software. Even the testing of modules is part of
the certification process. On the one hand the document postulates a self-test (pre-operational
and periodic during operations), on the other hand a vendor test is necessary to exclude produc-
tion errors.
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To reach security level 1 and 2 it is sufficient to perform a functional test of the cryptographic
module. In case of an AES implementation it would be sufficient to perform one encryption
and one decryption of a sample vector, which is given in AES validation suite [40]. To get
a certificate for level 3 and 4 a “low-level testing” is necessary and this low-level testing is
restricted to hardware modules only. The document does not give any statement, how the low-
level test is implemented. E.g. for the AES, each functional module (AddKey, SBox, ShiftRow,
MixColumn) can be tested separately. A set of known input vectors are applied to each module
and the response is compared to a golden vector. Such a test has to be implemented and the
implementation has to be verified. Another approach of a low-level testing is a scan chain.
Such a scan chain insertion is supported by different tools and is independent of the current
implementation. A well implemented scan chain reaches a test coverage of more than 99 %,
which guarantees a low-level test.
In FIPS140-3 document [57], the details for a secure design are described. Level 3 and 4 are
only reachable for hardware based implementations, so these levels are described more in detail
here. The physical requirements for level 3 are:
• Tamper response and zeroization circuitry on removable covers
• Protection from probing, e.g. needle probes on open device
• Hard opaque coating
The physical requirements for the highest security level, level 4, are additionally to level 3:
• Tamper detection and zeroization circuitry for multi-chip modules
• Fault injection mitigation
Especially the requirement “fault injection mitigation” for level 4 shows that the aim of a
tamper-resistant design is not to make an attack impossible, because no one can guarantee a
fully tamper-resistant device. In fact the requirement is to harden a design against attacks.
An attacker of class 1 (beginner) should not be able to get access to device internals. More
difficult to assess is an attacker of class 2, but even such an attacker should not be able to get
access to internal data of a protected device. For professional attackers (class 3) a certain security
level is required. The developer team of the tamper-resistant device should estimate the cost for
a successful attack and in any case an attack should cost much more money than a third party
is able to earn. Clearly such estimation is very difficult because only known attacks can be
considered. In [51] an overview of reverse engineering techniques is given, which is related to
consumer electronic systems and not to a tamper-resistant ASICs. But it can be seen as a starting
point and the approach of estimation can be derived for ASICs.
Attackers of class 4 are an exception. They are supported by their government, so that in most
cases money is no object. Here it is more a question of time instead of money to get the secret
data. Furthermore, if the technical approach collapses, other ways such as social engineering
seems to be a suitable way to get the required information. Most successful attacks are exploit-
ing “social engineering”, and maybe even the cheapest attacks. For example, in [48] a study was
published in which pedestrians were offered a piece of chocolate if they gave away their pass-
word. Up to 50 % of the participants wrote down the correct password onto the questionnaire.
6
2.3 JTAG
JTAG is a well-known interface for testing and debugging. In the IEEE 1149.1 standard [32],
the input, the output and the behavior of the serial interface are described. It can be used for
programming and debugging of microcontrollers, to perform a scan chain test, or even to initiate
a BIST or a memory test - i.e. it is a flexible interface for testing and debugging purposes with a
low pin count.
This type of interface is very common; therefore many IP cores are available. E.g. openJTAG
[64] offers an open source implementation in a HDL, or the company Synopsys has a config-
urable JTAG module [76]. The open source solution has the advantage that the user is able to
review the code and to adapt in regard to its own requirements. Any unused functionality can
be removed with impact on area and power consumption. The DesignWare component from
Synopsys is a black box, which can be configured by the user within limits.
2.3.1 Test Capabilities
A useful feature of the JTAG interface is that several ASICs can be connected in one chain and
one physical access port (e.g. pin header on PCB) is sufficient for data transfer. In Figure 2, an
example of three connected ASICs is given. The devices are called Test Access Port (TAP). One
single TAP can be an ASIC on a PCB or even several dies inside of a package.
An internal JTAG controller has a set of different registers: an instruction register, a bypass
register and a user data register. Each register is accessible from the JTAG interface as shown in
Figure 3 and it is linked to certain commands and functions.
The different types of commands allow different tests, for example “intest” and “extest” mode.
Since the “intest” mode is responsible for testing the ASIC internally, the “extest” is responsi-
ble to test the board connections. In Figure 3 the required boundary scan registers (BSC) are
shown, which are directly connected to the pad. The boundary scan registers are a replacement
for needle test points on the PCB. The test points are now available via a communication in-
terface instead of a large amount of needle probes. Also if the internal test is disabled, the test
of the board connections can be performed. The board connections can be tested at a low fre-
quency only, because the data is transferred from one boundary scan register in one ASIC to the
boundary scan register in the connected ASIC.
The “intest” allows a scan-based test and to execute the test code on the microcontroller for
diagnostic purposes. The patterns for the scan chain tests are generated by a pattern generator.
2.3.2 Debugging Capabilities
Two different approaches, shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5, are possible to connect a CPU core
to the JTAG interface for debugging. The first one in Figure 4 is used in devices of ATMEL [3].
All flip flops are connected like a scan chain. During a debug session, all data of all registers are
read out and displayed in the debug environment. For a large shift register, it takes a long time
to read out the content. Furthermore, without any additional effort such a solution is applicable
on designs with one scan chain only. The advantage during a debug session is that all registers
are read out and displayed in the debug tool.
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Figure 2: Schematic of several ASICs, which are connected in a JTAG chain. TRESET, TMS
and TCK are shared pins; TDI is the input to the first device and feed through to all
other devices. The output of the last ASIC in the chain is connected to the TDO pin.
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Figure 3: ASIC with additional, simply JTAG component and its interface. JTAG is used for
boundary test and scan chain test (red arrows) in this example.
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The second approach in Figure 5 is a separate unit for debugging which has access to the data
bus of the microcontroller. An example of this solution is the MSP430 from TI [80]. Several
different commands control the MAB, MDB, CPU behavior and further settings. As result,
the command from the serial interface is translated to a parallel access onto the internal bus
structure. For a “read” or “write” access to a specific address or register, a set of commands has
to be sending per JTAG interface into an instruction register. A “read” or “write” request to a
register within designs with a high number of flip flops is proceeded much faster. To get the data
from a specific address, only the data from these flip flops have to be read. In contrast to this
solution, in the first solution all flip flops have to be read, which is much more time consuming.
2.3.3 Security Solutions
In both selected examples for the use of a JTAG controller as a debug interface in microcon-
trollers, the Atmega32 as well as the MSP430, have security features. According to the JTAG
standard, a set of user-defined registers is allowed, which offers the possibility to implement
functions e.g. to support a password protection, setting of fuse bits or an authentication process.
But the implementation of hidden commands should be avoided. In [68] it is shown that they
are security risks.
2.4 State of the Art - Attacks
2.4.1 Introduction
An attack on a sensor node or any other system can be driven by different aspects. In rare cases
the attacker can be the owner of the device itself, to extract a firmware for which the sources
are lost. Even an attacker from outside can be interested in the firmware of the device, e.g. to
save development time or to get efficient software algorithms or implementations. The software
image can be disassembled, so a human readable program can be generated.
The node itself can be very expensive, so that an attacker might be interested to get full control
of the node and to misuse a stolen node for its own application area. Also the extraction of a
secret key of a cryptographic algorithm can be in focus. Such a stolen key can be helpful to
decrypt stolen measurement data or to manipulate it, which can be risky e.g. in agriculture
applications. Wrong measurement data can result in wrong watering or manuring, so that the
plants might be damaged. If pictures, taken by a digital camera, get extracted by an attacker,
privacy is at risk. Measurement data or the program itself can be affected on-the-fly by a debug
interface, which is connected to a host.
It does not matter, what the exact goal of an attacker is. In fact, a sensor node which is under
control by a third party, puts the whole network at risk. The effort to secure a device causes
additional costs to the owner. It turns out to be cheaper to invest in a secure node and network,
instead of running the risk to get one’s network invaded by an attacker.
Knowledge about different types of attacks is necessary to develop suitable countermeasures.
For example, a side-channel attack can be used to extract a secret key from a device, but the
secret key is used to protect a debug interface. Now it is possible to get full access to the device.
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Figure 4: Microcontroller Atmega32 with JTAG interface. The JTAG allows an access to the
internal scan chain, which is used for scan test (marked in green) as well as debugging
(marked in red) as kind of a large shift register and even programming of the memory
(marked in blue). Figure adapted from [3].
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Figure 5: JTAG in MSP430 with direct access to memory data and address bus for debugging.
The content of each address can be read or written individually, independent of any-
thing. Figure adapted from [81].
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It is also important to know the types of attacks, so that the developed security mechanism can
be checked, whether it is vulnerable for attacks or not.
2.4.2 Read-back Attacks
Read-back attacks are very simple attacks. “Simple” in terms of the idea behind it and short in
duration. Any unprotected device is vulnerable for such an attack without the high effort of a
side channel attack. Dedicated test structures as well as programming interface allow an explicit
access to most elements inside an ASIC.
In general the following attacks are possible:
• Extract data stored in registers, on RAM, ROM or flash
• Manipulate data, stored on a device
• Get information about the structure of the device to support side channel attacks
• Influence an active system
The first example is an attack against a microcontroller. Often a JTAG connection as pin
header, or the port, is built with soldering pads and marked with corresponding signal names
on the PCB. The programming and debugging interfaces are well documented in many cases
and corresponding software to read out data is available from manufactures of ASICs. In a
microcontroller, volatile memory for data storage and non-volatile memory for program storage
exists. For some attackers the program itself might be in the focus of interest, for other attackers,
it is to get access to accumulated data.
The second example is an attack against an FPGA. A verification feature can be misused
by read-back attacks on FPGAs. After writing the configuration of the FPGA in a verification
step, the configuration is read out and compared to the golden program. Such a read-back can
be used to extract a hardware implementation or to get e.g. a secret key, which is part of the
implementation.
2.4.3 Invasive Attacks
A physical attack means to analyze or to modify a device. Mainly for this type of attack, the
device package needs to be opened. Since a modification of the ASIC is clearly visible, this type
of attack is difficult to hide. Furthermore the risk of damage exists. For example the used acid,
to open a package, can damage the die.
The most common physical attacks are:
• Read out the value of a laser fuse bit [26]
• Read out the value of an EEPROM [55]
• Repair fuse bit on a FIB [27]
• Probing attack - contact a wire with a small needle to get the signal value
• Laser attacks - influence content of memory elements
• Reverse engineering - destroying procedure to extract the schematic of a device
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2.4.4 Package Opening
An ASIC in an open package can be helpful to attack the device. A carefully opened package,
like the one in Figure 6, has intact bond wires, so that the device can be used under normal
operation conditions. To get a fully functional device into an open package several experiments
are required. Depending on the package type, plastic or epoxide resin, different types of acids
have to be used [6].
At the end a small needle probe, which contacts a wire, can grab a signal or set the signal
to a specific value into the device. Furthermore memories like flash [70] or SRAM [13] can be
influenced by an attacker. Even an infrared camera can be used to identify highly active regions
onto the die. If the attacker forces the usage of special functions, like encryption, a local heating
is shown in an infrared picture. That can be helpful to reduce the effort in a reverse engineering
step, because only a certain area has to be analyzed.
(a) Microcontroller in an opened package, ready to
sold on a PCB for further attacks.
(b) Zoom in of Figure 6a in corner with intact bond
wires.
Figure 6: Prepared microcontroller for microprobing or laser attack.
2.4.5 Reverse Engineering
“Reverse engineering” denotes the analyzing of a system. This could be a whole electronic
system, like a video game console, or a PCB or even an ASIC. In the area of this thesis “reverse
engineering” is a picture based recovering of the circuit. The motivation for an analysis can
be different. At first it is a physical level analysis and the integrated circuit is inspected for
production failures with a known schematic. The second motivation for a reverse engineering is
the functional analysis. Such a functional analysis includes also the extraction of a secret key of
a device.
The topic of “reverse engineering” is important especially in the area of WSN. In Figure 7 a
commercial ASIC for sensor nodes is shown. All identified components are marked and labeled.
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Figure 7: Microcontroller JN5139 after removing top metal layers. The ringlike structures is
caused by the polish process. The outer material is removed faster than the inner one.
With external information such as the data sheet [44] and some experience, the core, all memory
structures and the analogue components can be located.
Manufacturing technologies down to 180 nm can be analyzed using optical microscopes,
which are used for different microcontrollers. These microscopes are available in many lab-
oratories or they are cheap to buy. So in principle any attacker is able to extract information
from a Device under Attack (DUA). The quality of a polished ASIC and of the photographs
depends on the budget and the experience of the attacker. A detailed tutorial for reverse engi-
neering can be found in [47]. The general idea of the reverse engineering of analogue and digital
circuits, is an iterative process of photography, followed by removing the current metallization
layer, followed by a next photography and so until photographs of all metallization layers are
taken.
In Figure 8 a vertical cut through a silicon technology is shown. It can be seen, that metalliza-
tion layer and each vertical connection (via) has a small high of less than 1 µm. So, the removing
a layer is a very difficult task, because only a very small amount of material has to be removed
to be successful. In Figure 9 a small cutout of a die with four different metal layers is shown. In
the first one (Figure 9a) all metallization layer are visible, in the second one (Figure 9b) several
layers are removed so that the vias from metal 2 down to metal 1 are visible. Although the di-
ameter of the vias is less than 360 nm, the vias are clearly visible. In the last Figure 9c only the
structures on metal 1 are visible. To generate the netlist of the reviewed device, the function of
the digital standard cells is required. Finally the wiring of all cells is extracted from photographs
of each metallization layer. Tools like degate [46] supports this complex task.
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Figure 8: Cross section of IHP 0.25 μm technology with dimensions of metallization layers and
vias.
2.5 Memory Types
In this section different memory types are presented. At ﬁrst, non-volatile memory is required to
store the golden key. Second, the secret key has to be stored at least for the time window which
is required to perform the post-production test or the debugging session.
Depending on the application area, a memory should be writable only once or more than once.
In the case of a device ID, the value should not be changeable, so an OTP is a suitable solution. If
the memory contains an application program, reprogramming can be useful to update software,
e.g. to eliminate bugs.
One requirement for the solution proposed in this thesis is, that the key is stored at least for
the time to test or debug. The key, which is written by the user to enable the corresponding
function (secure scan chain or debug interface), can be stored in a volatile memory. This has the
advantage that a security leak does not occur in case of the user forgetting to delete the secret
key after usage. Such a memory can be implemented as SRAM or can be ﬂip ﬂop based. These
types of volatile memory are very common. Any other type of memory like DRAM is not well
suited to the area of sensor nodes.
2.5.1 Volatile Memory
Flip Flops Flip ﬂops are standard cells in a digital library and they are placed in rows in the
layout as any other digital standard cell. A schematic of ﬂip ﬂop is shown in Figure 10a and
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(a) Detail of an ASIC with three standard cell rows and
a wiring up to metal layer 4. Two horizontal and two
vertical metal layers are visible.
(b) Photograph of a polished ASIC. The higher metal
layer are removed and now three standard cell rows
with metal layer 1 and vias to metal layer 2 are visi-
ble.
(c) Photograph of a polished ASIC down to metal layer 1.
The ﬂip ﬂops are marked in green and inverters in red
as example for a practical reverse engineering.
Figure 9: Photography of an ASIC with different number of metallization layers in IHP 0.25 μm
technology, from top to bottom. This is a usual view during a reverse engineering with
removing of each metallization layer by polishing.
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the corresponding layout in Figure 10b. Figure 9c shows a small section of an ASIC layout,
in which a flip flop is marked in green. In principle, a flip flop is easily identifiable in optical
inspection, if less metal layers are used, because it is one of the largest cell types of a library. In
case of three or more metal layers for the wiring, it is more complicated to identify the different
cell types without mechanical polishing. E.g. in Figure 9a an example is given, in which all
cells are covered with wires. Although only four metal layers are used, the cell types are hard to
identify.
(a) Schematic of a flip flop, based on NAND
gates in feedback loop.
(b) Layout from schematic 10a in IHP
0.25 µm technology. An optimized layout
causes that the NAND gates in feedback
loop cannot be identified easily.
Layer mapping
Figure 10: Schematic and layout of a flip flop
SRAM This type of memory is widely used in many application areas and is available in most
digital design kits. The data is written into specifically designed cells and the value is stored
until power is switched off. In inactive mode, which means that no input signals is changed,
SRAM has very low power consumption.
One usual SRAM cell requires six transistors to store one bit value (Figure 11a), additionally
an address multiplexer for controlling and amplifiers for read and write operations are needed.
For very small memories an SRAM is not well suited, because the additional components in-
crease the required area. Especially if the data word has an increased width (more than 16 bit),
the required area for amplifiers becomes significant, as each bit requires an amplifier. In the end,
an SRAM module is well identifiable in layout, which could be helpful in a reverse engineering
step or in a probing attack.
2.5.2 Non-volatile Memory
In a non-volatile memory the value is retained, even if the power supply is interrupted. So
in this section different types of non-volatile memories are described. First, different kind of
memories are shown, whose content must be defined before production of the ASIC. Second,
types of memories, which can be programmed after production, and third, memories, which can
be re-written several times, are explained.
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(a) Schematic of SRAM. Two cross coupled inverters and
two access transistors.
(b) SRAM layout.
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Figure 11: Schematic and example layout of six transistor SRAM cell
Combinational Logic ROM A very simple ROM is based on combinational logic cells. A
look-up table, for each input value, has a specific output value and is built up by digital standard
cells. A possible implementation in VHDL is shown in listing 1. The Figure 12a is a photograph
of a ROM, which is made out of digital standards cells. The cells are distributed in a common
area for all digital standard cells of the ASIC and it is not possible to identify them without
significant effort. For an attacker it is unclear, which combinational cells are part of the ROM
and which cells are part of the e.g. microcontroller.
Listing 1: Combinational ROM in VHDL
case input is
when x"01" => output <= x"63";
when x"02" => output <= x"7c";
when x"03" => output <= x"77";
when x"04" => output <= x"7B";
...
when x"ff" => output <= x"16";
end case;
Array ROM In Figure 12b a ROM array, called “masked ROM”, is shown. The horizontal
wires are “word lines” and the vertical wires “bit lines”. The content, which means every stored
bit, is programmed at the cross point of word and bit lines by placing active material. As for the
combinational ROM, the programming of array ROM is fixed for all ASICs with one mask set.
If the content should be changed, a new set of masks and a new device production is necessary,
which is expensive and time consuming. In case the ROM is used as program memory, software
development process must be finished before the ASIC gets produced.
Laser fuse OTP For laser fuses, a laser beam is used to cut a short stripe of polysilicon or
metal with a width of 2 µm to 3 µm. The cell size is very large and it is only usable for ASICs,
which are on a wafer or in a package with a window, but not in closed packages. The typical
application area is for memory repair. A defect memory area is replaced by a spare module.
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(a) Combinational ROM in layout view in IHP
0.25 µm technology.
(b) Array ROM in layout. Some “ones” are marked
with a green circle. Figure reprinted from [1].
Figure 12: Different types of ROM
Figure 13a shows laser fuses which are already cut. Contrary to other components in CMOS
technology, a laser fuse cannot be build smaller than 2 µm to 3 µm. A very small laser fuse
cannot be cut, because the laser spot size is to large. Reducing the size of the laser spot is a
future challenge.
Electrical fuse OTP An electrical fuse is a storage element, which is fully compatible to the
CMOS process. Such a fuse is made of polysilicon (see Figure 13b). The cells are programmed
one by one to keep the required total of the current at 20 mA. In the end the former electrical
connection is cut. Similar to a laser fuse, the required area is relatively large and the value can
be read out by optical inspection as seen in Figure 13b. A detailed comparison to all fuse types
is given in [21].
2 µm
(a) Cut laser fuse. Figure reprinted from [26]. (b) Electrical fuse OTP. Figure reprinted from [14].
Figure 13: Laser and electrical fuse OTP
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Anti-fuse OTP While a fuse has a low resistance (a conductive connection as initial value)
the anti-fuse has a high resistance (non-conductive connection) at the beginning. An anti-fuse
bit cell is based on a transistor (Figure 14), in which the gate oxide is the anti-fuse element. A
high voltage between gate and source causes a “hard gate oxide breakdown” and the isolated
connection becomes a conducting connection. Before the breakdown, the gate resistance is very
high, around 1 GΩ. After the programming phase, the resistance is less than 100 kΩ. During
programming of a single bit cell does not require additional components, the reading process
requires a sense ampliﬁer.
Like the electrical fuse OTP, the anti-fuse OTP cells can be fabricated in a standard CMOS
process without additional steps [35]. An nmos as well as a pmos transistor can be the basis of
the OTP cell. The high voltage is only required to program the fuse bit, so a thick gate-oxide for
transistors is not necessary. The advantage is that the design principle is usable even for very
small technologies, in which a thick gate-oxide is not available.
In the layout, the cells are clearly identiﬁable. The differences between an anti-fuse OTP
cell with sense ampliﬁer and a digital standard cell are signiﬁcant. The three transistors with a
common active area would be an unusual structure for digital standard cells.
Another implementation type of an anti-fuse OTP is a metal-to-metal anti-fuse [90] shown in
Figure 15. Between two different wires on two different metal layers a via and an isolator are
placed. In case of a high voltage, the isolator will breakdown and the connection between the
different wires is established. In [69] this type of anti-fuse is classiﬁed under “extremely high
security level”.
No matter in which variants anti-fuse cells are implemented, it is impossible to read out the
value via optical inspection, by using a microscope. At least a FIB is required because the anti-
fuse area is so small that it cannot be seen optically. In Figure 15 an example of such an analysis
is shown.
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(a) Schematic of single OTP cell
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(b) Layout of single OTP cell. The anti-fuse transistor is much smaller
than the other ones.
Figure 14: Example for transistor-based anti-fuse OTP.
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(a) Unprogrammed anti-fuse cell (b) Programmed anti-fuse cell
Figure 15: Metal-base anti-fuse OTP in TEM photography. Figure reprinted from [50].
EPROM The content of an EPROM can be programmed after production and furthermore
it can be erased [23]. The disadvantage of a ROM, programming during production phase, is
solved by use of this memory type.
Each cell has two gates, which are on top of each other as shown in Figure 16. To store a value,
a high voltage is applied at the top gate electrode for the corresponding bit cell. The high electric
potential causes a placement of electrons between both gates and the effect is called Hot-Carrier
Injection (HCI). The programmed value, the injected electrons, can only be erased for the whole
memory array, by UV light. For such a circuit, a special package with a small quartz window
is required. If the memory is embedded into a standard plastic package without a window, the
memory can be used as OTP. While a ROM can be fabricated without any additional costs, the
EPROM requires additional masks to fabricate an additional gate on top of the other one.
Flash Memory Flash memory is a type of EPROM which can be erased, too. In contrast to
EPROM the erase process is done in an electrical way, so that no special package is required. To
perform the erase process, a voltage is applied to the floating gate (see Figure 16). Additional
circuits like an internal voltage regulator or transistors to erase the content of the memory are
necessary.
RRAM In previous years, several new memory techniques were developed, such as FeRAM,
MRAM or RRAM. An example of the new generation of fast NVM types, the resistive RAM, is
shown.
In Figure 17a the schematic of the RRAM is shown. The basis of this memory type is a
Metal-Insulator-Metal-system Figure (17b), which is enhanced by an HfO2 layer. In principle, a
via connects metal structures on two different metal layers. The HfO2 layer is placed under the
via and this works as resistor. An electroforming process changes the value of the resistor. A
low resistance causes the logical value “1” and a high resistance the logical value “0”. An nmos
transistor is used to read out the value.
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Floating Gate Tunnel Oxide
Source N+
P-substrate
Figure 16: Design principle of flash cell in vertical view. The double gate implements the store
functionality. In the floating gate are injected electrons. The structure of flash and
EPROM cell is the same; the different is in the additional module for the erase pro-
cess.
In [20] the advantages of RRAM as secure memory are described. The content cannot be read
out optically, nor can it be influenced by a backside attack, using a laser.
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VWL
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VSL
(a) Schematic of RRAM cell (b) TEM photography of RRAM cell in IHP 0.25 µm
technology. On top is Metal3. A via, made of wol-
fram, goes in direction of Metal2. The direct con-
nection between Metal2 and Metal3 is interrupted
by a small hafnium oxide layer. The Hafnium ox-
ide is responsible for resistive effect.
Figure 17: Schematic and implementation of RRAM cell.
PUF A very special non-volatile memory is a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). Such a
PUF cannot store a user defined value. It generates an individual identifier or secret key, e.g. 64
or 128 bit, for every device based on deviations in the production process. The goal of a PUF is
to generate a value which always is the same for a specific device at any time, independent of
operation conditions like temperature or voltage. Since the value of a PUF cannot be influenced
during fabrication, the value is individual to every device.
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Well known types of PUFs are the delay PUF and the SRAM PUF. One bit of the delay PUF
requires two identically implemented delay paths. In a race condition it is decided whether the
corresponding value is “0” or “1”. For an SRAM based PUF the initial value of the memory is
used. A time consuming post-processing, e.g. with support of BCH [45], of the initial value,
eliminates single bit faults.
2.6 Camouflaging Structures
“Camouflaging” in the context of ASICs means a type of security mechanism, which is able
to increase the effort for the reverse engineering. Additional structures without influence on
the behavior of the design are examples for such techniques. The effort during the reverse
engineering is increased for the attacker and it is to be assumed that the error rate is increased or
it is completely impossible to extract the netlist.
Another approach for a camouflaging technique is the use of a conductive or non-conductive
connection, which is not visible in optical inspection. In a microscope the attacker sees only a
flat view in 2D.
In the following camouflaging structures at different levels are explained. They are the basis
for the designed compare units CMP0 and CMP1 in this thesis. These units are a main feature
of this thesis.
2.6.1 Transistor Level
In the first step during ASIC fabrication the nmos and pmos transistor are produced. So the first
element of all layers in the ASIC production is the transistor. Even this device can be modified
in its functionality without changing the visual appearance. In [4] a permanently on transistor
is shown, which is helpful to confuse an attacker in a reverse engineering step. In an analogue
layout the transistor can be used to implement a circuit, which is always connected to power
on. An attacker would identify the transistor as power on and power off switching element. For
digital circuits the permanently on transistor can be used to implement logic gates with another
function as it looks like.
2.6.2 Logic Gate Level
In a standard digital library each cell has a specific layout as shown in Figure 18a. An experi-
enced designer is able to identify the functionality of each cell; this is required for successful
reverse engineering. In Figure 18b the optical view is shown, which means this is what in an
optical inspection can be seen. The appearance of the NOR and NAND cell differs clearly.
A countermeasure against reverse engineering is a digital standard cell library; within all
cells have a common layout, independent of its logical function. An example for such a library
is given in [5]. The NAND and NOR cells have the same layout in optical inspection. The
different between both cell types is the placement of implants at different positions. The implant
is used to build a conductive connection at a very low layer. It is not visible in optical techniques,
so that the function of the standard cell cannot be determined. In Figure 18c a layout of NOR
and NAND cell is shown. The n-well layer is marked in green and the active layer is marked
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in turquoise. Except of these two layers, both cells have an identical layout. Even in reverse
engineering with removing every metal layer, the n-well and active layer cannot be seen. So an
attacker gets the image, which is shown in Figure 18d.
The idea of the dummy contact is presented in [12]. It allows another camouflaging approach.
Between a transistor and the wiring metal layer a contact or a dummy contact is placed. In an
optical inspection is no difference between the conductive and non-conductive connection. A
very careful reverse engineering step is required to differentiate both types. In [62] the idea is
used, to implement a standard cell library. In a pure optical inspection the function of the cell
cannot be determined.
An advantage of such modified digital libraries is that these libraries are available from
foundries or specialized companies [43]. With such a library the design flow is equal to the
design flow for developing an “unsecure” ASIC1, the library is verified and support is given.
A disadvantage of this approach is the need to redesign of all cells into a design which looks
equal for all cell types. So the cell design is not specialized to its function anymore. This causes
an increased area consumption, power consumption and internal cell delay. In [62] a factor of 4
to 5 is given for area and power consumption. The delay is getting worse up to a factor of 1.6.
Furthermore it can be clearly seen, that special cells are used in a design and an attacker might
be more interested into the ASIC.
2.6.3 Wiring Level and Coating
A very simple type of protection mechanism against reverse engineering is the hiding of struc-
tures under wide metal stripes. This countermeasure works only in cases in which the attacker
does not remove each metal layer in polishing steps. In Figure 19 an example is given, in which
the wide stripe on metal 2 covers a part of the standard cells. In a visual inspection, it is not clear,
which cells are inverters and which cells are filler cells. As result it is unclear for an attacker in
Figure 19, whether the signal is inverted or just buffered.
A further protection mechanism is “coating”. It means that the whole die is covered by a metal
layer without any function for the signal routing, but it can be used for distributing the power
supply. In Figure 20a a microcontroller without a top metallization is shown. So, in Figure 20b
details of the digital standard cells can be seen in an optical inspection. The microcontroller in
Figure 20c has a full top metallization and details in metal layers below cannot be seen. Further-
more the top metal coating prevents simple laser attacks, in which the content of a memory is
influenced by a laser beam.
2.6.4 Conclusion
“Camouflaging” is a common approach to make the reverse engineering of an ASIC harder.
Some techniques like coating do not influence the power consumption, but digital standard cells
with a common layout influence the power consumption significantly, so that this approach is
not applicable in the area of battery powered devices. Nevertheless the high number of patents
in this area shows, that there is a big market.
1An “unsecure” ASIC means a design which does not include countermeasures against reverse engineering.
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(a) NOR and NAND standard cell in layout
view.
(b) NOR and NAND standard cell as visible
in optical inspection on an ASIC. Only
GatePoly and Metal1 are visible.
(c) NOR and NAND cell in camouflage tech-
nique. The layout of both cells is similar,
the difference in the functionality is made
by different active regions.
(d) NOR and NAND cell in camouflage tech-
nique in optical inspection on an ASIC.
Only GatePoly and Metal1 are visible, so
that the cells have the same appearance.
Layer mapping
Figure 18: Layout of NOR and NAND cell from IHP 0.25 µm standard cell library (Figure a
and b) and implemented in camouflage technique (Figure c and d). Figure c and d
reprinted from [5].
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(a) Placed digital standard cells, three in-
verters, one filler cell in the layout
view.
(b) Circuit as it looks like in optical in-
spection on an ASIC. The wide
Metal2 wire covers the cells, so that the
schematic of the circuit is not clearly
determinable.
Layer mapping
Figure 19: Simple camouflage technique at wiring level with IHP 0.25 µm standard cell library.
Without removing of metal layers, the type of each cell cannot be identified clearly.
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(a) Photography of a corner of a microcontroller. Bond pad area
(upper and left side) and area with digital standard cells and
their wiring is visible.
(b) Zoom of Figure 20a, so that two standard cell rows and a
wiring on Metal layer 2 and 3 are visible.
(c) Photography of a microcontroller. Bond pads and wide metal
stripes are visible only.
Figure 20: ASIC without and with top metal coating.
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3 State of the Art – Test and Debug
In the following section an overview of the post production test of ASICs, possible attacks and
countermeasures is given. Later in this thesis the secured scan interface are checked against
these attacks and the weak points of the countermeasures are analyzed.
3.1 Test
The post-production test verifies, that the produced devices fulfill a given specification and,
typically, it includes two types of tests. On one hand is the parametric electrical test. Already
in this test, some devices may fail due to shorts and opens of the pads or the leakage current is
larger than expected. On the other hand the device test is the functional verification of the logic
which covers most defects in transistors and connections. This is a very complex task compared
to the parametric test. For an extensive functional test after production controllability as well as
observability are a precondition.
Typically a simple functional test of a complex ASIC does not have a high test coverage and
requires a long test time in most cases. Such a test would be very slow and furthermore an
error analysis is very complicated. E.g. a pure functional test of a counter with a size of 32 bit
requires 4 billion clock cycles to verify that every bit can flip from “0” to “1”. Based on this lack
of a very time consuming functional test, explicit post-production tests are developed in 1960’s.
To support the post-production test two different approaches are very common. The first one is
the scan test [37], and the second one is an exhaustive self-test, called Built-In Self-Test (BIST)
[49].
3.1.1 Test vs. Security
Quality requirements of high-volume ASIC production can be fulfilled by post-production tests
only. Due to the fact that every ASIC has up to several million transistors, production errors
cannot be avoided. To ensure that the delivered devices are fully correct, a comprehensive test
of each device has to be done. From the economic point of view it is important to exclude defect
devices from further processing, to avoid additional costs.
To enable an efficient test, a scan chain is built into an ASIC in most cases. Such a scan chain
is easy to integrate and the test coverage is very high. Furthermore, a defect analysis is possible
and it can be used to optimize the production process and to increase the yield. The yield rate can
be improved by analyzing productions errors. For such an analysis, it has to be clearly identified
at which gate an error occurs more often. The design and input and output test pattern are put
into a software. The software compares the expected output and the received ones and calculates
the gate, which is responsible for the error.
The requirements for an extensive test and fault analyzing are contradicting to a secure design.
On one hand, an extensive test requires full access to any module in the device. On the other
hand, a secure design does not leak any information. Security leakages occur, if the scan chain
contains secret data, like a private key, or intermediate results, which can be used to retrieve the
secret data.
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A BIST compresses the output data to a minimum value. In its extreme form, only two output
signals, BIST done and BIST fail, are generated. This is a secure solution, but it does not give
any idea about any error. The only information provided is that at least one error has occurred
during self-test. It means that a BIST is not an option.
3.1.2 Scan Test
A well-known technique to support an efficient test is the insertion of a scan chain. The scan
test technology was introduced by Kobayashi in [37]. The design principle is the access to the
storage elements, especially flip flops, inside of ASIC with a minimum number of additional
pins. As result all flip flops are combined to a long shift register with external pins for input and
output. This shift register is called “scan chain”. An example for scan chain insertion is given
in Figure 21a and 21b. The first figure shows a circuit after synthesis without scan flip flops, the
second figure shows a circuit, in which the combinatorial logic is unchanged, but all flip flops
are replaced by scan flip flops. To test a device this scan chain is used to shift in a predefined
pattern, apply one working clock cycle and compare the output with computed results.
A well testable design has test coverage of more than 99 % for stuck-at faults. To reach
such a value, almost all flip flops of the design have to be replaced by scan flip flops and they
become part of a scan chain. Since a scan chain is a large shift register the device has a high
controllability because the input of each register can be set individually, independent of other
flip flops. The observability is very high as well; because of output of the large shift register is
connected to an output pad of the device.
This technique can be used to identify different types of faults like stuck-at and delay faults
or opens and shorts. In the corresponding test pattern generator the fault models are set and the
required test patterns are calculated. Since the functional test of a 32 bit counter, requires several
billion clock cycles, an exhaustive post-production test using a scan chain is much faster. The
example design requires 2,475 clock cycles only to test the device on stack-at faults.
Stuck-at faults can be found by a simple test vector, but delay faults are more complicated to
identify. Delay faults and their test require more than one test vector and it has to be executed at
the same clock frequency as the one for which the ASIC was designed.
Integrating a scan chain into an ASIC is a straight-forward task for a standard design. The
input and output pins can be shared with functional pins of the device. Only the scan_enable
pin has to be a separate input pin. Furthermore, it is possible to combine the scan chain with an
JTAG interface as shown in Section 2.3.
Many tools like TetraMax (Synopsys) [78] or Encounter DFT Architect (Cadence) [9] support
the scan insertion and test pattern generation for the given fault models. Flip flops within a design
are replaced by “scan flip flops” as shown in Figure 21 but the logic is untouched. Only the type
of the flip flops is changed, which is a well applicable task. Figure 21a shows the differences
between a normal flip flop and scan flip flop in Figure 21b. A standard flip flop is extended by a
multiplexer at the data input. The scan_enable signal controls the multiplexer and switches
the design from functional mode to scan mode and vice versa. In functional mode the flip flop
gets its data from the combinatorial logic. If the scan_enable signal is asserted, the scan flip
flop receives its data from output of preceding scan flip flop. The timing of the scan_enable
signal is uncritical so that many flip flops are controllable without a large buffer tree.
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The additional multiplexer at the input influences the timing of the storage element. This is
the only point where the timing is getting worse during the scan insertion.
In some cases a flip flop cannot be integrated into a scan chain. For example, inside of a clock
controller with clock divider because the clock signal is fed through this component and the
clock signal has to be stable for the while duration of the test. So, the clock controller is tested
by a small functional test, e.g. setting different clock frequencies and a verification step in which
the adjusted frequency is observed.
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(a) Flip flops and combinatorial logic.
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(b) Scan flip flop and combinatorial logic
Figure 21: Design without and with scan flip flops
The following sequence is illustrated in Figure 22, which has to be executed to perform a scan
test. The execution of the scan test is done in the following way:
1. Set scan enable signal
2. Apply scan input data and one clock cycle for each data value
3. Release scan enable signal
4. Apply one clock cycle
5. Set scan enable signal
6. Apply a clock cycle for each data value / flip flop and read the output
All flip flops in a scan chain can be filled with any data. Afterwards one working clock cycle
is executed, which is the shortest execution window in an ASIC. At the end the content of any
flip flop can be read out. The difference in the data, before and after applying the clock cycle,
30
1 2 3 4 5 6
Clock ... ...
Scan_enable ... ...
Scan_in 1101...0101 (n bit)
Scan_out 1110...1100 (n bit)
Shift scan data in for n 
clock cycles in scan mode
Shift scan data out for n clock 
cycles in scan mode
1 clock cycle in 
execution 
mode 
(capture)
Figure 22: Waveform of scan test. The number of clock cycles n is equal to the number of flip
flops in the scan chain.
allows to draw conclusions about the combinational functions. The design is full controllable
and it can be analyzed, independent of a test engineer or an attacker performs the access.
3.1.3 Built-In Self-Test
A BIST is used for the self-test of a device. Two different approaches are known for such a
BIST, on one hand the offline [49] and on the other hand the online test [10]. In an offline test
a special test mode is entered and the test is executed. This means that in this time the device is
not in operation mode.
A device test during operation mode is called “online BIST”. This self-checking mechanism
can be divided into two different categories. In concurrent mode a duplication and comparison
is performed during the operation. In a non-concurrent online test the idle time of a device is
used to test the device. Special diagnostic routines in software are executed, but they can be
interrupted at any time to switch back in normal operation mode.
To implement an offline BIST functionality of an ASIC, four additional circuits have to be
built into the device. In Figure 23 an approach for an offline test is shown. The JTAG interface
can be used to set the BIST configuration inside the BIST controller, starting and read of the
result. In the pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) the input data for the internal scan
chains is generated. A Multiple-Input Signature Register (MISR) is used as compactor module
and compare unit and it checks the result with the expected value.
As an advantage it can be seen that a BIST is a test with a low effort during the test procedure.
It is not necessary to apply a set of long test vectors to the device, instead a command, send via
JTAG, starts the test. After test execution a single bit informs about pass or fail of the device. A
standard BIST implementation does not have any diagnostics capability. Furthermore the time
to test could be longer and the additional hardware overhead could be high for an exhaustive
test. But such a test does not send data to the output ports, so that the risk for a security leakage
is minimal.
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Figure 23: Core with all components, which are required for an ofﬂine BIST test. The addi-
tional components are marked in blue. A PRNG works as pattern generator and an
MISR is a compressor unit to verify results. The JTAG interface is responsible for
communication with test equipment.
Nevertheless a BIST is a useful replenishment to a scan test. To get a certiﬁcate of FIPS140-3,
level 3, [57] beside an extensive post-production test, a self-checking of the device is required.
3.2 Scan Chain Attacks
Different scan chain attacks are published, for example in [87] and [54]. A simple scan chain at-
tack writes and reads registers through the scan chain shift register, followed by a data extraction
and analysis.
It is obvious from the description of scan test in Section 3.1.2 that all registers can be ﬁlled
with attacker determined data. If the scan_enable signal is released and one clock cycle is
performed, exactly one internal logic operation was executed. After such a working phase the
data of all registers can be read out. This could be one possible and very simple attack by misuse
the scan interface.
The CMOS technology has the property, the clock frequency of an ASIC can be reduced from
its target frequency into the range of kHz or less. As long as the power supply is connected, the
ASIC is in its current state including the data in SRAM and registers. So a low-budget micro-
controller can be used to generate the signals for clock, reset, scan_in, scan_enable
and scan_out to initiate an attack, even at low speed.
In Figure 24 a possible setup is shown. The host PC can be used to prepare input data.
The microcontroller receives commands and data from the host, converts them into the protocol
format of the scan chain interface. Finally the microcontroller forwards the output from the
DUA to the host PC. There a comprehensive analysis of the data is possible.
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Figure 24: Simple setup for a scan chain attack with Host PC as user interface and microcon-
troller for signal generation.
3.2.1 Scan Chain Attack – Preparation and Duration
Since the debug interface of a device is often well documented, details of the scan chain are not
typically published. Nevertheless, with additional information, which are public available, the
structure of the scan chain can be determined. This is necessary to perform an attack.
The data sheet of an ASIC provides pin information, so that scan_enable pin can be
identiﬁed with a high probability. Setting the scan_enable pin and a clock signal on the
corresponding clock input, the attacker is able to ﬁnd out the scan data out pins. On these pins
a more or less random data pattern is visible. Now, the scan input pins are easy to identify. On
each input pin of the device a predeﬁned pattern, e.g. 0, 1, 0..., is applied. After a certain time,
this pattern is shifted out on the scan data output pins. Now, the scan chain interface is fully
determined. At this point the structure of the scan chain is still unknown. The length of each
scan chain can be determined by applying a known pattern at the scan input and counting clock
cycles until the pattern appears on the scan data output. In the last step a detailed analysis is
necessary. Flip ﬂops which are in focus of the attacker have to be identiﬁed. E.g. an encryption
can be executed and the content of the ﬂip ﬂops is observed via scan chain to identify the ﬂip
ﬂops which are involved into the encryption scheme. Based on this knowledge an attack can be
performed, for example to extract the secret key.
To conclude the following steps are necessary to determine the scan chain properties:
1. Extract information from data sheet to identify scan_enable pin
2. Apply unique input pattern at each input and observe output pins
3. Assign scan input to corresponding scan output
4. Determine length of each scan chain
5. Assign relevant ﬂip ﬂops to its property and position in scan chain
3.2.2 Example of Scan Chain Attack
It is important to know, how a scan chain attack can be performed to get a feeling, why an
unprotected scan chain is dangerous. In [87] the authors show a straight-forward attack on a
DES implementation. But the DES algorithm is outdated, so in the following an attack onto a
secure cipher algorithm is described.
Starting point for an example scan chain attack is a straight forward AES implementation
with a scan chain. Clearly all other types of cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable for such an
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attack if no countermeasures are applied. The AES algorithm is explained in [40] and the chosen
implementation for the attack is described in [86]. The AES in this example is implemented for
WSN and the secret key is stored in a NVM and the NVM cannot be read from outside. The area
is very small and every step of the algorithm is performed in one clock cycle as shown in Figure
25. In the first clock cycle the AddKey operation is done, in the next one the S-Box operation
and so on.
Figure 25: AES Implementation. Data as well as key are processed in a 4x4 byte matrix. Starting
point for attack is AddKey operation. Each arrow accords to one clock cycle.
A scan chain is inserted and it is possible to switch from functional mode to scan test without
any restriction, which means that no countermeasures for scan chain attacks are integrated. From
the view of an attacker this has the advantage that the encryption or decryption operation is
interruptible after the first AddKey operation. The data register contains input data XOR the
secret key. Since the input data is known, the key can be recalculated by an XOR operation with
known input data. In addition the attack is supported by a poor implementation. A well designed
implementation avoids such beginner’s mistake.
To illustrate the simplicity of an attack on an unprotected device, a possible attack is described
in detail: After a reset the data for encryption is written into the device. The best choice for the
input data is “0...0”. The structure of the scan chain is unknown at the moment, so the data is
written in using the standard interface. After one clock cycle the clock is stopped, because
in the current state the flip flops contain data XOR key. With use of the scan chain the register
values are shifted out. This intermediate value is the secret key, but the bit order is not known
at the moment. To determine the correct bit order, in a next step a chosen plain text attack is
required. The sequence is the same as in the first step. A data block for encryption is written
into the core, after one clock cycle, the intermediate result is read out per scan interface. In sum
128 test patterns are necessary and in each pattern one bit position is set on “1” and all others on
“0”. A short analysis identifies the corresponding bit position of the key in the output data.
This straight forward attack is quite simple. With well-prepared equipment and an existing
setup, such an attack can be performed in some seconds for a known device. The attack can be
done by using a cheap microcontroller, which controls the scan interface. High-end equipment
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like a high resolution oscilloscope is not required, because all signals are digital and no analogue
data has to be analyzed.
3.2.3 Complex Scan Chain Attacks
On first inspection a scan test approach with test response compaction is not susceptible to scan
chain attacks. However, in [17] a way is shown to get the secret key from a device, which uses
test response compaction. The effort for such an attack is much higher than described in Section
3.2 and consists of four steps:
1. Create device model for logic simulation
2. Create look-up table with secret key values and corresponding compacted test response
3. Perform scan test and read out compacted test response
4. Search in the look-up table to get the secret key
The disadvantages, from attackers view, are the complexity and that the implementation de-
tails and the used test compaction scheme have to be known. In case of modern cryptographic
algorithms with a long key, like AES or ECC, the look-up table would be so large that is impos-
sible to create it. Nevertheless, such an attack is possible, e.g. for cryptographic algorithms with
short keys or in case the key handling is divided in several parts.
3.2.4 Board Internal Scan Chain Attack
In case of scan chain attacks mostly external attacks are in mind. This means that an attacker
uses, e.g. the JTAG connector on PCB to manipulate the ASIC or to get secret information. A
complex PCB can have several ASICs which are combined via JTAG to fulfill test requirements.
It is possible that one or two of these ASICs are owned by an attacker as shown on Figure 26.
So an attack on an ASIC on a PCB is possible without any external access. It causes that the
following attacks are possible, which are described in [63] in detail:
• Sniff and store signals on JTAG path
• Modify signals on JTAG path during test
• Initiate communication between devices
To sniff the data from the JTAG chain is a very simple task, if the attacker’s ASIC is part of
the JTAG chain. During a scan test several megabytes of data are transferred. Such an amount
of data can be stored in a NVM for later processing and analysis, because the memories which
are on the market are very large. During post-production test the ASIC of the attacker is able to
modify the input data and the response values of all other ASICs on the PCB. So, e.g., an error
affected device can be declared as error-free. The most dangerous situation comes up, if one
device initiates a communication using the JTAG interface while the application runs. A secret
key can be in a register which is accessible via JTAG and so the attacker is able to get the secret
key.
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Figure 26: JTAG PCB internal attack. The ﬁrst involved attacker sends stimulating data to the
victim and the second involved attacker stores the output of the victim in its memory.
Figure adapted from [63].
3.2.5 Conclusion
Scan chain attacks against unprotected devices are easy to perform. A digital interface is used
to stimulate the design as well as to read out data. In most other Side-Channel Analysis (SCA)
like Electro Magnetic (EM) attack or measuring the power consumption, the output from the
measurement is an analogue value. It has to be interpreted and mapped to digital signals. The
probability of an error in this step is high because the interpretation is based on a noisy analogue
value. In case of a direct read access of the scan chain interface, the output is digital already
and it cannot be interpreted in a wrong manner. Even unusual attacks are possible like the board
internal attack, in which ASICs as part of the JTAG chain are involved.
3.3 Secure Scan Techniques, Countermeasures and Attacks
Countermeasures against scan chain attacks are manifold. They are divided into destructive and
non-destructive protection mechanisms and Figure 27 gives an overview. Every solution has its
own advantages and disadvantages. A destroying approach like disable the scan chain interface
by a fuse bit is highly secure. A type of physical attack is necessary to re-enable the scan chain
interface.
Other solutions require a secret key to enable the interface or the output of the scan chain is
scrambled in a pseudo-random way. The most complex solutions are using an authentication
scheme with well-deﬁned standardized cryptographic algorithms. All these solutions have in
common that additional hardware is required to establish a protection mechanism against side
channel attacks via the scan chain interface. A general overview of existing solutions is given in
[29], [11] and [16].
Possible countermeasures, which are explained and compared in detail below, are:
• Logical modiﬁed scan chain
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Figure 27: Classification of countermeasures against scan chain attacks.
• Fuse bit
• Non-accessible key
• Compression technique
• Lock and key technique
• Authentication based security mechanism
• Encrypted scan chain channel
• BIST
3.3.1 Preventing Physical Access
The first idea to prevent a scan chain of undesired access is to prevent the access to the test pads.
The test of the DUT is done at wafer level and in the following packaging step the scan chain
pads are not connected to an external pin by a bond wire. Unfortunately this countermeasure
can be bypassed very easy. An example for this attack is given in Figure 28 and this device is
extracted from a smart card. The function of every external pin is documented in a standard
[34]. At first the cover, made of plastic is removed and the die can be seen as shown in Figure
28a. An inspection under a microscope shows unbounded pads, which are probably pins for
testing. The device can be unpacked, as shown in Figure 28 and all pads are bonded on a small
PCB with low effort. After rebonding the test pins are accessible. The pin assignment of the
non-documented pins can be identified by an experienced engineer, as described in Section 3.2
and internal information can be read out.
A further option after a wafer level test is cutting the test pads. This solution is not suitable
for many designs. A whole edge has to be cut, which can be a lot of silicon area and this is
expensive. In Figure 29 the design principle is shown. The I/O pad ring is extended by an
additional row with three pads which are required for a scan chain test. After the test these pads
are cut. In the given example in Figure 29 the die has a size of 4 mm2 and additional 0.3 mm2
are required for the test pads.
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(a) ASIC of a smart card still covered with epoxy. Some
pins are bonded with wires and some not bonded test
pins, which are marked in red.
(b) Fully unpackaged ASIC of a smart
card. The epoxy and bond wires are
removed. The small dot, marked in
red, at the lower pad comes from a nee-
dle, which was used in post-production
test.
Figure 28: Unpackaged smart card
3.3.2 Scan Detection
While all other solutions proposed are countermeasures against scan chain attacks, the spy flip
flop [28] is a detection circuit only. The designer has to decide, which action is done in case of
an unexpected scan test, which could be a scan chain attack. Possible activities inside the ASIC
are deletion of secret key memory or a general reset of the device.
Figure 30 shows a simple but effective solution to detect events along the scan chain. The
shift detection circuit consists of a flip flop with a fixed input value (e.g. “1”), which is part of
the scan chain. The output of the flip flop is input to combinatorial logic. This logic tests the
output on “1” or “0”. The value “0” can only be reached if a flip flop of the scan shift register
has a “0” propagated to the spy flip flop. To ensure that a scan chain attack can be recognized for
both cases (“0” and “1”) a detection circuit should be integrated. The integration is possible at
RTL so it is technology independent with a very low area overhead. Nevertheless it is not clear
why the spy flip flops are necessary because the scan chain itself is enabled by the scan enable
signal only. So it is sufficient to observe the scan enable signal.
3.3.3 Modified scan chain
This security mechanism is based on “security by obscurity”. The input and output pins of
the scan chain are not disabled. In fact the input and output values are different from a design
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Figure 29: Principle of test pads to cut. The pad ring in green is the I/O interface of the ASIC
and the additional row (marked in blue) contains the test pads. They are cut after the
test.
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Figure 30: Detection circuit for scan chain use. The additional scan flip flop with a fixed data
input, marked in blue, sets an alert if the shift register mode is used. Figure adapted
from [28].
without the logical modified scan chain. Since the functionality of the ASIC is not changed,
the long shift register of the scan chain is adapted. An attacker is confused because a mapping
between input and output data does not deliver meaningful results.
A solution for a secure scan test with a very low area overhead is proposed in [66]. The scan
chain is extended by inverters in between some flip flops to influence the input and output data
of the scan chain as shown in Figure 31. The designer knows the positions of them and is able
to adapt the test patterns. The inverter in front of the flip flop requires that the corresponding
bit value, and all following, in the test pattern are flipped. The functional operation mode is
not influenced in this case with one exception. Some designs use shift registers, e.g. in an
SPI [52]. Scan insertion tools are optimized so that for a shift register no special scan chain is
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inserted. Instead the shift register itself is used. The DFT designer has to consider this point and
to exclude the addition of inverters in a functional shift register.
For an attacker it is possible to identify the inverters as part of the scan chain in the following
way. At first a chain of zeros is written into the core in scan mode. In the next step the functional
mode is used. A simple read operation on readable registers delivers a zero for registers without
inverter in front of the flip flop and one for registers with an inverter in front of the flip flop.
Furthermore the approach works as “security by obscurity” so that in case of reverse engineering
the inverters are visible and it can be considered by the attacker. During the implementation the
designer has to keep in mind that the number of inserted inverters is even. Otherwise if an
odd number of inverters is used, is very obvious for an attacker that there is a countermeasure
built-in.
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Figure 31: Logical obfuscation of the scan chain. Inverters, marked in blue, are inserted into
the shift register path. An attacker does not know the number and the position of the
inverters and the output of the scan chain is useless, because the data is modified.
Figure adapted from [66].
3.3.4 Fuse Bit
A fuse bit is a suitable solution to deactivate a scan chain after the test procedure. It does not
matter, whether a fuse or an anti-fuse is used for this purpose. Both types of fuses is common that
they are blown once, the process cannot be reversed. In [58] the authors show a security mech-
anism, in which the scan_enable signal and/or the scan input and output are protected with
the use of a fuse element. In Figure 32 an example is shown, in which every scan_enable
input is protected by a fuse element.
In [53] the use of one or more EEPROM cells is described. Unfortunately the stored bits in an
EEPROM can be erased, even if countermeasures are implemented. X-ray radiation can be used
to delete the content of EEPROM cells [38]. The trapped electrons in the floating-gate transistor
are removed during an x-ray treatment.
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Figure 32: Fuse cells, marked in blue, for scan_enable input for each scan flip flop to deac-
tivate the scan functionality after post production test. Figure reprinted from [58].
3.3.5 Non-accessible Secret Information
This type of countermeasure prevents a direct access to the secret key register of a cryptographic
core, because they are not part of the scan chain. In the following two different approaches are
described.
The Mirror Key Register (MKR) approach integrates a mirrored register as shown in Figure
33, which replaces the secret key register during a scan test. The proposed solution in [88] and
[89] is declared as solution for cryptographic cores. If a scan test is performed the key for the test
comes from the MKR. The secret key from system mode is never used in test mode. Therefore
it is protected against scan test attacks.
This solution is implementable on RTL and it does not require any modification of the syn-
thesized netlist. The MKR approach is well realizable, because the control structure is straight-
forward and the complexity is low. The scan patterns can be generated by standard software
tools. Furthermore the power consumption is not influenced significantly, if clock gating is im-
plemented. In a reverse engineering step the MKR is visible. But for an attacker this information
is not helpful to disable the security feature. There is no secret key used and reverse engineering
does not help to bypass this countermeasure. However, there is one exception for the security
of reverse engineering. In case that the secret key for system mode is stored in combinational
logic, it can be read out. But this problem occurs in all situations if the secret key is stored in
that way.
The disadvantage of the solution is that the application area is restricted to cryptographic
cores, especially to standalone modules. For SoCs, e.g., a processor and connected crypto-
graphic cores, this approach is not suitable, since an interaction between the processor and the
cryptographic core is possible so that a copy of the secret key is stored in registers of the proces-
sor.
Moreover, the use of MKR decreases the test coverage. In a typical scan test, the flip flops
are tested implicitly. In this solution, only the mirror key registers are tested but not the register
with the secret key. To test these register, a functional test has to be performed additionally.
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Depending on the implementation the additional area is up to several per cent. For example
the size of the AES implementation, described in [86] would be increased by 8 %. The size
of the core is 323,000 µm2 in IHP 0.25 µm technology. For an MKR, one multiplexer and one
register are required for each bit of the 128 bit secret key. A flip flop has as an area of 155 µm2
and a multiplexer has an area of 49 µm2. In sum the additional area is more than 26,000 µm2.
Furthermore, a speed test is not possible, since of the logic paths in test mode are not equal to
the logic paths in non-test mode.
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Figure 33: The design contains two types of flip flops. The scan flip flops are used during test
mode, the flip flops without scan functionality, marked in blue, are used in operation
mode. Figure adapted from [88].
In contrast to MKR the solution in [71], shown in Figure 34, does not use a register to protect
the AES core. In case that the JTAG interface gets a scan test request, a fake key is loaded into
the secret key register. Due to the fact, that the fake key is a fixed value with zeros for all key
bits, the area overhead is very small. Furthermore the authors implemented a special function,
which prevents interrupting of an ongoing encryption. So, an access to intermediate results is
not possible, which would be a leakage. The authors describe, that the use of a fixed fake key has
the disadvantage that the key is fixed during all tests. So they evaluated different keys regarding
the test coverage and in the end, a fixed key with all zeros results in the highest test coverage.
Independent of the small area overhead this solution seems not very practicable because the test
coverage is decreased slightly. The process for the search of a key with high test coverage is a
very time consuming. Furthermore the solution is not generic, so that is usable for cryptographic
cores.
3.3.6 Compression Techniques
The characteristic of compression technique is that scan data input and output are compressed. In
contrast to the BIST the input and output data are feed into the DUT and they are not generated
inside of the ASIC. A compression for output data reduces the amount of direct analyzable
information. The highest compression rate would be achieved by a single bit output for the
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Figure 34: The AES implementation is enhanced by an additional multiplexer and the fake key
component. In case of a scan chain test, the JTAG controller selects the fake key as
input for the subkey generator. The additional components for the secure scan test
are marked in blue.
whole test. A “0” or “1” informs about an unsuccessful or successful test. The amount of
additional information for the user as well as for the attacker is equal to zero, because this is a
lossy compression technique. The security level is very high, but a fault analysis is not possible.
In case that the compression algorithm is known and the compression is lossless, it is possible
to gain information of the uncompressed data and to perform known scan chain attacks. In
Figure 35 a very simple compression mechanism is shown. This approach does not provide any
security. A design with a given number of scan chains is modiﬁed to a design, which contains
more of them. The number of scan in and out pins is equal. A compression and decompression
unit is added to the design. E.g., in the example given in Figure 35, a 3 bit input drives 8 scan
chains. The compression causes a reduction of the required scan vectors. The components are
inserted by the DFT tool and the compression scheme is well documented. A successful scan
chain attack against an AES implementation with a compression scheme is described in [22].
A compression test for an AES in a pipelined version is shown in [67]. The implementation
consists of ten identical modules, one for each round. Due to the fact that the scan chain in every
module is the same, the scan data input and scan data output is the same, too. A comparator
checks the output of every module as shown in Figure 36. In case of any deviation an error the
compare unit sets a corresponding signal. The error signal allows identifying the test vector, but
not the module which fails. A diagnostic capability can be added by an additional component.
This component allows enabling of the scan test for each module separately. In case of an error,
each module can be excluded from the scan test. If the defect module is disabled, no error is
signalized.
The advantage of this solution is that very few information is available for an attacker and
direct read access to intermediate results is not possible. A special design helps to identify
which round module is responsible for the error and which logic gate inside of the round module
has been damaged during production. Since every round module is equal to the other modules,
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Figure 35: Comparison: scan chain vs. compressed scan chain.
the time for generating test patterns is decreased signiﬁcantly, because the test pattern are the
same for all modules. Even the time to test is reduced.
The disadvantage is that the solution is only suitable for circuits having a regular structure
with equal modules inside. Every module has to be fully identical to the other ones. Not only
the logic structure, but also connection between the scan ﬂip ﬂops. For designs, which are not
timing critical, the schematic of each module is equal to the other one. But in case of a timing
critical design, a reordering of the scan chain is a possible optimization. Thereby in layout
process the serial scan path between all ﬂip ﬂops is adapted. As result the schematic is changed
slightly. Nevertheless such a small modiﬁcation prohibits the use of the described compression
method.
3.3.7 Lock and Key Technique
The main characteristic of the lock and key technique is the use of a secret key. Every counter-
measure, which enables access to the test port with a password, is classiﬁed as “lock and key
technique”.
Two different approaches are known. In the ﬁrst case the device contains a golden key and
only if the test engineer enters the correct key, the interface is enabled. In the second case the
interface is always on. The secret key is used to encrypt and decrypt the input and output data of
the scan interface. A similar technique uses public private key authentication. Such techniques
are described in Section 3.3.8 in detail.
In [41] and [42] the author describes a key-based authentication scheme for the scan test.
Without the correct secret key, the output of the scan chains is scrambled. The scan chain
is divided into several sub chains. Although the design has internally many sub chains the
interface to the outside is the same as before as shown in Figure 37. The additional scrambler
unit is responsible for sorting the output of the sub chains. To test the device the secret key is
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Figure 36: Pipelined AES implementation, one module for each round, and an internal compare
unit, marked in blue, for the scan chain output. The compare unit compresses the
output to a minimum value. Only a pass or fail signal is generated. Figure reprinted
from [67].
put into the device. If the secret key is correct, the serial data stream at the scan data pin is right
order. In the case that the secret key is wrong the output of all sub chains is scrambled by the
multiplexer, which is controlled by an LFSR. In the case of multiple scan chains, this step is
performed for each scan chain separately.
The protection mechanism has two different states. On the one hand the insecure state, this is
the default after a reset of the device. On the other hand the secure state which is entered after the
correct secret key is put into the device. The LFSR is the key feature of the proposed solution
and it controls a multiplexer. The multiplexer combines all sub chains to a single propagated
output. One requirement of the LFSR is that every sub chain has to be selected and its output
is propagated to the scan data out before any sub chain is selected again. Otherwise the time to
test increases signiﬁcantly.
The advantage of this solution is that test pattern generation is possible using standard tools
and a post processing is not required. Only one additional test vector has to be generated which
writes the secret key before the scan test is initiated. If the correct key is written into the device
the output vectors on the scan data output pins are equal to the generated vectors from the test
pattern generator. The additional overhead is restricted to the additional time which is required
at the beginning of the scan test to feed the secret key into the device. The application of this
solution requires an adaption of the netlist. One scan chain is replaced by several scan chains and
an LFSR and a controller is added. Changing the netlist can cause some errors, so comprehensive
veriﬁcation is necessary. In case of a wrong key the input and output is not blocked and data can
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be shifted in and out. In principle due to the scrambled scan chain the output data are useless,
but in best case no data is available at the scan data output pins.
Scan_in[0]
Scan_in[1]
Scan_in[2]
Scan_out[0]
Scan_out[1]
Scan_out[2]
Core
Secret Key
Scrambler
n-to-3
0...n
3-to-n
...
Figure 37: Lock and key technique for scan chain protection. Without the correct secret key, the
output of all scan chains is scrambled in a pseudo-random way. Figure adapted from
[41].
The proposed solution has disadvantages. At first the system is not safe against reverse en-
gineering. The implementation is time-consuming because a suitable LFSR has to be found.
Furthermore a wrong secret key does not lock the input as well as the output of the test interface.
Therefore it is possible to write and read data although the data is scrambled. This data can be
used to perform an attack.
In [11] a solution for the JTAG standard IEEE 1500 is shown. In Figure 38 an overview of the
solution is given. A direct access from the boundary scan register to the scan chain is removed.
At the beginning of the scan chain test using the JTAG interface, a secret key has to be written
into the device. This key is compared to the internal golden key. In case of a granted access the
AND gates get a logical “1” from the security controller and the access to the internal signals
is possible. To keep the additional overhead as low as possible, the golden key is not stored
directly within the device. Instead the golden key is generated using an LFSR in combination
with the registers which are already part of the JTAG controller. The advantage of this solution,
is the sharing of existing resources (flip flops). Therefore the overhead is very low. Diagnostic
tests are possible to identify production defects. The disadvantage is that the interface is usable
at any time if the secret key is known. Furthermore a reverse engineering is possible. In this step
the implementation of the LFSR can be extracted and the secret key can be determined.
3.3.8 Authentication based Security Mechanism
In an authentication based security mechanism, the device contains a public key and the test
engineer has the corresponding private key. Only with a matching key pair the access is granted.
Compared to the lock and key technique from Section 3.3.7 the solution is robust against reverse
engineering. An extracted public key is useless, since the corresponding private key cannot be
derived from the public key.
46
Figure 38: Lock and key technique for IEEE 1500. Additional AND gates between boundary
scan register and core are used to control the access to the core internals. The addi-
tional required components to implement the security mechanism are marked in blue.
Figure adapted from [11].
In [60] and [61] an authentication based security system is introduced, which uses the JTAG
interface. The approach is shown in Figure 39. The access monitors allow fine granular right
management so that e.g. one user is allowed to use the scan chain but another user is only able to
update the content of a NVM. The approach can be used with different authentication schemes
and it is proposed to use a server based authentication protocol, which is shown in Figure 40.
Such an adaptable dynamic user management allows to drop out a doubtful user from the list,
restrict the access or to enhance the rights of a user. It is required that a private key is stored into
the device. A controller is responsible for the protocol handling. Therefore the individual right
management provides as many privilege levels as required. Each scan chain has its own security
mechanism and a memory controller restricts the access according to the privilege level for each
address range. An access monitor enables the corresponding components. The required area is
significant. For this specific implementation an area of 74,681 GE is used.
In [19] a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-based authentication is presented. Beside the
PUF generator, a PRNG, memory and controller are required. After production every device
generates a challenge-response pair and the challenge is a random value. The response of the
device is based on the challenge and PUF value. After this step the read access to the PUF
element is disabled, e.g., by blowing a fuse bit. The authentication protocol was developed in
such a way, that it prevents replay attacks. Since replay attacks are not possible, this solution is
suitable to avoid attacks on a PCB as described in Section 3.2.4. The authors of [19] describe the
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solution explicitly for cryptographic cores, but the approach is applicable to any design. The area
overhead is small, around 3,000 GE, and the timing of the scan chain itself is not influenced.
Although the approach is for an SoC, the enroll phase seems to be very expensive and time-
consuming. Furthermore, a PUF is required and the test engineer has to trust the PUF database.
However, it is a secure solution also for various devices in one JTAG onto a PCB.
A further authentication mechanism is described in [18]. An ECC based protocol is imple-
mented and allows an authentication of the device as well as the user. The hardware implemen-
tation of the ECC core has a very high area overhead and the initial setup time is high too. After
finishing the complex protocol the input and output of the scan chain is handled without any
encryption.
Figure 39: Authentication based security extension for a JTAG interface. The additional compo-
nents are marked in blue and they offer a fine granular access management due to the
use of an integrated access monitor for the memory bus. Figure adapted from [60].
3.3.9 Encrypted Scan Channel
As described in Section 3.2 attacks against a PCB along a JTAG chain are possible. To get a
secure test environment for specific devices on the PCB a high effort is required [63]. A full
encrypted channel is established between the DUT and the test environment. This includes:
• Authentication
• Encrypted communication channel
• Integrity check
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Figure 40: Message exchange for authentication based security extension for a JTAG interface
to establish an access to internal scan chain and memory. Figure reprinted from [60].
Fuse bits, which are set in the factory, generate a unique identifier. A feature is that each device
in the JTAG chain establishes a fully encrypted data channel to the test environment. In the setup
phase the secret keys between test environment and ASIC are shared. In the communication
phase the data stream between tester and ASIC is encrypted and a Message Authentication
Code (MAC) is added to verify the source of the data. Different types of attacks like sniffing of
data or man-in-the-middle are effectively prevented using this countermeasure.
The additional area overhead is high, more than 126,000 GE are required. Furthermore an
initial communication protocol is needed to establish the secured channel before every test. For
this, a time of roughly 2,200 clock cycles has to be considered.
3.3.10 Offline BIST
A BIST is a well-known test technique as described in Section 3.1.3. The communication to the
test environment is restricted to few signals like start, stop and fail.
An example for an offline BIST for a general purpose CPU is given in [74]. The authors
use modules which are available in the device to generate test pattern and to compact the test
result. The generated test patterns are a serial bit stream which is used as stimuli of an internal
scan chain. The idea is usable in a design with a general purpose CPU, because an accumulator
and a register with feedback are required. Even the response compaction after the internal scan
test is done using an adder and register of the CPU. This means that the adder-register unit or
the register has to be twice in a circuit to generate the test pattern and to perform the response
compaction. The disadvantages are that the adder and the register cannot be part of the scan
chain and the defect analysis is very complicated. Like in every other BIST the test pattern are
generated internally. This causes that much test patterns have to be generated to reach high test
coverage.
In [65] a BIST is analyzed with focus on cryptographic cores in general. The block cipher
3WAY [15] is used to show an example implementation for this test approach. An LFSR as
shown in Figure 41 is used to generate the pseudo random input data and a control unit feeds this
data into the key generator and into the data registers. An encryption or decryption is performed
and the result is fed into a MISR and the result is compressed and shifted out. This output
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is compared to expected data and the ASIC can be classified as “pass” or “fail”. The authors
describe that 20 encryption and 20 decryption operations are required to reach a test coverage of
more than 99 %. The advantage of the solution is, that no data transfer in type of a scan chain
is necessary. In contrast the disadvantage is that the approach is specialized for cryptographic
cores and not for general purpose CPUs. Furthermore the design has to be analyzed with a high
effort to get a high test coverage and not in every case such a high test coverage seems to be
possible.
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Figure 41: Offline BIST integrated in 3WAY block cipher. Additional components for test are
marked in blue. LFSRs generate input data and MISR compresses the data output.
Figure adapted from [65].
3.3.11 Online BIST
IP core dependent solutions are introduced here which are not based on scan chain test. For
example in [56] an on-line self-test of an AES core is described. The assumption is that the
S-Boxes are the main element within the design and have to be checked for errors. The authors
chose an AES implementation in which the S-Box and the flip flops are combined in one module
and them argument that this module requires 85 % of the area. The later parts of the AES
algorithm are AddKey, ShiftRow and MixColumn and they are untested.
Four S-Boxes are implemented in the design. For the on-line test, an additional S-Box with
flip flops is added as shown in Figure 42. This S-Box is used to check the other ones. It gets
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the same input data as the S-Box which should be tested. Both outputs are compared. In case of
different results an error occurred. To test every S-Box the additional S-Box checks all S-Boxes
in the design in a cyclic way.
The advantage of this solution is a fast on-line test, but the disadvantages are dominant. The
test coverage is by far less than 99 %, an error analysis is not possible and the solution is spe-
cialized for the AES. The additional overhead is more than 21 % in contrast to an off-line scan
test which requires an additional overhead of less than 10 %.
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Figure 42: Online BIST in an AES implementation. A redundant S-Box and a compare unit,
marked in blue, are added to the design. All four S-Boxes are tested in a cyclic way.
Figure adapted from [56].
3.3.12 Discussion
In Table 1 countermeasures against scan chain attacks and their evaluation are shown. Different
types of countermeasures are available. Each of the described approaches has its advantages as
well as disadvantages.
A countermeasure which is independent of the design can be easy ported to another system.
For example the authentication based scan chain interface with ECC is a stand-alone component
with a single output to enable and disable the interface. It can be used to protect any system. In
contrast to that generic protection mechanism, the online BIST [56] is very design specific. A
change of the design requires a re-design of the BIST module. Even the implementation effort
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differs with the type of protection mechanism. E.g. a fuse bit is very simple, but an authentica-
tion protocol requires a lot of time and experience to implement. The silicon area is an important
fact. Each fabricated device contains the countermeasure. Especially in a cost-sensitive area for
mass products the area overhead should be as low as possible. The same statement is valid for
the additional time to test the device. In some cases a time consuming protocol has to be exe-
cuted before the scan chain test can be started, e.g. the ECC-based authentication requires up to
133 ms. The solution with the scrambled output has a very low overhead regarding the time to
test. Only the secret key has to be written into the device. This additional time is negligible. All
solutions for a secure test have minor influence on the timing of the design. It means that the
additional components do not influence the internal signal paths of the DUT in most cases. An
example for a changed timing is the mirror key register. It influences the signal path slightly by
insertion of a multiplexer into the signal path.
The test patterns generation is part of the DFT flow and it is done by a test pattern generator.
This generator cannot be influenced with respect to a secured scan chain interface. If setting a
secret key before the scan test patterns are applied, an additional set of test patterns has to be
generated externally. For example the lock and key technique with the scrambled output requires
a small additional pattern to set the secret key. In contrast to this simple mechanism the effort for
the encrypted scan channel is much higher. The scan patterns are generated for a system without
an encryption scheme at the scan chain interface. So a tool is required which reads in the scan
pattern, encrypts the data and write out the encrypted scan chain patterns. Even some protection
mechanisms are not suitable to protect a microcontroller system. E.g. the online BIST [56]
is a very specialized solution for an predefined encryption algorithm. Other solutions like the
authentication based mechanisms protect the scan chain interface, independent of the internal
structure.
Even this online BIST has an influence on the test coverage. Depending of the implementa-
tion the test coverage differs. The protection mechanisms for the interface instead do not have
any influence on the test coverage. Test structures which uses scan chain pattern allows a fault
analysis. In case of a fabrication error the output pattern is not equal to the reference output
pattern. Depending of the position in the data stream the defect can be localized. With a BIST
based fabrication test such an analysis is not possible. A device without any protection mecha-
nism for the scan chain interface can be tested immediately after fabrication. It means that there
is no additional effort after fabrication for every device. In case of the PUF based authentica-
tion mechanism, after fabrication the PUF has to be read-out from every device and stored in a
database. To test a device an access to the database is necessary. An error in the mapping of
the device and the entry in the database causes that the ASICs are not testable. Especially in the
area of microcontroller the JTAG interface is a common approach as interface for testing and
debugging so that it useful that the countermeasure can be integrated into an JTAG interface.
Important facts are the properties of the protection mechanism against scan chain attacks re-
garding the security. The resistance against reverse engineering and probing attacks has to be
checked. A protection mechanism like the PUF based authentication is a very complex mecha-
nism with a high effort regarding area and additional time to enable the test procedure. But an
attack using a needle probe is relatively simple. It is sufficient to identify the enable signal
inside of the ASIC and to “overwrite” the signal with an external voltage source. Such an attack
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can be performed by attackers of class 2. A laboratory with FIB, needle probe and voltage source
might be available in universities and so on. The authentication solution in [61] avoids a single
point of attack. So an attack is much more complicated and much more expensive with respect
to money and time. E.g. the compression technique [67] is resistant against most of attackers.
The result of the test does not give information about detailed test results. Only a pass or fail
signal is enabled. In a reverse engineering step the implementation of the test mechanism can be
extracted, but this is not helpful to attack the device. Nevertheless the protection mechanism is
not usable for a microcontroller system.
In conclusion none of the shown solutions seem to be well suitable as countermeasure against
scan chain attacks, especially with respect to the application area of wireless sensor nodes.
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Table 1: Countermeasures against scan chain attacks and their features and properties.
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Scan Detection6 [28] + ++ ++ o ++ ++ yes no yes ++ no n/a no n/a
Modified scan chain [66] - o ++ o ++ ++ yes no yes ++ yes – yes 1
Fuse bit ++ + ++ o ++ + yes no yes + yes ++ no 1
Mirror key register [88] - + - ++ + ++ no yes yes ++ no ++ yes 2
Compression
technique [67]
+ + + ++ ++ ++ no no no ++ no ++ yes 3
Lock and key:
interface off[11]
++ + + o ++ o yes no yes + yes – no 1
Lock and key:
scrambled output[41]
– + + o ++ o yes no yes + yes – yes 1
Authentication [61] o – + - ++ o yes no yes ++ yes – yes 3
Authentication PUF[19] o – – - ++ o yes no yes – yes ++ yes 1
Authentication ECC[18] ++ – – – ++ o yes no yes ++ yes – no 1
Encrypted
Scan Channel [63]
+ – – - ++ – yes no yes + yes ++ yes 3
BIST, offline7 - + o + + ++ yes yes no ++ yes ++ yes 3
BIST, online[56] – - - ++ + n/a no yes no ++ no ++ yes 3
Legend:
++ very good + good o average - bad – very bad
1Single scan chain is reference timing
2System: CPU, cryptographic modules and memory
3E.g. read out a PUF-based secret key and storage in a database
4Information benefit to get access to the secure scan chain interface
5Read or influence internal signal
6Detection circuit only
7Tool supported integration
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3.4 Programming and Debug Interface
In the following the state of the art in programming and debug interface, and securing it, is
described. This type of interface is a common approach to upload and update and debug the
software of a microcontroller. An abandonment of such an interface is almost impossible.
There is a difference between debugging and programming, which impacts to the security
mechanism for the debug interface. In case that a microcontroller should get an update of the
application program, the device can be rebooted before the programming sequence is started.
The application program can be interrupted because after a code update it has to be restarted
anyway. In contrast to a reprogramming for debugging a reset of the device should be avoided
in some cases. E.g. if the device is in an error state it is useful to enable a debug session without
a reset. The reset causes that the program is interrupted and the register file gets an initial value.
So the information is lost which are required to debug a running program. In many cases it is
very difficult and time consuming for the software developer to reproduce the error state again.
Since the process of debugging contains a debug and a reprogramming step, in the following
the programming and debug interface is called “debug interface”.
3.5 General Design of Debug Interface
The debug interface consists of two different parts. The first one is the physical interface, which
is often a standard communication interface, e.g. SPI, UART or even JTAG. The second part is
a communication protocol, which is device and/or vendor specific.
The communication interface to outside, which means to the debug host, is a serial interface
typically. To save pins a parallel interface is avoided. UART, IIC and SPI are common interfaces
to implement a low pin debug and programming interface. The data rates are low so that no
expensive high speed serial interfaces like PCI express are necessary. Often the target frequency
is between 10 and 100 MHz.
For a small 16 bit microcontroller, like the openMPS430 [24], a communication protocol is
sufficient, which contains a small subset of control words and set of 16 bit registers for address
and data. For a larger processor, e.g., LEON2 [2], the size of the register has to be adapted
and the complex pipeline requires more control information. Companies like Atmel, Texas
Instruments or in projects from public domain projects like openMSP430 from openCores use
own communication protocols, on top of physical interface, specific to their requirements.
During a scan chain test, the ASIC can be stopped after one clock cycle and intermediate
results can be read out. The debug interface does not allow an access to the register at any
clock cycle. A processor executes an instruction, which requires usually more than one clock
cycle. After this, the debug interface allows a snapshot of all registers of the processor. An
uncontrollable access to a device is a backdoor for an attacker, because a debug unit is fully
integrated into the system so that every register and memory area can be read or written.
3.5.1 Device-specific Debug Interface
Figure 43 and 44 show different possibilities to integrate a debug interface into a microcontroller
without a JTAG interface.
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The LEON2 processor in Figure 43 [2] has an AMBA bus system and the debug unit consists
of two components. First the debug serial link, which provides the UART interface, and second
the debug unit itself. The debug unit is plugged onto the AHB bus and every data which is
transferred on the bus can be captured by the debug unit and stored into a trace buffer.
5-Stage
Integer Unit
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Controller
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Controller
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Bridge
UART
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Figure 43: LEON2 processor with AMBA bus sub system and connected debug support unit and
debug serial interface, marked in green. Debug interface and debug unit are separate
units and the communication between them is done via the AMBA bus. The debug
unit has access to the processor core and to the AMBA bus. The integrated MMU
does not protect any memory area during accesses from the debug interface. Figure
reprinted from [2].
The 16 bit microcontroller openMSP430 in Figure 44 [24] has an embedded debug unit, which
is fully integrated and directly connected to the execution logic, the front end and the memory
bus. For communication to the host an UART interface with its own protocol is used. The debug
unit can send a “CPU halt” command, so that the program execution is stopped after the current
instruction. Furthermore a read and write access to all memory areas including the CPU register
is possible on-the-fly. This means that it is not required to stop the CPU for such operations.
3.5.2 JTAG based Debug Interface
The JTAG Standard 1149.1 [32] defines a serial interface. As part of the interface description
the internal command structure is defined. In addition to test commands also a set of free usable
commands are available. These vendor-specific commands can be used to implement a debug
and programming interface.
As described in Section 2.3.2 a microcontroller from Atmel [3] uses a scan chain to get access
to all registers at the serial debug interface. The interface itself follows the JTAG standard.
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Figure 44: Debug unit, marked in green, in an openMSP430. It is deeply integrated into the
system and it has access to all components. In contrast to the debug unit in the
LEON2 processor, it cannot be removed. Figure reprinted from [24].
3.6 Secure Debug Interfaces
The misuse of a debug interface to attack a device is obvious. From a stolen device the stored
program can be read out to get the program code or reprogramming of the device to use it for
attacker’s purpose. The security mechanisms are not so manifold for the debug interface as
for the scan chain interface. Fuse bits or passwords are common countermeasures for attacks
against debug interfaces. Special solutions, like the Mirror Key Register (MKR) as protection
for a secret key register, are not meaningful.
3.6.1 Boot Loader for Password Protection
A boot loader can be helpful in different application scenarios. It allows a programming with-
out a special programmer or additional features can be implemented subsequently without a
programmer but with an interface connection to UART or USB.
In microcontrollers with a boot loader mechanism the non-volatile memory is divided into
two parts and every part contains an executable program as shown in Figure 45. The first part
contains the boot loader; the second part contains the application itself. The booting address is
hard coded or user-defined e.g. by fuse bits. The second solution has the advantage that the im-
age size of the boot loader and the application are flexible. Furthermore for a final programming
of sensor nodes in a shipment state the boot loader can be removed.
After a reset the boot loader software is executed. A user interaction to interrupt the start of
the application can be pushing of a button or a predefined command on a communication channel
(e.g. 0x55AA on TX line of UART interface). If no user interaction happens after a certain time
the boot loader jumps to the specific address of the application. Now the application is executed.
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The range of functionality of a boot loader depends on requirements, available memory and
the type of the microcontroller. Typically the NVM, which can be used by the boot loader, is in
the range of several kBytes. This restricts the software routines to a minimum subset, e.g. im-
plementation of a communication protocol via SPI or UART, simple authentication mechanism
[82], or even a wireless update communication protocol [79], or the implementation of code
verification.
An example for a password protection of the debug port is the MSP430 from Texas Instru-
ments. To enable the access to the debug port a shared secret key, the password, has to be applied
to the device by the user. The Bootstrap Loader (BSL) offers debug functionality and it is used
to program an MSP430 device. But in addition to a standard boot loader as shown in Figure 45
the BSL is located in a secured memory area.
Every shipped device has a preprogrammed BSL which supports UART as serial communica-
tion link. If required the user is able to update the BSL code, e.g. to replace the UART protocol
by an IIC protocol. Two different types of commands are supported: unprotected commands
and password protected commands. Clearly the “password transmit” command is unprotected,
furthermore the change of the baud rate and the full erase of the device. After sending the cor-
rect password to the MSP430 the full access to the device is enabled, the protected commands
like reading and writing of the memory or setting the program counter can be executed. The
password has a length of 256 bit, so that a brute force attack is nearly impossible. Later versions
of BSL have advanced security features which can be set in a separate section of NVM. The
BSL can be disabled fully or the content of the memory is deleted if a wrong password was sent
to the device.
Due to the fact that the mass erase command in BSL is not protected by a password and the
password is set to a default value the device can be fully used after the erase step. Furthermore
the configuration of the BSL can be set into a state which initiates the deletion of content in
the flash memory if the entered password is wrong. It cannot be avoided that the owner of the
device fails during entering the password. But in this case the content of the device is deleted.
This can be annoying because of the password is very long and a typing error is not unusual.
The firmware of the BSL can be updated by the user. On one hand this can be an advantage to
fix bugs or improve security features. On the other hand is can be a disadvantage in case that a
programmer adds some bugs which are usable to get secret information from the device.
3.6.2 Authentication Mechanism
The password protection from Section 3.6.1 is a very simple type of an authentication mech-
anism. The authentication is based on a shared secret key. A trusted group of users knows
the secret key, which is a very insecure type of an authentication in principle as it cannot be
guaranteed that the secret key is kept secret.
A more secure solution for an authentication mechanism is a public-private key scheme. The
protocol handling is done in software which runs on the system processor or in a specific hard-
ware module. The simplest approach is a non-server based authentication. The public key is
stored in the device and the private key is known by the application developer. Unfortunately
the same weak spot like for password check is existing. The security depends of the private key
being secret. Especially if many people use the same key, the risk exists that the private key is
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Figure 45: Boot loader mechanism of a microcontroller. Boot loader and user application are in
the same NVM. After a reset the program from the boot loader section is executed.
Without any event at the debug interface in a defined time slot the user application is
started.
misused. A possible countermeasure is a server based authentication mechanism, which requires
a connection to the server at least for the authentication step. The server is in the same network
or it is reachable per internet connection. In the age of WiFi and UMTS it can be assumed that
such a connection is available at most places.
A disadvantage of the authentication mechanism is the type of protocol handling. To establish
a debug session the running application has to be interrupted and an application, which is re-
sponsible for the authentication, has to be started on the processor. This means that the running
program cannot be stalled and debugged in the current state. Especially if the application pro-
gram has an error, which causes an endless loop, a reset is required. In this case the information
of the current program state, like value of program counter or content of the register file, is lost.
A debugging is not possible until the error occurs again.
For an update of the user application, the authentication mechanism is well usable. The ap-
plication has to be restarted after the update, so that an additional interrupt of the application to
perform the authentication protocol is possible.
A further example for an authentication based debug port for WSN is described in [39]. The
microcontroller is enhanced by an additional microcontroller with an RFID tag as shown in
Figure 46. Both microcontrollers have independent power supplies. The microcontroller of the
sensor node has its own power supply, e.g. a battery, but the microcontroller for debug does
not have any permanent power supply. In case of debug request, the user has a RFID read/write
module. This module provides electrical energy via its antenna. This amount of energy is
sufficient to perform the wake up sequence. Afterwards the authentication scheme is done. In
case of granted access the data is transferred per Bluetooth.
3.6.3 Destroying
In case of a dedicated debug and programming interface a simple approach of protection is de-
stroying of the interface. On the input pad of the interface a high input voltage is supplied which
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Figure 46: Wireless authentication approach for debugging. A second microcontroller performs
the protocol handling. Figure reprinted from [39].
is much higher than the breakdown voltage. E.g. in the IHP 0.25 μm technology the maximum
breakdown voltage is speciﬁed as 6V for an nmos transistor. This means a voltage higher than
this breakdown voltage destroys a transistor. In case that the debug interface uses some shared
pins, e.g. on GPIOs, it is not possible to destroy the interface in that way. Furthermore the
approach is dangerous because it cannot be guaranteed that no other circuits inside of the ASIC
are affected. Figure 47 shows a photograph of destroyed input pads. Although both pads are
destroyed under the same conditions, this means the applied voltage and current were identical,
the result is different. It shows that applying a high voltage causes unpredictable destroying of
semiconductor structures.
With the knowledge of the risk this solution can be used for a handful of devices in very
early prototype phase of a project. Keep in mind that the interface is not usable anymore and a
reprogramming of the internal program memory is not possible.
3.6.4 Fuse Bits
A fuse bit is a security mechanism, which is based on applying a high voltage to destroy a semi-
conductor structure in a well-deﬁned way. It can be implemented in different ways as described
in Section 2.5.2. A very common implementation is the anti-fuse. After device programming
and debugging on the gate oxide of a transistor a high voltage is applied which causes that the
oxide is destroyed. For example the Cortex processor in [72] contains three fuse bit banks, each
255 bit. Since bank 1 and 2 are for user-deﬁned data, bank three contains control bits and 4 bits
to disable the JTAG interface. Once the interface is switched off, it cannot be enabled without
high effort. The die has to be decapsulated and in a FIB the broken connection has to be repaired.
Such equipment is very expensive and a well-educated engineer is required. But companies of-
fer the usage of a FIB as a service for external customers, which reduces cost of such an attack
dramatically.
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Figure 47: Photography of an ASIC in IHP 0.25 µm technology. Two input pads of a microcon-
troller which are destroyed by a high input voltage. The transistors are covered by
technology fillers, so they are not visible. Although both pads are destroyed under
same conditions, the result is different. In the pad on the left side only a small area
seems to be affected (red ellipse). This is the internal driver structure. The pad on the
right side is damaged first near the bond wire (green ellipse) and second inside of the
driver structure (red ellipse) too.
The MSP430 family offers a second debug interface at the JTAG port. This interface is pro-
tected by “electronic fuses”. In contrast to a fuse in OTP manner such a fuse is resettable. The
test interface is enhanced by several additional registers, which is compliant to the IEEE 1149.1
standard [32]. Once the fuses are blown an access to debug the device is only possible using the
BSL and with a command the fuses are resettable. The JTAG port as additional debug port offers
the possibility to test and debug the device on the PCB. This is useful if more than one JTAG
enabled device is mounted on PCB to test the connection between the devices. But the user has
to keep in mind that two debug interfaces have to be disabled to avoid unrestricted access.
The difference between BSL and JTAG based password protection is the check of the pass-
word. While BSL is a software solution with a type of a boot loader, the JTAG based protection
mechanism is a pure hardware based approach. In case of BSL the MSP430 processor has to
stop the execution of the application and to perform the password check.
3.6.5 Module Based Debug Unit
The misuse of the debug interface can be avoided if the debug interface is not part of the final
ASIC. In other words: the ASIC is fabricated twice. One version with the debug interface and
one version without the debug interface. In case that the debug interface is built as a separate
layout macro, as shown in Figure 48, it can be removed very easily. Nevertheless two different
mask sets are necessary.
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DebugUnit
Figure 48: The debug unit is integrated as a hard macro so that it can be easily removed for a
version without a debug unit.
The second approach is the fabricating of the device without debug interface. The software
development is done on an FPGA implementation, which contains the debug interface. Ana-
logue components like radio or an ADC cannot be mapped into FPGA resources. So it is not
possible to test software routines, which use these components.
The debug interface is typically used to store the program in the internal non-volatile memory,
but for both ideas the problem exists that the device cannot be programmed. It can be used for
microcontroller with ROM. The disadvantages are that the program has to be ready before the
final version of the ASIC is produced and an update is not possible. So these approaches are
not suitable in area of fully integrated microcontrollers, which have an internal reprogrammable
memory.
3.7 Attacks on Secure Debug Interfaces
Clearly unprotected as well as protected debug interfaces are in focus of attackers. In an un-
protected device the internal data are accessible for everyone. A suitable programmer and free
available software are sufficient, to read out and reprogram the attacked device.
Access to a device, which is protected, is more difficult. In [25] an attack against the boot
loader mechanism of the MSP430 is described. The password to enable the debug functionality
has a length of 256 bit. This is equivalent to 32 Bytes. A brute-force attack for such a key is
impossible. But the software routine of the boot loader checks the password byte by byte. In
case of a correct byte of the password, the comparison is two clock cycles faster than in case of
a wrong byte. Since this difference in program execution is observable from outside, each byte
of the password can be tested individually. As result after 32x256 tests the correct password is
determined by the attacker.
Interfaces which are secured by fuse bits can be enabled, but with a higher effort. As described
in Section 3.3.12 it is possible to repair a blown fuse bit. Clearly the effort and cost are too high
to steal a sensor node and to reprogram the device for attacker’s purpose. In fact repairing of a
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fuse bit is interesting, if the device contains secret data or the software itself which can be reused
by the attacker.
3.8 Discussion
In principle two different types of protection mechanisms exist. On the one hand in an irre-
versible process the interface is destroyed. Once the interface is destroyed a debugging and
reprogramming is not possible anymore. Without opening the package and repairing the struc-
ture with a FIB the access to the internal of the device is not possible.
Table 2: Countermeasures for programming and debug interface and their features and
properties. The evaluation based on estimation of the author of this thesis.
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Boot loader (BSL) no yes – no - yes 1 no yes yes yes no yes
RFID based authentication yes yes – no – yes 1 no no no no no yes
Physical destroying (pad) yes yes ++ no ++ no 1 yes no no no yes no
Fuse bits yes yes ++ no ++ no 1 yes no no no yes no
Fuse bits (electronic) yes yes ++ no ++ no 1 yes no no no yes yes
Module based Debug Unit no yes ++ no ++ no 3 no no no no yes yes
Legend:
++ very good + good o average - bad – very bad
1Influence system with needle probe, e.g. force logic “1” on a specific wire
On the other hand a type of authentication process, this allows an access at any time. The
chosen approach depends on the selected system, application area and security level. The debug
interface is used after the post-production test of the device. It means that the error free device
can execute some software, e.g. a boot loader. The boot loader is a small piece of software with
a restricted number of functions for protocol handling and authentication. Since the device is
fully tested, there is no risk that a production error enables the interface accidentally.
Table 2 gives an overview of countermeasures for debug and programming interface. The
development team of a microcontroller has to consider the type of security mechanism in an
early stage of the project. While the fuse bits can be integrated with a low effort into a design,
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the boot loader mechanism requires additional effort for development. Once the fuse bit is blown
it cannot be reverted and a device with a software error is lost. But the device with the boot loader
can be updated.
In sum the ideal debug and programming interface does not exist. Each approach has its
advantages and disadvantages. Even the destroying of the pads can be ideal solution, because it
is cheap and it works at any device with separate pins for the interface. A solution is desirable,
which allows a debugging and reprogramming in several stages, but even with the option to fully
disable those features.
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4 Secure Scan Chain Interface
In the following chapter the solution for a secure scan chain interface (SSCI) developed in this
thesis is shown. At first the requirements are summarized, followed by a sketch and a detailed
description of the proposed solution. The integration into the protected system is described
including an evaluation and the description of the modified post-production test. A complex
security analysis and alternative implementations are shown, too. At the end the patent situation
is explained and a conclusion closes this chapter.
4.1 Requirements
The precise goal of this work is a protection mechanism, which allows a full and complex post-
production test and that prevents any unrestricted access which can be misused for scan attacks.
At a first glance, a BIST is a suitable solution for enabling a secure test. However, it provides
only limited fault diagnosis capabilities. Such an extensive diagnosis is indispensable to improve
the production rate.
The access to the internal data of a device, which may include secret data, should be com-
pletely restricted to authorized users only. The integration of the security component should be
seamless and in any case compatible to standard interfaces like JTAG and any other proprietary
test interfaces. Especially the generation of test pattern should be done by the standard tools like
TetraMax (Synopsys) [78] or Encounter DFT Architect (Cadence) [9]. Any modification of test
pattern is prone to errors and requires additional verification. The influence on additional area
and power should be as low as possible. Even the path delay should not be highly increased.
The progress in technology development causes a permanent scaling of transistors and met-
allization layers. Shrinking a purely digital design to a smaller technology is a fast process
compared to an analogue design. Thus, the security feature should be implemented in a way that
a porting to a smaller technology does not require high effort. This means that the solution and
most of its components should be scalable in an automatic way.
A generic approach is required so that the solution is not restricted to a special design or
IP core. It should be usable for any design, independent of its function. After fabrication and
packaging the device is typically soldered onto a PCB. Often such a PCB has several ASICs
mounted and they are testable with a JTAG chain. The solution shall be compatible with typical
scan interfaces and support such board level tests.
In principle a secure scan and a secure debug interface have similar requirements (see Section
5.1), so that an approach for a secure scan chain interface is possibly reusable for a secure debug
interface.
In summary, the requirements for a secure scan chain interface are:
• Secure against access by unauthorized users
• Test pattern generation with standard tools
• No restriction on fault diagnostic
• Compatible with standard test equipment
• Minor influences on the timing
• Small area overhead
65
• Low power consumption in functional mode
• Adaptable for future technologies
• Generic approach
• Applicable for standard interfaces like JTAG
As shown above, the requirements are manifold and partially in contrast to each other. The
greatest challenge is to combine security and fault diagnosis.
4.2 Concept for Secure Test
A scan chain is a possible solution to fulﬁll the requirements, if it is enhanced by a strong
security mechanism. The core idea for the security mechanism is based on a matching key pair.
Figure 49 shows the general system architecture of approach proposed in this thesis. The core
to protect is surrounded by the Secure Scan Chain Interface (SSCI), which is implemented as
wrapper component. The SSCI protects the core by disabling the scan_enable, scan_in
and scan_out signal after fabrication, to hinder a misuse of the scan interface directly after
shipment of the die. After ﬁnalizing the post-production test the core is protected too.
The security controller is responsible to write and delete a secret key in the OTP. The “golden
key and compare unit” is instantiated multiply times in the devices and every unit contains one bit
of the golden key. In case the correct secret key is stored in the OTP the scan_enable signal
is forwarded from the pad to the core and the scan_in and scan_out signal are unlocked.
Core
Security 
Controller
Scan_in
Scan_enable[0]
OTP Scan_outScan_out
Wrapper
Scan_
enable_in
0
Golden Key &
Compare Unit
Golden Key &
Compare Unit
Golden Key &
Compare Unit
...
127
dout[0...127]
din[0…127]
User
Interface
Scan_enable[..]
Scan_enable[127]
&
&
&
Scan_enable
Scan_enable
Scan_in
Figure 49: Detailed sketch of the secure scan system. A wrapper around the core contains the
security mechanism for the access control. Although the wrapper looks large and
complex, the implementation requires less than 0.14mm2 in a 0.25 μm technology.
The core is modiﬁed slightly. The single bit input of scan_enable_in signal is
replaced by a 128 bit bus. This bus and the scan data input and output are protected
by the security mechanism.
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The system is used in the following way: First, the golden key is stored in a hidden way within
the device. The key is fixed and embedded during ASIC production. Second the secret key has
to be written by the test engineer into the device. If both keys are matching, the scan chain
interface is enabled. As long as the secret key is not correct the scan_in and scan_enable
signals are not forwarded to the core and the output of the scan_out signal is blocked.
The golden key is part of the design and it is stored in a set of compare units which are resistant
against reverse engineering. The secret key is stored into an OTP. Once the secret key is deleted,
a FIB and a very high effort are required to re-enable the scan interface again. This reduces the
number of potential attackers significantly. Furthermore, in contrast to approaches with only a
single fuse bit, a multi-bit entry in an OTP, the key, is used. Consequently, an attacker has to fix
a high number of blown fuse bits. A simple modification of every bit in the OTP is not sufficient.
Instead, the correct secret key has to be set. This is a complex task without very detailed reverse
engineering. The key has to be determined in brute-force manner which is nearly impossible
for attackers of class 1 to 3 and even very difficult for attackers of class 4. A brute-force attack
means that in worst case 2128 different secret keys have to be tested until an access via scan
chain is possible.
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4.3 Memory for SSCI and SDI
4.3.1 Requirements
The secure scan and debug interfaces have their own requirements regarding memory. Two
different memories are required; one memory for the golden key, the second memory for the
secret key. The size of each memory does not exceed 128 bit for the key, plus some control bits.
The golden key and the secret key are identical and they have to be keep secret. The golden key
should be permanent which means that an attacker is not able to change its value. Furthermore
reverse engineering should be very difficult, and in the best case, the golden key can be set
individually during the production step, e.g. for a group of ASICs without additional costs
or high time effort. The required silicon area of the security feature should be small, but for
additional security it is allowed to increase the area.
The read time of all memory types is fast enough to implement scan and debug interface
which operate at a low frequency. The time to write is not important. The amount of data,
which is written, is very small, so that the required time to write is short. During the testing and
debugging a higher power consumption is allowed even though the device’s power consumption
should be as low as possible during operation mode. Most devices are battery driven, so that
additional power consumption reduces their life time.
4.3.2 Golden Key
The value of the golden key should be fixed for the lifetime of the device. With a re-writable
memory, an attacker would be able to set the value. A setting of the key in groups should be a
possible feature to avoid the same key for different customers. The memory for the golden key
should be difficult to identify in layout, and it should be even more difficult to extract the content
of the memory in a reverse engineering process. Otherwise, it is possible for an attacker to read
out the value and set the “secret key” to same value. That is why a direct reading access to the
memory, where the golden key is located, must be forbidden.
4.3.3 Secret Key
The secret key must be programmable and erasable by the test engineer for the post-production
test or by the application developer for a debug session. Furthermore, the memory should be
either a slow writable memory or one-time writable memory.
From the view of a test engineer, a slow writable memory is a negative requirement at first
glance, because it increases the time for testing. A long time, which is required to write the
value to the memory, is helpful against brute-force-attacks. In brute-force-attacks, all possible
keys is tested in a trial and error approach to identify the correct secret key. Statistically in a
brute-force-attack the correct key is found after testing half of all possible key. For example a
flip flop is writable in a fast manner, so that a lot of keys can be checked in a short time. Possible
countermeasures against brute-force-attacks are the use of a long key, or a long writing-time for
the key, or a restricted number of write operations or combinations of them.
The scan interface is typically used only once for the post production test, so for this memory
one write operation should be sufficient.
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Enable_in Memory_out
Memory Output `0`
Metal1 Metal2 Metal3 MIMLegend: 
Memory Output `1`
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Enable_in Memory_out Enable_in Memory_out
Inverter U1
Enable_in Memory_out
VDD
GND
Figure 50: MIM-based ROM with enable input. The cell on the left side with output “0” is
connected to VDD permanently; the cell on the right side with output “1” has the
function of a inverter. To improve the visibility the MIM structure is shown larger.
If different development cycles require several debug and programming steps and the memory
is writable only once, the memory should offer several entries, 128 bit each.
4.3.4 Introduction of MIM-based ROM
The MIM-based ROM was developed as part of this work and it is a special type of combina-
tional logic ROM. It bases on digital standard cells and resists optical reverse engineering. In
contrast to a pure digital design an additional layer, during fabrication, is used. The MIM layer
is typically used for mixed-signals designs or pure analog circuits.
In Figure 50 one possible implementation of such a ROM is shown. It contains one stored bit.
The value is placed at the output when the “read enable” signal is set. The difference between
Figure 50(a) and Figure 50(b) is the output value. Once it is zero and once the output value is
one. It is controlled by a MIM structure, which is marked in red in the figure. During fabrication
the MIM layer is produced as very thin isolation layer (58 nm), made of silicon nitride. In a
reverse engineering process, using an optical microscope, it is not possible to identify the stored
bit value. Like every other type of ROM the value is fixed in the layout phase.
The example bases on modification of digital standard cells and their wiring. The implemen-
tation on an array structure like Section 2.5.2 is also feasible.
4.3.5 Evaluation
In Table 3 the properties of different memory types are summarized with respect to the applica-
tion area of a secure scan and debug interface. The requirements, of the described secure scan
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and debug interface in this thesis, are almost the same for both interfaces and are described in
Section 4.3.1. In Table 3, additional properties of the memories are considered, which are not
relevant in most application areas, but to secure scan and debug interfaces, they are important.
For example, a programming after production simplifies the requirement of different keys for
different customers. The possibility of reprogramming, or reading of the value in an optical
way, or changing of the value (e.g. in a laser attack), is a weakness.
Table 3: Benchmarking of different memory types for 128 bit memory for storage
of a secret key.
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combinational logic ROM no no no ++ ++ n/a o yes + ++ ++
Array ROM no no no o ++ n/a o no - ++ o
MIM no yes no ++ ++ n/a + yes ++ ++ +
Laser fuse OTP yes yes no - ++ ++ ++ no – – +
Electrical fuse OTP yes yes no - ++ ++ ++ no – – -
Anti-fuse OTP yes yes no - ++ – ++ no ++ ++ -
EPROM yes yes yes – + + + no ++ – –
Flash yes yes yes – + + + no ++ – –
RRAM yes yes yes + ++ – ++ no ++ ++ –
SRAM based PUF no no no + – n/a + no ++ – –
Legend:
++ very good + good o average - bad – very bad
The silicon area of the memory is taken into account for a memory which has 128 bit plus
some additional control bits. Additional area increases the cost, so that is getting more difficult
to establish a secure scan and debug interface.
In general it is possible, to use NVM for the golden key as well as for the secret key. Every
memory which is reprogrammable is not usable for the golden key without additional counter-
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measures. Otherwise an attacker is able to set the value of the golden key by himself. The
attacker’s golden key can be written into the secret key memory and the access to the interface
is not protected anymore.
All memories which are writable after production have an additional weak point. An attacker
would be able to program all bits with a known value, if he gets a untested (“raw”) device. The
secret key can be set to the same value and there is no security anymore for the interfaces. An
additional countermeasure is required to prevent this type of attack.
The timing for read is not important because the scan as well as the debug interface work at
a low frequency so that the timing for read is not a restrictive factor. For a write operation the
required time does not matter, moreover a very slow write time has the advantage that a brute-
force-attack requires more time. This is the reason why memories with long write time get a
better rating in Table 3 than memories with short write time.
In area of WSN the power consumption is an important fact. Each additional component
reduces the lifetime of the battery and so the lifetime of the device. For example for volatile
memory a flip flop consumes more energy to store a bit value than an SRAM. For non-volatile
memory a very energy efficient solution is the laser fuse OTP. A bit value is stored in type of a
cut or uncut wire without any transistors. So this type of memory has zero leakage.
Another application issue is the structure and the layout of the memory. A flip flop based
memory is made of standard cells which are arranged in the standard cell grid. It is difficult to
identify them and to grab signals. For non-volatile memory the combinational logic is a possible
implementation for memory which is hard to identify in an ASIC. Memories which are built as
blocks are clearly visible in an ASIC layout. As example different types of memories are marked
in Figure 7. They cannot be hidden in layout and a probing attack might be easier. Furthermore
some types of memories allow a determination of the content by visible inspection. In Figure
13a an example is given for such a memory in whose the content can be read via microscope.
A fully contrast to this block based memories, the MIM based memory is distributed in layout
and, even in a typical reverse engineering step, the content of the memory cannot be extracted.
A typical type of attack against memory is a laser attack, in which the content of the memory
can be read out or even modified. Such an attack requires an opened package in a manner that
the device is still working. A laser fuse can be set very easily, because this type of memory
was developed for programming it by a laser. Furthermore the electrical fuse OTP seems to be
vulnerable for this type of attack. A short metal wire looks similar to a laser fuse OTP, but it is
programmed by a high current. It might be possible, that this piece of metal can be cut by laser
in the same manner as for the laser fuse OTP.
The content of the flash or EPROM can be influenced by an attacker via a laser. Anti-fuse
OTP and a memory in RRAM technology are resistant against read out or modification. The
data is stored in a way, which cannot be influenced by a laser.
A last important fact for selection of the memory type, is the implementation effort. For exam-
ple, flip flops are part of every digital standard cell library. For an array ROM a simple memory
generator is required. For an SRAM such a generator is quite more complex and for flash or
RRAM a very high effort is required in development of the technology and in implementation
of the generator.
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Table 3 describes different properties of each memory type, Table 4 contains a list of all
possible combinations for golden and secret key. For golden key only non-volatile memory is
used, because the nature of this key is that the value needs to be stored even after power-off. For
the secret key both types of memories are possible, volatile and non-volatile memory.
A laser fuse OTP for the secret key is not usable in any case, independent of the used memory
type for the golden key. An open package would be required to program the secret key. The
cost and the effort are too high for such a solution. The electric fuse OTP has the disadvantage
that the usage for golden and/or secret key is very risky from a security point of view. The fuse
element is relatively large and the content can be read out using an optical microscope.
In contrast to the electrical fuse OTP the anti-fuse OTP is well usable for the secret key.
It can be written only once. Nevertheless it is possible to delete the entry without additional
countermeasures. The storage element is the gate oxide of a transistor and the value cannot be
determined without high effort (usage of FIB).
EPROM and flash based memory are usable in case of short secret keys. The limited number
of write cycles and the slow time to write prevents a brute-force attack. But RRAM, and espe-
cially flip flops and SRAM, offer a high number of write cycles in a short time, which might be
enables a trial and error until the secret key is found.
For the golden key all types of non-volatile memories are usable. Most of them are not well
usable or they are unsecure. From security point of view the anti-fuse OTP and the RRAM
are resistant against attacks. Unfortunately the RRAM technology requires a very high effort
in production and it is available from selected manufactures only. Nevertheless these types of
memories are built in as complete memory blocks, so it is possible to identify them in a layout.
With low effort the outputs are identified and in a further modification step in a FIB the outputs
can be set to a defined value.
4.3.6 Discussion
At the first view a volatile memory is the best choice for the secret key. After power-off the
memory is empty and the corresponding function is not enabled as before. The volatile memory
has two disadvantages. The first one is the fast reprogramming, which is possible. If the secret
key is short a brute-force-attack can be successful. Clearly this disadvantage can be solved by
an additional countermeasure. The second disadvantage is that a key is writable at any time and
it is not possible to deactivate writing keys. This means that the interface can be enabled at any
time during the lifetime of the device.
In summary no combination of different, traditional memory types in Table 4 is very well
suitable for the SSCI as well the SDI. Since the secret key can be stored into an anti-fuse OTP,
the golden key cannot be stored in a secret way. All available types of memory do not fulfill
the requirements, so a new method is necessary to store the golden key. The new introduced
MIM-based ROM is well usable and a secure solution.
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Table 4: The ratings for all combinations of memory types for golden
and secret key are shown.
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Legend:
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4.4 Description of Secure Scan Chain Interface
In the following the technical details of the SSCI are described. All components, which are
required for the SSCI are combined in a wrapper and the protected core is embedded into this
wrapper component. The main focus is on the new developed compare units, CMP0 and CMP1,
which are resistant against optical reverse engineering. In the following the OTP as a one-time
key storage and the user interface are explained. To perform the key handling, a small controller
is part of the system too. Finally the verification of the developed system is described. The SSCI
is implemented in IHP 0.25 µm technology.
4.4.1 Compare Units
The concept of the compare units (CMP) is developed as a part of this thesis. These units are
used as storage element of the golden key with an integrated comparison of the key input. Each
compare unit contains one bit of the golden key and two different types are necessary: CMP0,
for bit value zero and CMP1 for bit value one. A set of 128 compare units compose the golden
key and compare the corresponding output, the secret key, from the OTP.
Schematic In Figure 51 and 52 schematics for both types of cells are shown. In one con-
figuration the logical value “0” at the key_in input enables the output (CMP0), in the other
configuration the logical value “1” does (CMP1). The approach bases on digital standard cells
and a wiring between them. The new cell element consists of three logic gates: two inverters
and one NAND gate.
The main feature of this approach is the resistance against optical reverse engineering. In
contrast to a pure digital design an additional layer, during fabrication, is used. Usually the
MIM layer is used for mixed-signal designs or pure analog circuits. The MIM module is used
as capacitor in analogue circuits, so that it in the schematic it is shown as a capacitor with a
capacitance of 1.6 fF. For comparison the input capacitance of the used inverter is 2.6 fF. This
means that the MIM structure has less influence than an additional connected inverter.
The difference between CMP0 and CMP1 element is realized by placing a MIM structure
at different positions. Figure 53 shows the approach of a MIM layer. The integration of the
additional isolation layer into a digital signal path is used to control the property of the circuit.
The inverter U1 is combined with a MIM structure and it is used to connect or disconnect the
signal from the inverter. The inverter U2 and the NAND cell U3 finalize the circuit. These cells
are equivalent to an AND gate and enable the output if the input is the expected value. The truth
tables are given in Table 5 and Table 6.
The CMP units can be constructed as new elements of the standard cell library. Since these
units are built from digital standard cells, the effort for implementation is small. This is an
important fact, otherwise a time consuming process is required to build completely new cells.
Layout Between the different metal layers silicon dioxide is placed as isolation layer with
a high of several hundred nanometers. The vertical interconnect between the metal layer is
made by a via structure with a conductive material, e.g. titan nitride. The MIM structure is an
additional very thin isolation layer (58 nm), made of silicon nitride and it is marked in red in
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Key_in
Scan_enable_in
Enable_out
U1 U2 U3
C1
Figure 51: Schematic of CMP0. U1, U2 and U3 are digital standard cells and the capacitor C1
represents the MIM structure. The key_in signal is inverted by U1. U2 and U3
implement an AND gate, so this module activates the enable_out, if key_in
signal is logical “zero”.
Key_in
Scan_enable_in
Enable_out
U1 U2 U3
C1
Figure 52: Schematic of CMP1. U1, U2 and U3 are digital standard cells and the capacitor C1
represents the MIM structure. In contrast to CMP0, the inverter U1 is bypassed and
the unit enables the output signal enable_out, if key_in is logical “one”.
Table 5: Truth table CMP0
Key_in Scan_enable_in Enable_out
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 0
1 1 0
Table 6: Truth table CMP1
Key_in Scan_enable_in Enable_out
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
75
Step 1: 
Add Metal2
Step 2:
Add MIM
Step 3:
Add via
720nm
58nm
930nm
Step 4: 
Add  Metal3
720nm
Top 
view
Vertical 
view
Layer 
Thickness
Via2Metal2 Metal3MIMLegend
Figure 53: Flow of integrating the MIM structure between two metallization layers in vertical
and top view. As shown in the top view, the MIM structure is not visible in an optical
reverse engineering process.
Figure 53. It is placed between the metal and a via and the used in analogue designs to build on-
chip capacitors. For fabrication this isolation layer requires an additional mask and each MIM
structure is a rectangle on the mask. Based on this element the new CMP units are developed.
In Figure 54 an abstract view of CMP0 and CMP1 is shown. The digital standard cells are
placed like in the schematic. The inverter U1 at the left side is responsible to invert the incoming
key bit from the OTP, if the compare cell should test for logic “0” (CMP0). The output of the
inverter U1 is connected to an AND logic, made of a NAND gate U2 and an inverter U3. It
is necessary because of the used digital standard cell library does not contain an AND gate.
This logic structure enables the secure scan_enable output if both inputs, inverted key and
scan_enable, are “1”.
For the case that the compare cell (CMP1) should test on “1” at the input the MIM layer is
placed as shown in Figure 54. In this layout the first inverter is bypassed so that the signal of the
key bit is directly connected to the AND logic.
In Figure 55 a layout view, extracted from Cadence Virtuoso, of CMP0 (Figure 55a) and
CMP1 (Figure 55b) is shown. A single standard cell has a wiring on metal 1 only. The compare
units have a wiring on metal 1 to metal 3 and the MIM structure is placed between metal 2 and
metal 3.
Simulation The simulation for the new developed compare units was done in different levels.
At first the schematic, Figure 51 and 52, of the compare cells were simulated in SPICE. The
design of the compare cells bases on digital standard cells. These cells are verified before the
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Figure 54: Abstract layout view of CMP0 and CMP1. CMP0 enables the output if key_in is
logical “zero” and CMP1 if key_in is logical “one”. The wiring of both units is
identical and in an optical inspection no differences between both types are visible.
A small, invisible MIM element at different positions is responsible to include the
inverter U1 into the logic path for CMP0 or to exclude the inverter U1 for CMP1.
(a) Layout view of CMP0. The MIM element
blocks the direct connection from key_in
to the NAND gate.
(b) Layout view of CMP1. The MIM elements
bypassed the inverter U1.
(c) Legend
Figure 55: Simplified layout of CMP0 and CMP1 in IHP 0.25 µm technology.
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library is shipped, but the additional MIM capacitor may influence behavior and timing. The
simulation in Figures 51 and 52 are done to verify the correctness of the functionality.
In Figures 56a and 57a a further simulation setup and its results are shown. To get the impact
of the MIM capacitor the compare cells with capacitor and the modified compare cells without
capacitor are simulated. At first the signal for the key input is set with a value which is able to
enable the SSCI. This is shown in Figures 56b and 57b. After a short delay the enable_in
signal changes the logical value from “0” to “1” at the position of Marker V1. At marker V2 the
enable_out signal switches to “high”. For CMP0 and CMP1 the internal delay is 0.09 ns.
The second simulation in 56c and 57c the scan_enable signal is fixed and the input for the
key is changed at marker V1. The compare unit CMP0 without capacitor switches faster, at
marker V2, in contrast to CMP0 with capacitor at marker V3 in Figure 56c. The influence of
the additional capacitor causes an additional delay of 0.03 ns and this is marginal. For CMP1 is
no difference between the schematic with and without capacitor. The timing is not influenced
because the MIM is not in the signal path. The additional delay in Figure 56c is negligible. This
is a situation which does not happen in normal operation mode. The output from the OTP which
is the key input for the compare units is static.
Conclusion The schematic with the layout, as described above, is an example for an im-
plementation of the compare logic. The key feature of the units CMP0 and CMP1 is that their
layouts are almost identical. The only difference is the placement of a small and thin isolator
at specific positions. This difference is invisible for optical inspections and makes the realiza-
tion secure against reverse engineering. Depending on requirements and available digital stan-
dard cell library the schematic and layout may differ from the specific implementation sketched
above. The influence of the MIM capacitor is negligible, in the worst case the additional delay
is 0.03 ns, and a remodeling of the behavior with respect to the timing is not necessary.
4.4.2 AND Module
In Figure 58 the connection between OTP, compare units and scan flip flops is shown. All
compare units are connected to AND gates. The output of the AND gates is the scan_enable
signal to the scan flip flops. This combination of signals is necessary to ensure that the scan chain
is enabled only if all bits of the secret key are correct. Even the scan_in and scan_out port
are protected by AND gates. To simplify the integration of this protection mechanism, the AND
gates are implemented in one module combined with the compare units.
4.4.3 OTP as One Time Key Storage
Design Decision The golden key is hard-wired into the device, but the key to enable the scan
chain has to be stored into the device on user request. This means that a memory is required,
which stores the key during the scan chain test. In principle any type of memory can be used in
this secure scan chain interface to store the secret key for enabling the scan chain.
Typically a memory block like flip flops, RAM, flash or even the OTP can be written and read
by the user. The time to write a data value into a memory depends on the memory type. A flip
flop or a RAM typically have a fast write and rewrite time of less than 10 nanoseconds. RAM,
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(a) Schematic for evaluation of CMP0. The security mechanism bases on a MIM capacitor, so the influence of the
capacitor is simulated in this setup. The CMP0 unit is simulated twice. Once with the MIM capacitor, once without
the MIM capacitor.
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Figure 56: Simulation setup and results for CMP0. The compare unit is simulated with and
without MIM capacitor to analyze the influence of the circuit. An additional circuit
delay caused of the MIM structure is only if the key_in is rising of CMP0.
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(a) Schematic for evaluation of CMP0. The security mechanism bases on a MIM capacitor, so the influence of the
capacitor is simulated in this setup. The CMP0 unit is simulated twice. Once with the MIM capacitor, once without
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Figure 57: Simulation setup and results for CMP1. The compare unit is simulated with and
without MIM capacitor to analyze the influence of the circuit. An additional circuit
delay caused of the MIM structure is only if the key_in is rising of CMP0.
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Figure 58: Block diagram of SSCI with AND module. Each compare unit follows an AND gate
and each AND gate is the scan_enable input for a group of flip flops. This mech-
anism enables the scan chain only if all compare units gets the correct corresponding
bit of the secret key.
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flip flops or Flash can be reprogrammed so a brute-force attack cannot be excluded and with
a matching key pair the scan chain is enabled. Clearly with a 128 bit secret key, a brute-force
attack is nearly impossible. For smaller designs it might be an option to reduce the additional
area for the secure scan chain interface and to reduce the length of the secret key.
For the slow scan chain interface there are no requirements for the timing. The additional
area is legitimate as the ASIC is more secure than before. During test the DUT has no restricted
power budget because this is done at the test environment which is hosted in a laboratory or fab.
After the key was deleted it should be not possible to rewrite the key again and further access
to the scan chain it not possible. Thus, for the SSCI a one-time programmable memory is well
usable.
The available OTP in IHP 0.25 technology is a one-time writable memory in anti-fuse tech-
nology based on transistors. After production every bit has the value “0” and can be set to “1”
with a write operation. Before a test on test equipment is performed, the secret key has to be
written into the memory. After the test the key is deleted. For an OTP the write time is approx.
100 µs.
In order to realize the secure scan chain the OTP array needs to be connected to the compare
logic cells, and it needs to be programmed appropriately. If and only if all OTP cells are pro-
viding the values expected by the compare logic, the scan_enable signal is propagated to all
scan flip flops.
As seen in Figure 58 every bit of the OTP and the corresponding compare cell is responsible
to enable the scan functionality of more than one flip flop. E.g. if the scan chain has a length
of 2,048 bit and the width of the OTP is 128 bit, 16 flip flops share one security element. One
security element for one flip flop would increase the security but the additional overhead is not
justifiable. To enhance the security it is useful to avoid a straight forward mapping of the entries
in OTP to the group of scan flip flops. It means that the first entry of the OTP should not enable
the first 16 flip flops in the scan chain, the second entry the next 16 flip flops and so on. Otherwise
a bitwise fixing of the secret key in the OTP might be easier. In fact a random assignment of a
secure element to a group of scan flip flops seems to be a small security enhancement.
Design and Interface Description An OTP with a common interface for read and write is
widely-used, e.g. for program memory in microcontrollers. A property of the used OTP in this
thesis is that the memory has two different interfaces. A typical application area is a unique ID,
like a serial number or a private key for an encryption scheme.
The OTP has two independent interfaces as shown in block diagram in Figure 59 and in layout
in Figure 60. The first one is the programming interface for the read and write operation with
external access. The OTP module as part of the secure scan chain solution is implemented in
such a way that it is only writable at the programming interface and the data_out bus is not
connected to the security controller as shown in Figure 59. The second interface is read only
for the secret key and it is a parallel output for all stored data. The strict separation of both
interfaces, one external for the programming operation and one internal for the read operation,
secures the design against implementation errors which could cause a vulnerable device.
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Figure 59: OTP unit for key storage, connected to the security controller. The data_out sig-
nal, marked in gray, is not connected to the security controller to avoid a read-out of
the secret key via programming interface. The dout[130:191] is not connected
because it is not used.
Since the programming interface has a 12 bit data bus and a 4 bit address bus to store 192 bit,
the full parallel output does not need any address input. All bits are forwarded to the interface
without any control signals and the content of the memory is permanently available at the output.
The used OTP has a size of 192 bit. This is related to the memory generator. It is possible to
generate an OTP with a size of 128 bit, but at least two additional control bits are required, so
that the next available size was chosen and some bits are not used.
Writing the Key The test engineer sets the secret key by using of the user interface of the
SSCI. The security controller is responsible to perform this operation. At the serial interface
a command is sent to the controller and it is decoded into a specific address and data word.
Address, data and control signals are set and the write process is observed by the controller, too.
To enhance the security, a key_set bit is introduced. It is located in the OTP. As long as
the key_set bit has the logical value “0” the secret key can be set, but the check of the key
in the security elements, and the scan chain, is disabled. The value of the key_set bit can be
changed only one time from “0” to “1”. With key_set is set to “1” the scan chain interface is
enabled subject to the condition that the secret key is equal to the golden key.
Without this security feature a weak point exists. The assumption is that an attacker gets
access to fully untested and non-programmed devices. The weak point is the following. A key
contains “0” and “1” and the nature of the OTP is that per default the bit entry is “0” and it can
be set to “1” in an irreversible step. An attacker would be able to set one bit and test the key.
If the key does not match the attacker would set a further bit to “1”. This can be done until all
bits are set to “1”. So an attacker is able to test up to 128 secret keys with one device. But with
the additional security bit only one key can be tested. Clearly the disadvantage of this solution
is that the setting of the key for a scan chain test by the test engineer has to be first time right.
But this fact is negligible, since it is expected that the test setup is a well-structured process and
mistakes are avoidable.
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Figure 60: Hard macro of the OTP in IHP 0.25 µm technology. The unit is surrounded by a
power ring and the size is 305.7 µm in the height and 315.8 µm in the width. The
programming interface is located at the top and at the right side, marked with red
lines, and the parallel output dout at the bottom of the macro, marked with a green
line.
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Deletion of the Key The only operation which can be performed with the stored secret key
is to delete the secret key. Thus as soon as the test is completed, successful or not, the scan
chain has to be deactivated, i.e. all the OTP bits have to be programmed, which means all bits
are set to “1”. To minimize weak points the user cannot delete the key bit by bit or word by
word. The user can only send a command per user interface to the controller, which causes the
deletion of the secret key. This avoids that the user forgets to delete parts of the secret key or to
delete only parts of the key in bad faith. Furthermore the status flag key_del in the OTP is set
automatically if the complete secret key is deleted.
Power Supply A requirement of OTP memory are the two different voltage levels for the
power supply, depending of the operation mode. To change the value of a cell from “0” to “1”
a high voltage at the gate of the fuse transistor is required. This high voltage has to be applied
only for programming which exceeds the breakdown voltage and it is typically above 7 V. The
read operation is performed at the nominal operation voltage, e.g., of 2.5 V for the used 0.25 µm
IHP technology.
To provide the programming voltage two different ways are possible. The first one is to use
an external voltage source which requires an additional pad. To built-in an additional pad is
the most suitable solution with low effort for designers. Only to set and delete the secret key
the high voltage has to be applied to the device at this pad. In read phase a voltage of 2.5 V is
required at the input of the pad. If the output data of the OTP is not necessary, the power pad
can be connected to ground.
The second approach is an internal circuit which generates the required voltage. A similar
step-up converter for flash memory has a size of 450 µm× 180 µm and special high voltage
transistors are necessary. Furthermore high effort for schematic and layout generation is re-
quired.
Power Saving Strategy In the area of wireless sensor nodes one of the requirements is a
low leakage and a low operation current of the device in field. Any unused component should
be in a power saving or power-off mode. Different power saving strategies are explained in [31].
Due to the fact that the OTP is a block design with its own power rings, the power of the unit
can be switched off after a successful test. In [59] power gating cells are described, which are
well usable for this application area. In normal operation mode the OTP consumes no power
anymore.
Partitioning With a size of 192 bit the OTP has more entries than the 128 bit key requires.
Two additional bits are used for further security mechanisms. The status flags “key_set” and
“key_del” are readable by the user over the programming interface. All other entries of the OTP
which are related to the secret key and the secure scan chain interface are not forwarded for
reading.
Since some bits of the OTP are not used, it can be used to store other values like the device ID
and so on. But from security point of view, it is not recommended to use the OTP for additional
function. On one hand, the power saving strategy cannot be implemented; on the other hand any
design modification can cause a security leakage.
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4.4.4 User Defined Interface
To perform the scan chain test, the secret key has to be written into the device. In this thesis an
SPI was used for the example implementation. The interface component and all other compo-
nents of the wrapper are not part of the scan chain; they are used before the scan chain test is
done. The test of the interface component is done in the functional test during setting the secret
key. If this action fails, the ASIC is marked as “failed device”.
4.4.5 SSCI Controller
The controller connects compare units, external programming interface (SPI) and OTP. Further-
more some functions like set and delete of the key are implemented to minimize handling errors
and security leakages. Controller and SPI are connected to the system clock. The slight logic
deep allows a high operation frequency.
The used SPI as communication interface is a serial protocol and the controller contains an
SPI slave. The signals clock, CS, MOSI and MISO are part of the interface and they are
connected to the test equipment. In Table 7 an overview of supported commands is given. At
the external programming interface a command identifier, followed by data and address are set.
The SPI module has a 32 bit internal output. Several bits are used to select the command, 12 bits
are mapped to data input and further 4 bits are mapped to address input of the OTP.
The used OTP has a memory interface and a data width of 12 bit, which is enforced by the
memory generator. So, for the 128 bit secret key 11 write transactions with 12 bits are necessary.
After the procedure of writing the key, a key_set bit has to be set to enable the scan chain
functionality. In sum 12 write transaction, each 32 bit, are necessary. It results into 384 clock
cycles at the SPI port.
In case that the user writes the “key delete” command, all data inputs at all addresses are
programmed with a “1” automatically by the controller. At the end of the procedure, the key is
deleted and the scan chain cannot be used anymore.
Table 7: Control commands of SSCI
Function Command (32 bit)
Write Key 0x0100 + data<11:0> + addr<3:0>
Set key active 0x020...0
Delete key 0x030...0
4.4.6 Verification
The verification consists of two different steps. The first step is the verification of the design
concept. It means that the concept of SSCI has to be reviewed against design errors. The
second step is the verification of the implementation, which means that the the system has to be
simulated extensively with a high test coverage. The implementation is simulated as stand-alone
module with its own test bench as shown in Figure 61.
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Figure 61: Block diagram of SSCI and test bench
4.5 Integration and Adaption of the Target Design
From a design in HDL to a shipped device, many steps are necessary. An additional component
can have effects at different steps in the design flow. In the following the integration of the SSCI
into core is described and in every step the impact of the SSCI is checked.
4.5.1 Technological Prerequisites
The first requirement to implement the SSCI is that the technology supports a thin isolator layer
between two metallization layers, which is typically used for a MIM capacitor. To get a high ca-
pacitance such an isolation layer is very thin, and during optical inspection of a circuit, invisible.
On the element of the MIM capacitor the security feature of this thesis was built.
Furthermore for applying the solution sketched above, it is essential that the used technology
offers OTPs to store the secret key. For this, especially the anti-fuse OTP is well suited, since the
basic cell can be implemented in any CMOS technology and consists of three transistors only.
4.5.2 Influence on Design Flow
In Figure 62 a typical design flow, from RTL to shipment, is shown. The stages, marked in
green color, are the additional steps which are required to integrate the SSCI. These steps are
explained in detail in the following.
4.5.3 RTL Design
The SSCI is fully implemented in HDL and ready to use and all SSCI components are combined
in one module, which simplifies the integration. The only change of the source code before the
component can be used, is related to the secret key. The default secret key into the parameter file
has to be replaced by a new one. Target system is developed like every other processor without
any consideration that a secure scan chain interface is inserted in a later phase in the design flow.
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Listing 2: ifdef in verilog
1 ‘ifdef ASIC
2 //implement full SSCI here including compare units and OTP
3 ‘elsif FPGA
4 //implement SSCI here.
5 //Replace OTP by RAM and do not implement compare units
6 ‘else
7 //nothing
8 ‘endif
In the next step the system core and the SSCI are merged into one design and the core which has
to be protected is connected to the SSCI module.
4.5.4 Simulation
Since a stand-alone test bench for the SSCI is provided in this work, the test bench of the target
is device specific. An error during the integration process could cause an insecure scan chain
interface, an untestable device or even a fully non-working device. Keep in mind that two
different simulation setups are required. At first the system has to be simulated to ensure that
the new component does not influence the functionality. This is equal to a system test. After this
the functionality of the integrated SSCI has to be simulated.
In step (b) in Figure 62 only a functional test of the interface and the key set and key delete is
performed. The scan chain test cannot be simulated in this phase because it is not integrated yet.
For the simulation in the digital design flow the compare units are part of the netlist and base on
digital standard cells. The OTP is based on physical destroying of a gate of a transistor. This
is a physical effect, which cannot be implemented in HDL. As workaround a behavioral model
for the simulation is implemented. The function is to emulate writing the secret key as well as
deleting the secret key.
Often after a simulation on RTL a design is verified on an FPGA. For pure digital designs
this is a fast possibility for verification. The OTP and the compare cells cannot be mapped to
FPGA elements directly. But the implementation of these modules in an FPGA is not necessary,
because they are used in case of a scan chain test only. It is useful to test the programming
interface of the SSCI on an FPGA. To enable such a test, in HDL code macro directives are
used. In a preprocessing step the corresponding code section is selected. An example is given
in Listing 2. So for an ASIC the SSCI is fully implemented as required, for the verification on
FPGA the SSCI consists of the programming interface and a small memory block only. The
memory, e.g. an SRAM, is the substitute for the OTP, so that the functionality of the interface
can be verified.
Apart from this small modification in the SSCI module, the design can be implemented for
FPGA verification as before. Clearly the scan chain cannot be tested, but the test on the FPGA
is for a functional verification of the design and not for verification of the test approach.
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4.5.5 Synthesis and Scan Chain Insertion
The following steps, (c) and (d) in Figure 62, synthesis and scan chain insertion, are done without
any changes in the design flow. The HDL code is transformed into a gate level netlist and a scan
chain is inserted.
The controller of the SSCI is written in HDL and it is synthesizable using DesignCompiler
[75] like any other component on RTL. The compare units are combined in a netlist already and
the OTP is generated as a hard macro. A difference between the protected core and the SSCI is
that the SSCI does not get a scan chain.
4.5.6 Test Pattern Generation
Usually a test bench is generated by the scan pattern generator. For this tool the protection
mechanism is a transparent solution.
During test pattern generation the additional test patterns for set and delete key have to be
generated. They are used later during post-production test before shipment of the device.
4.5.7 Scan Chain Simulation
After scan insertion a simulation of the scan patterns has to be done. In Figure 63 the procedure
of this step is shown. At first the scan chain interface has to be enabled using the correct secret
key, afterwards the scan chain test is performed and at the end the secret key has to be deleted.
Clearly the deletion of the key is not a necessary step to simulate the scan chain test, but it is
useful to verify this feature. The effort for the design team to develop the test bench to write
and delete the secret key is minor. The basis for these test benches are the test benches for the
stand-alone verification of the SSCI. Based on this test bench the patterns for the test equipment
are generated.
4.5.8 Netlist Modification and Verification
After synthesis and scan insertion the netlist of the core has to be slightly modified in step (h)
in Figure 62. The netlist has a single input for the scan_enable signal after scan insertion
and all flip flops are switching from functional mode to scan mode by enabling this signal. To
avoid this weak point the number of scan_enable signals has to be identical to the number
of compare cells. Instead of a single scan_enable signal for all flip flops, a group of flip
flops get their own scan_enable signal. In this step the single signal is replaced by a bus for
the scan_enable signal. E.g. in a design with 2,048 flip flops and 128 compare cells, the
scan_enable bus is 128 wide and each group of 16 flip flops has its own control signal to
switch in scan mode.
A TCL script is provided in this work to perform a modification of the netlist. The user sets
the number of key bits in the configuration section of the script. The scan_enable signal at
the input of each scan flip flop is replaced by a selected wire from the scan_enable bus as
shown in Figure 64 during the modification step. The replacement can be done for a single scan
chain as well as multiple scan chains in a design.
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Figure 63: Simulation of the system with integrated SSCI for verification of the scan chain. The
first test bench (marked in green) sets the secret key to enable the scan functionality.
The second test bench (marked in blue) is the generated test from the test pattern
generator and it performs the scan chain test itself. The third test bench (marked in
orange) disables the scan functionality and verifies the deletion process of the secret
key.
This slight modification of the netlist is fail-safe, but a verification step, for example with a
netlist equivalence checker, is clearly required (step (i) in Figure 62). In Formality (Synopsys)
[77] the original and the modified netlist are read in. A compare rule defines a mapping of the
scan_enable bus in the modified netlist to the single scan_enable in the original netlist.
Afterwards the tool verifies the equivalence of both netlists. This kind of verification avoids an
extensive simulation of the modified netlist and it is fast and safe.
4.5.9 Layout
In the layout phase of a system with integrated SSCI the “don’t touch” attribute has to be set for
the SSCI. This is required to avoid that the layout tool performs any optimization which could
influence the functionality. The control logic and the compare units are standard cells and they
are distributed on power rails besides all other standard cells of the processor. The OTP is a hard
macro cell, which means that it is a fully pre-layouted design with pins for inputs, outputs and
power supply. In case power gating is used to allow a deep sleep mode of this memory, special
power gating cells have to be inserted.
To optimize the timing and area utilization the layout tools offer a command to reorder the
scan chain. After synthesis the order of the scan chain, this means the output of one flip flop to
the input of another flip flop, is more or less random. It could cause that a flip flop in one corner
of the ASIC is connected to a flip flop in the opposite one. The effort for the wiring is increased.
The process of reordering the scan chain reduces this effort to a minimum, because each flip
flop in the scan chain is connected to its nearest neighbor. The functionality of the design is not
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Figure 64: Netlist modification step to replace single bit scan_enable by 128 bit bus
scan_enable
influenced by this modification. Only the test vectors have to be generated again. For timing and
area critical designs a reordering of the scan chain is indispensable, but solutions like proposed
in [67] and [66] and many other scan chain protection mechanism do not support it.
4.5.10 Test
During the test phase additional test pattern have to applied to the DUT as described in Section
4.6 in detail.
4.6 Test
Goal of the developed SSCI is at the one hand an effective security mechanism and on the other
hand to ensure that the design is fully testable without any restrictions. In the following section
the process of test for a design with SSCI is described.
The OTP, which is built-in as storage for the secret key, requires a high programing voltage.
The discussion in Section 4.4.3 concludes that this voltage is applied on a dedicated input pad.
For this case the test environment has to deliver the programming voltage. To provide different
voltages, e.g. for core and pad power supply, and even for analogue circuits, is a standard
function of test equipment. So the voltage for the OTP can be delivered without any additional
means.
4.6.1 Process of Scan Pattern Generation
For scan tests a set of test pattern is necessary. These patterns are generated by tools like Tetra-
Max (Synopsys) [78]. In a DRC the test pattern tool verifies that all scan flip flops are fully
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controllable. To control a scan flip flop in test mode all inputs and outputs of the flip flop have
to be accessible via the scan interface. Thus the clock signal, data input and data output as well
as the scan_enable signal have to be controllable in the scan mode.
Two different cases have to be considered for pattern generation. The first case is the gener-
ation of pattern of the original netlist directly after synthesis. This can be done as for any other
scan design. Any flip flop is controllable with scan_enable signal and the design passed the
DRC.
The second case has to be considered, if the scan chain was reordered in the layout phase
as described in Section 4.5.2. The netlist contains the compare units and they influence the
scan_enable signal. Therefor the secret key has to be applied to the input of the compare
units using corresponding commands in the test pattern generator. With the correct secret key,
applied at the input, the scan_enable signal is controllable and DRC is passed.
After this, the generation of the test pattern is the same as for any other case. Also any type of
test pattern can be generated, e.g. test on stack-at faults or even a path delay test. The number
of test vectors is equal to a design without SSCI.
4.6.2 Test Process
In contrast to an unprotected design, two additional patterns are required to perform the test: the
first pattern for setting the secret key before the test and the second pattern to delete the secret
key after the test. In Figure 65 the step for setting the secret key is marked in green and the step
for deleting it in orange. These patterns can be generated in a simulation as described in Section
4.5.7 and they are in VCD or in EVCD format. The test patterns from TetraMax are in WGL
or in STIL format. During the setup phase the test engineer integrates all test patterns, even in
different formats, into the test program.
For writing the key a certain time interval is required. At first the sending the secret key into
the device at the SPI requires 384 clock cycles. Second the writing of the secret key into the
OTP. To write one data word into this memory a time of 100 µs and for the full secret key a time
of 1.2 ms is required. If the device has a system clock of 10 MHz, additional 12,384 clock cycles
are necessary for the setup. After the post-production test, the secret key has to be deleted. The
deletion of the secret key is equal to a write process and all bits are written. Again a time of
1.2 ms is necessary to deactivate the SSCI.
The handling of the test pattern file, which contains more precisely the secret key, has to
be done in a secure way. A file transfer should be done using Secure Copy (SCP) or FTP
over Secure Socket Layer (SSL). Also the access rights of the data should be restricted to
trusted employees only. Nevertheless the secret key in hands of an attacker is not sufficient for a
successful attack. The attacker needs an untested ASIC to enable the secure scan chain in a fast
way.
4.6.3 Support of Several Test Cycles
In times of 3D integration, each die can be tested separately and after stacked bond procedure an
additional test can be performed again. There are two different possibilities to solve the problem
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Figure 65: Test ﬂow for an ASIC with SSCI. The steps for setting the secret key, marked in
green, and the steps for deleting the secret key, marked in orange, are additional to
the standard test ﬂow.
of an additional test. The ﬁrst one is not to delete secret key after test. The secret key is deleted
after the ﬁnal integration test, only.
The second possibility to perform a second test is a second row in the OTP. After the ﬁrst test
of the die, the secret key is deleted. In the ﬁnal test, after the 3D integration, the secret key is
written into the second row of the OTP and the scan chain interface is re-enabled until this key
is deleted too.
The same approach, i.e. a second row in the OTP can be used for an aging test. In the ﬁrst
post production test the ﬁrst entry in the OTP is used. After a certain time in operation the device
is tested again. In this test the second row in OTP is used. Since the scan chain test can be done
without any limitations even an error analysis can be done. This is helpful to identify types of
digital standard cells, which can be improved to minimize aging effects.
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4.6.4 Advantages of the Proposed Solution
The generated test patterns from the scan pattern tool can be used without any modification.
This is an important fact, because the test pattern generators are not adaptable with respect to
secure scan chain interfaces. Furthermore any compression technique for test patterns can be
used combined with the proposed SSCI.
Even a test, in which the maximum operation frequency of the device is determined, can be
performed. This test requires one test pattern, followed by two operation clock cycles and a
read out of the data via the scan chain. This kind of test is important to classify the produced
devices into different speed grades. Once the scan interface is enabled, it is not influenced by
the protection mechanism.
4.6.5 Potential Weaknesses
The secret key is written into the device without an authentication scheme. Without this secu-
rity mechanism, everyone is able to set the key on a certain value and to delete the key. The
disadvantage of an authentication scheme is the required area for a hardware implementation of
the ECC algorithm as described in [18]. Beside that everyone is able to set the secret key in the
device; every device is able to receive the secret key. E.g. an attacker can grab the secret key
during a test with a special prepared ASIC. This ASIC needs an SPI to receive the commands
with the secret key, coming from the test equipment. An NVM stores the data permanently. In a
later step the attacker reads out the memory and extracts the secret key.
A further weak point is the physical access during the test procedure. If the DUT is not
protected against physical access, an attacker can remove a device during a running test. As
result he gets a device in which the scan interface is still enabled.
An access control for employees in the field of ASIC production and test is self-evident and
the trusted environment minimizes the problems above.
4.7 Evaluation
In this section the SSCI is analyzed with respect to its influence on the target device.
4.7.1 Influence on the Target
The main influence on the target system is applied to the scan chain interface. An additional
component is integrated to support the feature to unlock and lock the SSCI. This means for the
test case the system gets an additional function: write and delete of the secret key. All other
components are untouched. After a test and deleting the secret key it is no longer possible to
enable the shift register functionality of a scan chain.
4.7.2 Area
In Table 8 the area of the compare units and the AND gates is given. The AND gates are respon-
sible for ensuring that the output of the scan_enable bus is only activated, if all compare
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Table 8: Area of compare units (128 bit) including
AND module.
Cell type Number of Instances Area
CMP 128 7,224 µm2
AND gates 1 128 5,418 µm2
Sum 12,642 µm2
1128 AND gates are the AND module
Table 9: Area of SSCI after synthesis and estimated
area for layout.
Component Area (synthesis) Area (layout)1
Controller 0.003 mm2 0.004 mm2
SPI slave 0.011 mm2 0.014 mm2
Compare cells 0.013 mm2 0.017 mm2
OTP - 2 0.097 mm2
Sum 0.132 mm2
1Estimated
2Hard macro, layout only
units have a valid output. These compare units and AND gates are special modules and fix in
structure and area for a given key length.
The SSCI controller and the SPI component are written in HDL and the required area differs,
depending of the synthesis tool. The synthesis of both components was done by Synopsys DC
[75]. The OTP is generated with a memory generator and integrated as hard macro. In Table 9
an overview about the required area for all components is given.
For controller, interface and compare cells the additional area overhead for routing is not
considered in the synthesis phase. Typically 30 % of the area is added during placement. This
value is added in the second column of Table 9 to get more accurate area estimation.
The netlist after synthesis has to be modified as described in Section 4.5. In this process the
scan_enable input is split to a bus. Since only the wiring is changed, the input load of all
cells is identical to one of the non-modified netlist. Additional buffers are not required and the
area is not influenced.
The additional area required for the SSCI is relatively small compared to the area of a full
processor. For example the core of the openMSP430 requires an area of 15.8 mm2 in the layout
phase including cryptographic cores and memories. In Table 9 the area after layout for the SSCI
is given with 0.132 mm2. This means that area overhead for the secure scan chain interface is
less than 1 % of the protected system. For benchmarking issues the area is equal to 5,196 GE 2.
2A gate equivalent is 25.4 µm2 in 0.25 µm IHP Technology
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4.7.3 Power
In the following the power consumption for different cases is described. The analysis of the
power consumption as well as the one of the timing was done with a typical nominal voltage of
2.5 V and a temperature of 25 ◦C for the 0.25 µm IHP technology.
Power in Test Mode In the post-production test, the power is provided by the power supply
of the test equipment. During a scan chain test a high number of gates switches at the same
time which causes a high current flow. It is important that the additional security mechanism for
the scan chain does not increase the power consumption significantly. Otherwise the ASIC is at
risk, due to a damaged power supply pad because a high current in pad and the temperature is
increased to a dangerous level.
In test mode the additional SSCI component does not influence the power consumption of the
system significantly. The scan_enable signal is a simple input. Due to the fact that high
number of a flip flops is driven by the scan_enable signal, a buffer tree is required. After
integration of the SSCI, a similar buffer tree is required because the input capacitance of all
connected flip flops is the same as without SSCI.
For the compare units only combinatorial cells are used. This means that the units con-
sumes power only if the input is changed. The input is either the secret key from the OTP
or the scan_enable signal. The secret key from the OTP is fixed most of the time and
is only changed to enable and to disable the scan chain interface. In contrast to the key the
scan_enable signal is changed during a scan test for each test vector.
To assert the scan_enable signal, the compare units require an energy of 8.88 pW s for the
example design with a 128 bit secret key. To disable the shift register functionality, which means
setting the scan_enable signal to low, consumes 9.72 pW s. In sum an energy of 18.6 pW s
is consumed by the compare units for one scan test vector. The openMSP430 requires an energy
of 2.14 µW s to shift in one scan test vector. This means that the additional power overhead is
negligible and the power consumption during the scan chain test is not influenced significant.
Power in Operation Mode The power in the operation mode has to be considered for two
different cases. The first case is the operation cycle during scan chain test and the second case is
the operation mode when the scan chain is fully disabled. In both cases the input of the compare
units is static. The scan_enable signal is low and all bits of the secret key from the OTP are
at a defined value. So the dynamic power consumption is zero.
Leakage For sensor nodes the standby current is an important factor to get a long battery
life time. Most of the time the device is in standby mode and the leakage dominates the power
consumption. The power consumption of the controller and the OTP can be reduced by using a
power gating technology. Controller and OTP are separate modules with their own power supply
rings. In these rings the power gates are integrated and the components can be switched off to
save energy. Without power gating the controller has a leakage of 11.6 nW. For the OTP the
leakage is not given in the data sheet, so this value cannot be considered.
97
For the compare units the approach of power gating is not useful, because the digital standard
cells are distributed in the core area. Only the leakage power of the compare units and the AND
gates increases the power consumption in operation mode.
In Table 10 the different cases for the leakage analysis are described. Every digital standard
cell has a leakage current, which depends of the cell type and the value of the inputs. In column
3 and 4 the leakage is estimated for the case that a secret key is stored in the OTP. In both
cases, scan_enable signal on and off, have to be considered. The values for the leakage in
operation mode are given in column 5 of Table 10. The cells are not in a separate power island
and cannot be disconnected from the power supply. The leakage is approximately 10.5 nW.
The openMSP430 has a leakage of 4.3 µW, which means that the additional cells for the SSCI
increase the leakage of the protected design by 0.2 % only.
Table 10: Leakage of compare units and AND gates. These cells are distributed in the lay-
out and cannot be disconnected from the power supply in non-test mode. For the
compare units a set of 64 CMP0 and 64 CMP1 is assumed.
Cell # Secret key set,
scan_enable=’1’
Secret key set,
scan_enable=’0’
Secret key deleted,
interface disabled
Compare unit 128 7,210 pW 5,420 pW 5,890 pW
AND gate 128 5,403 pW 4,587 pW 4,587 pW
Sum 256 12,613 pW 10,007 pW 10,477 pW
4.7.4 Timing
The developed approach for protecting the scan chain influences the timing in the test mode.
The design itself is not changed and the protection mechanism influences the scan_enable
signal only. The scan_enable signal is an input of the compare units, which have an internal
delay.
In Table 11 and 12 the path delay for each type is shown. Both types of compare units have
the same delay of 0.09 ns. In Figure 66 and 67 the schematic for both types of compare cells is
shown, which helps to understand why both cell types have the same internal delay. The data
value of the key_in signal is fixed as long as the OTP has the same content. At the beginning
of a scan chain test, the secret key is written into the device. From this point on, the key is fixed
at the input of the compare cells, until the secret key is deleted after a successful test. Due to
the static key input the inverter U1 has a static output for CMP0 and for CMP1 the inverter U1
is fully bypassed. The internal delay of the cell depends on changes of the scan_enable_in
signal only.
For the example design with a 128 bit key, the enable signal has to be forwarded through
128 gates as shown in Figure 68. For the 0.25 µm IHP technology the scan_enable_in
signal is propagated to all flip flops in approximately 10 ns if the secret key is correct. In Figure
69 the simulation for this case is shown. This additional delay has to be considered when the
scan_enable_in signal is set. During a scan test this is required before a scan pattern is
loaded into the DUT. The clock frequency which is used to shift data into the scan chain is
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Table 11: Delay of Compare Unit CMP0
with fixed key_in signal and
variable scan_enable_in
signal
Cell type and name Delay
Inverter U1 0.00 ns
NAND U2 0.06 ns
Inverter U3 0.03 ns
Sum 0.09 ns
Table 12: Delay of Compare Unit CMP1
with fixed key_in signal and
variable scan_enable_in
signal
Cell type and name Delay
Inverter U1 0.00 ns
NAND U2 0.06 ns
Inverter U3 0.03 ns
Sum 0.09 ns
U1
U2key_in
scan_enable_in enable_out
U3
Static input = 0
0/1
10
1/0 0/1
Delay 0ns 0.06ns 0.03ns
Switching input = 0 /1
Figure 66: Schematic for timing analysis of CMP0
low; typically the period is 100 ns. Thus the additional delay does not influence the timing
constraints for test patterns. The same internal delay of CMP0 and CMP1 prevents an extraction
of the secret key. For a 128 bit secret key the delay to enable the scan chain is the same.
In case of setting the scan_enable_in signal to logic “0”, the information is propagated
in 0.27 ns to each scan flip flop as shown in the simulation in Figure 70. The delay in test mode
is necessary and cannot be improved without influence into area and power consumption.
In summary, the most important fact is that the timing in the operation mode is not affected.
Since the logic path is not changed, the additional circuit does not cause a delay. This is an
important fact to prevent an attack, which observes the timing behavior.
4.7.5 Adaptability and Scalability
A well designed protection mechanism is well designed only if it can be reused for any sys-
tem without circumstances or modifications. The main idea behind the SSCI, is to control the
scan_enable_in signal. Since scan flip flops have a common architecture, it can be used for
different technologies which uses traditional scan flip flops or even scan latches. A precondition
is that the used technology supports MIM capacitors to contribute the required invisible isolator.
Without this isolator the developed approach works as well, but the compare units for “0” and
“1” have an individual foot print in layout. An attack based on reverse engineering would be
easier.
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Figure 67: Schematic for timing analysis of CMP1
Figure 68: Logic path for AND module. The last scan_enable signal (scan_enable[127])
is activated, if the corresponding bit of the secret key is correct and all other secret
key bits before are correct, too. This causes a long logic path and a long propagation
time.
10ns 19.2ns
Figure 69: Delay for scan_enable_in signal. At 10 ns the scan chain functionality is
switched on and at 19.2 ns the scan_enable bus is fully switched on. The propa-
gation delay is 9.2 ns.
100
30ns
30.268ns
Figure 70: Delay for releasing the scan_enable_in signal. At 30 ns the scan chain func-
tionality is switched off and at 30.27 ns the scan_enable bus is fully switched
off. The propagation delay is 0.27 ns.
In the chosen example the secret key has a length of 128 bit. For every bit of the OTP one
compare unit has to be integrated into the design. Any adaption of the length of the secret key
is realizable with low effort. As described in Section 4.9.1 a generic verilog implementation is
provided in this work. It is adaptable regarding key length and key value. Even the test bench
for the stand alone simulation is automatically adapted.
Furthermore only the scan_enable signal is touched, independent whether the design has
one scan chain or a lot of them. The area is not influenced by this fact. Even the number of
scan flip flops is not restricted by this approach. The power consumption, area and timing are
independent of the design size and depend only on the key length.
The minimum number of flip flops in a secured design is equal to the number of bits of the
key. In this case for every flip flop one bit of the key is responsible. An upscaling of the number
of scan flip flops to any value is possible. Independent of the number of flip flops, all bits of the
secret key have to be set to the correct value to enable the scan chain.
The provided TCL script, for modifying the netlist, counts the number of scan flip flops. From
the number of scan flip flops into the design and the number of key bits, the script calculates the
number of scan flip flops with a shared scan_enable signal.
Vendors of soft IP blocks offer encrypted netlists to protect their knowledge. In this case it
is necessary that the vendor executes the TCL script before netlist encryption. Afterwards the
encrypted netlist can be integrated by the customer in its system like any other component.
4.8 Security Analysis
In the following selected attacks against the security mechanism are evaluated. As described in
Section 2.1 different groups of attackers are classified. Essentially the first two groups (begin-
ners and independents) should not be able to get access to the device. For the third group, the
business, the required investment to get the key or to get access to device internals should be
much higher than the expected ROI.
The new security mechanism for a scan chain is evaluated on a system which has a secret key
length of 128 bit. From symmetric cipher algorithms is known that a brute force attack with
such a high number of different keys is nearly impossible, so that a key length of 128 bit is
recommended in [7]. In sum 2128 combinations for the secret key are possible which is equal
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to 3.438. Due to statistical analysis the secret key would be found after testing of 1.738 keys in
average.
4.8.1 Attacks using a Hardware Trojan
The ASIC which contains the SSCI is relevant to security. The assumption can be done, that the
final integration of the device, from writing RTL code to layout and verification of it, is in hand
of one company. In many cases an ASIC contains supplied IP cores. These additional cores are
delivered in RTL code or in an encrypted netlist. The RTL code can be reviewed and malicious
code can be discovered. In case of an encrypted netlist, such a code review is not possible.
The developed SSCI in this work is a stand-alone module, which enables and disables the scan
chain interface without any interaction to any components. Thus a compromising component,
independent whether internal or external, is not security risk. The secret key inside of the OTP
is not readable by any other component. Even if the IP core with the Trojan is part of the scan
chain, it is not possible to extract useful information to re-enable the scan chain again.
4.8.2 Recovering the Key from the OTP
There are two places where the key is stored, for a certain time interval in the OTP and perma-
nently in the compare logic. In the OTP the key is destroyed after finishing the scan test, so it is
vanished. Nevertheless, a device with the secret key stored in the OTP, keeps it secret. A read
access is not possible because port for read access is not connected. At the end of the test, the
secret key into the OTP is deleted. So no information is in the OTP at the time of shipment to
the end user and no useful information can be earned in a reverse engineering step.
In the following is evaluated, whether it is feasible to extract the secret key from the OTP if
the step of deleting the secret key during post-production test is skipped.
Optical Inspection In [69] it is described that fuse bits in a layout can be identified. As
example in Figure 7 a small regular structure is marked; this is probably the OTP in this ASIC.
For programming the cells a high voltage is required. Either this voltage comes from outside
or it is generated by a step up circuit, which is easy to identify in a pure digital layout. From this
circuit or the dedicated power pad to the cells a connection exists, so that the OTP can be found
by an attacker. The located OTP in the ASIC is a starting point for an attack based on optical
inspection.
But recovering the secret key from OTP by optical inspection is infeasible. In Figure 71 sev-
eral bits of an OTP are shown and every second bit is programmed. Also in this high resolution
TEM extended by EDX there is no difference visible between the transistors.
Electrical Probing The approach for getting the secret key from OTP with electrical probing
is similar to the compare units. A hole has to be drilled into the ASIC with a FIB at the position
of the outputs. The ASIC is connected to the power supply and with a needle probe the value
of the OTP can be measured one by one. In contrast to the compare units only one measuring
probe is required. For the compare units two different needle probes are necessary. One needle,
which injects a low or high signal at the key_in and the second needle to grab the output value
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Figure 71: EDX photograph of programmed and unprogrammed OTP cells in IHP 0.25 µm tech-
nology. A difference between them is not visible.
(a) Top view photograph of verti-
cal metal2 and vias to horizontal
metal3. In the red marked area
a MIM structure is built-in (200x
magnification).
(b) Zoom in of Figure 72a (500x mag-
nification).
(c) Top view of 72a in dark field illu-
mination.
Figure 72: ASIC in IHP 0.25 µm technology with MIM structure in optical inspection. Even in
the zoom is no difference in top view visible.
of the circuit. In case of the OTP the value is fixed and stored in the memory cell and a stimulus
is not required to get the output value.
4.8.3 Recovering the Key from the Compare Units
Reverse Engineering For the compare logic the situation is a bit more sensitive. Here the
key cannot be erased, i.e. it is still there even after deployment. But the MIM structure used to
define the compare cell zero and one cannot be detected by optical inspection. In Figure 72a a
photo of a circuit with a MIM structure between the metallization layers 2 and 3 is shown. The
marked area in Figure 72b is a via between metal 2 and metal 3 with an additional isolation layer
under the via itself. Even in illumination with dark field in Figure 72c no difference between the
marked via with MIM structure and all standard vias is visible.
In Figure 72 a top view is shown as it can be seen in a suitable microscope. In contrast to that
in Figure 73 is a vertical view of a single structure of a MIM structure is shown. The photograph
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(a) TEM photograph of MIM structure in hor-
izontal view between Metal2 and Metal3.
The thin isolation is located at the bottom of
the view, marked with a red circle. The white
circle marks a regular via without isolation.
(b) EDX photograph of 73a. Different materi-
als are marked in different colors. The dif-
ference between a via with a connection be-
tween two metal layers and the via including
the isolation is clearly visible.
Figure 73: MIM structure, fabricated in IHP 0.25 µm technology in horizontal view.
is taken with a Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM). The additional isolation between the
metal 2 and the via on top can be seen, so that the type of the compare unit can be identified.
To generate a photograph as shown in Figure 73 a well-equipped laboratory is necessary. At
first with a FIB the part of the compare unit with the MIM structure has to be cut out. Second
the piece has to be analyzes in an Energy-Dispersive X-ray spectroscopy (EDX) process. This
process has to be done 128 times until all compare units are analyzed. In average one day is
required to analyze one compare unit and the DUA is destroyed. After the secret key is extracted,
the OTP of a further device has to be fixed to set the key.
Nevertheless such an analysis is required for every compare unit. This means at first all com-
pare units has to be identified in a reverse engineering step and second a very time consuming
analysis have to be done.
Electrical Probing A second possibility to extract the secret key from a compare unit is
electrical probing. This can be done by micro probing which is normally used for searching
defects caused by the production process. The applicability of this technique depends on the
manufacturing technology, i.e. gate size, and on the metal layer on which the MIM is used. The
lower the layer the more difficult it is to do micro probing. The inputs of the compare unit can
be set with a small needle probe. A third needle is placed at the output of the compare unit to
read out the value. To perform this attack at first the compare units has to be identified. In the
next step a hole has to be grabbed into the ASIC, using a FIB, because the wires for the compare
units are on lower level. E.g. for the 0.25 µm IHP technology the width of the wires in metal 2
and 3 is 420 nm, so that a set of very small needle probes is required.
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Figure 74: Illustration of the EBAC technique. An electron beam scans the surface of the ASIC
and injects electrons and a needle probe is connected to the metal wire.
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Figure 75: Compare units CMP0 and CMP1 shows different pictures in an EBAC analysis. Only
the metal stripe in green is visible.
EBAC An alternative technique to attack the compare logic is the use of a Electron Beam
Absorbed Current (EBAC) station. This device is able to detect shorts or opens on metal layers.
The principle is shown in Figure 74. The observed metal stripe has to be connected to the EBAC
with a needle. An electron beam scans the surface of the ASIC and injects charges. Metal lines
absorb the injected charge and a current is induced. This current can be measured with the small
needle probe with an amplifier. All connected metal stripes -also on different metal layers- can
be seen in the resulting picture.
The wiring of both compare unit types is the same, but the MIM structure causes a different
current induction. For this task it is necessary to know the location of all compare units and a
FIB to make a hole for connecting the key_in signal of every compare unit with the needle
probe. Such a system is able to show, whether the compare logic compares to “0” or “1”. The
different measurements of the EBAC analysis of both compare units are illustrated in Figure 75.
A relatively simple way to prevent testing of the compare logic by an EBAC system is to
implement it on the lower metal layers only, so that its accessibility is hindered by higher metal
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Table 13: Calculation of leakage for CMP0. The secret key in OTP is deleted and fixed on
logical “1”. Only the scan_enable_ can be set.
Cell Leakage scan_enable_in=“1” Leakage scan_enable_in=“0”
Inverter U1 13.984 pW 14.114 pW
Nand U2 23.350 pW 21.854 pW
Inverter U3 13.984 pW 14.114 pW
Sum 51.319 pW 49.823 pW
Table 14: Calculation of leakage for CMP1. The secret key in OTP is deleted and fixed on
logical “1”. Only the scan_enable_ can be set.
Cell Leakage scan_enable_in=“1” Leakage scan_enable_in=“0”
Inverter U1 13.984 pW 13.984 pW
Nand U2 27.968 pW 14.244 pW
Inverter U3 14.244 pW 13.984 pW
Sum 56.198 pW 42.213 pW
layers. Additionally the wiring can be redesigned in a manner, that both compare units have the
same view in the EBAC analysis.
Leakage Current Even the leakage current of cells can be helpful for an attacker to get
the required information. Leakage current is a property of cells and it cannot be avoided in
most cases. A full power-off is the only solution to prevent the very small current flow of the
circuit. Although the leakage current has very low entropy it is necessary to verify that even this
information is not helpful for an attacker. The goal of the attacker can be to decrease the search
space for the secret key by measuring the leakage current. If there is a large difference between
the leakage current of both types of compare units, it might be possible to derive the number of
CMP0 and CMP1 in a circuit.
In case of a device in which the secret key is deleted, the key_in input of the compare unit
is static. The scan_enable_in signal can be set by the user because it is connected to a pad
of the ASIC.
In Table 13 and Table 14 the leakage is shown for both types of compares cells. The difference
of the leakage between CMP0 and CMP1 is higher, if scan_enable_in signal is set to logical
“0”. An SSCI with a 128 bit key should have 64 compare units of each type in average. A set
of 64 CMP0 and 64 CMP1 units has a leakage of 5.9 nW. A secret key with the lowest leakage
consists of 128 CMP1 cells. The leakage is 5.4 nW. In contrast to this, the highest leakage of
6.4 nW has a secret key with 128 CMP0 cells.
So secret key has a leakage current of 5.9 nW ± 0.5 nW. Compared to a processor design of
the openMSP430 with a leakage current of 4.3 µW, it is only a fraction. It seems that it is not
possible to estimate the number of CMP0 and CMP1 cells in a design. Furthermore the leakage
current of a design has a high variation from device to device.
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4.8.4 Re-enabling the Scan Chain
The ﬁrst idea to re-enable the scan chain by an attacker would be to ﬁx the OTP. Keep in mind
that it is not sufﬁcient to ﬂip all bits from “1” to “0” using a FIB. This works only for a pro-
tection mechanism in which the fuse bit is in the logic path of the scan_enable signal. In
[58] an example for disconnecting the scan_enable signal with one or more fuse bits was
discussed. Due to the fact that we use a secret key, every bit of the OTP has to have the right
value. Otherwise the scan chain is not enabled.
Since revealing the key directly from the OTP cells or the compare logic is nearly infeasible
and due to the fact that no observable operations that could be used as side channel are executed,
a potential attacker could use a brute force attack to set the secret key in the OTP.
To repair the memory cells of an OTP special hardware equipment, a FIB, is required. The
average time for one bit is approx. 3-4 hours. If the OTP array is 128 bit long and each OTP cell
can have the value of “0” or “1”, so that 2128 different keys are possible. This means that the
average time to break an OTP key is 2(length of OTP−1) * 3.5 hours. In addition to the time as a
prohibitive factor, no ASIC will survive 2128 FIB operations.
With an extraction of the secret key from the compare units via FIB or electrical probing, the
very high effort of a brute force attack is avoided and the secret key can be set in OTP. Even
this approach is time consuming and it is not guaranteed that the device is still working after
modiﬁcation.
An alternative to ﬁx the secret key in the OTP is the modiﬁcation of the compare units. Ev-
ery compare unit gets a re-wiring so that the check of the key_in signal is bypassed and the
scan_enable signal is forwarded directly. Even this approach has a high effort because every
compare unit has to be ﬁxed with a FIB.
4.8.5 Financial Analysis
In the following a ﬁnancial analysis is given. The attack is most suitable attack as described
in Section 4.8.3. To analyze all compare units at ﬁrst a reverse engineering step is required to
identify them. In a second step every compare unit from the ASIC have to be analyzed in a TEM.
The effort, time and costs, for a reverse engineering depends of the design and the facilities in
the laboratory and the used software. Once compare unit is identiﬁed, it has to be prepared for
the analysis in TEM. It has to be cut from the ASIC using a FIB. In service facilities the price
for one hour in FIB or TEM is 200e and the estimated effort in timing is about 20 hours. To
analyze one compare unit the costs are 4,000e.
To protect the scan chain in this work an example with 128 bit is given. It means that for
the analysis of the whole secret key a budget of more than 500,000e has to be calculated. Fur-
thermore 320 working days are required. This estimation includes the analysis of the compare
units only without setting the secret key in the OTP. To set one bit in OTP around two working
days are required. In case of many metallization layers the time can be increased signiﬁcantly.
Furthermore the device is destroyed completely during the analysis and for ﬁxing the secret key
a second device is necessary. This approach works only if the analyzed and the ﬁxed ASIC have
the same secret key. In sum an amount of roughly 1,000,000e seems to be realistic as cost for
a potential attack.
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For a successful attack a well-equipped laboratory is required and an extensive knowledge
in ASIC design and production. Even for business attackers the effort seems very high to re-
enabling the scan chain again. An investment of roughly 1,000,000e is required to get access to
the device. The government as attacker class is out of focus because of time, effort and money
are no issue. Last but not least it is a very time consuming task to ﬁx the ASIC in that way, that
the scan chain is working again.
4.9 Enhancement and Alternative Implementations
The shown mechanism for the SSCI might have some weak points. For example that the secret
key is equal for all devices or that the design kit does not offer OTP memory. In the following
some enhancements or alternatives for parts of the SSCI are shown.
4.9.1 Conﬁguration and Security of the Secret Key
The secret key to enable the SSCI is part of the design and it is set in an early design phase in the
default design process. Many developers have access to the secret key, which can be a security
gap. In the age of global supply chains many different companies are involved in the fabrication
of an ASIC.
To get a minimum in security, the secret key is stored in an encrypted source ﬁle. The key is
not readable with a text editor, but from a simulation it is possible to extract it. Unfortunately,
the vendors of the design tools for synthesis, simulation and layout do not give any information
about the used encryption scheme and it can be that the used algorithm is risky too. Furthermore
the encryption scheme is vendor speciﬁc. This causes that for synthesis as well as for layout the
same vendor of the tools has to be used.
The setting of the secret key should be possible at different levels. Many processes during
ASIC fabrication are outsourced and the global supply chain comprises many hands before the
ASIC is ready to use. A solution for this problem is a process with trusted suppliers. E.g. the
company “Onsemi” offers such a technology. But the additional security increases the cost.
Another possibility is to shift the integration of the secret key into the design to a later stage than
the RTL design. In Figure 76 the different stages are shown in which the secret key can be set.
In the following the different stages of the device manufacturing are explained, in which a
setting of the golden key is possible. As later as in the design ﬂow, as less as persons have
access to the golden key. The security of the golden key is the same, equal in which design
phase the key is set.
Logic Synthesis During RTL development a source ﬁle with a default secret key is used. In
the following logic synthesis another ﬁle with secret to use key is read-in and the default secret
key is replaced by a new one.
Layout The next possible stage to replace a default secret key is in the layout phase. In
the conﬁguration step the netlist from the logic synthesis is set as input for the layout tool. It
is possible to read in several netlist ﬁles, which are combined into one design. This offers the
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possibility to read in a netlist with the system design including the SSCI but with a default key. A
second netlist contains the component with the “real” secret key and overwrites the default one.
The setting of the secret key is moved in a later stage of the design flow and fewer developers
have access to the secret key.
Layout Verification During the layout verification process the secret key can be set, too.
Therefore it is necessary to use a master design of CMP0 and CMP1 for the layout phase. The
difference between both types of compare units is the different placement of small isolators. So,
the master for CMP0 and CMP1 consists of the three basic cells without any isolation layer. The
isolation layer, the configuration of the compare cells, can be integrated into the back end phase.
In the DRC and LVS steps or during generation of layout data for production, a modification of
any mask layer is possible. Therefore, a tool can be developed that generates the rectangles in
isolation layer to set the configuration of each compare unit. In the end the layout of the ASIC
is written in a format, which can be delivered to mask production company.
Fabrication If more security is required and the fab does not trust the mask manufacturer, the
secret key can be set even in production. To choose between both types during ASIC production,
a change of processing the isolation layer is necessary and a mask is requires which contains a
rectangle for isolation at both positions for CMP0 and CMP1. The mask manufacturer does not
know which type of compare unit is chosen in the production.
Now a feature of lithographic machines can be used. Selected areas can be exposed, or even
not, to create the isolator rectangles individually. An advantage of this solution is that the secret
key can be set individually for each ASIC without additional costs for masks set. In this case the
effort for the device handling and key management is increased. A database is required, which
stores which key is used in which device. Any mistake in this database causes an untestable
device and it cannot be shipped to customers.
The fabrication is the last stage in the design flow, in which the type of the compare units,
and thereby the secret key, can be chosen. At this point the costumer has to trust the ASIC
manufacturer.
4.9.2 Golden Key
Alternative Layout The cost discussed in Section 4.8 holds true only in case the security
elements (compare units and OTP) are implemented as described above i.e. a fixed layout. At
the moment it based on two inverters and one NAND gate. An implementation which is logical
equivalent to the existing solution, but with different types of cells, is also possible. Furthermore
the layout of the compare units can be done in many other ways. With low effort the compare
units can be prepared in such a way, that the layout is not fixed anymore. The layout tool like
Encounter from Cadence [8] places the digital standard cells of the compare units. Typically
the cells are not placed side by side, but with some distance between each other and at different
positions for each unit. So it is harder for an attacker to identify the compare units in a layout.
Such an alternative layout causes more effort and it results in higher cost. To verify the approach
of the wiring with MIM layers, it is sufficient to use the fixed CMP units.
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Figure 76: Simplified design flow for ASIC development, production and test. Stages, in which
the secret key can be set, are marked in green.
Alternative Storage In principle the compare units are a distributed key storage. It can be
replaced by a PUF. After fabrication the value from the PUF is readout, stored in a database and
the readout functionality via user interface is disabled in the following. To enable the scan chain
the corresponding value for the device from the database is written into its OTP. A component
checks the data from the OTP and from the PUF and this replaces the compare units. Such a PUF
generates a device specific key and not per design. Furthermore this approach is more secure
because no one of the involved parties during the ASIC development and production knows the
key and a reverse engineering to get its value is not possible.
Other solutions to store the golden key, like flash or array ROM are not well suitable as
described in Section 2.5.2 because they are vulnerable. The value of a flash can be influenced
by a laser and the ROM is prone for reverse engineering.
4.9.3 OTP Replacement
For foundries which do not offer OTP memories the OTP can be replaced by SRAM or an flip
flop array. In this case before the scan chain test, the secret key has to be written into the memory.
The disadvantage of this system is, that it is less secure than the OTP version. The time which is
required to brute force a secret key is much smaller than for the OTP version. So it is required
to choose a longer key to increase the time for brute forcing significantly. Furthermore the SSCI
cannot be fully deactivated after post-production test. While a FIB is necessary to switch the
bit value of the OTP, for the volatile memory no special equipment is necessary. Clearly an
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OTP bases on a standard CMOS process, so that the circuit can be developed for every CMOS
technology.
4.9.4 Interface JTAG
Currently the SSCI is implemented with an SPI as communication interface which is sufficient
for a design study. The protection mechanism can be applied on a design with a JTAG interface
with the limitation that the SPI is used for the SSCI. To optimize the SSCI it is possible to use
the IEEE1500 standard for test interfaces [33]. Besides dedicated registers for controlling the
test, such user defined registers are called Core Data Register (CDR). The advantage of this
solution is that no further pads are required to set and delete the secret key. Furthermore the
IEEE1500 standard allows different subcores, so that different types of cores are possible, e.g.
one protected and one unprotected core or two protected cores with different secret keys and so
on.
Nevertheless a combination of an unprotected and a protected core should be avoided. It has
to be ensured that no secret data can be copied from the protected subcore to the unprotected
one. Clearly the unprotected core cannot grab the secret key as described in Section 4.8 but the
risk exists that an unprotected core has access to data of the protected core. This is a security
leakage.
4.10 Discussion and Comparison
In Table 15 a comparison of different security mechanisms including the SSCI for scan chains
is shown. Secure test approaches like BIST are not evaluated because they do not fulfill the
requirement of an extensive error diagnosis.
The evaluation of the SSCI showed that the time for activating the scan functionality is in mid-
range of all solutions in Table 15. Although it is in the mid-range the SSCI is twenty times faster
than the slow ECC based solution. Even the required silicon area is small compared to other
solutions. The abandonment of an authentication scheme reduced the implementation effort,
area and time for activation significantly.
The public-private key authentication scheme introduced in [18] is effective against attacks,
because only the public key is stored into the device. To enable the scan chain a private key
has to be known. This private key is not stored in the ASIC and the private key itself is not
transferred into the device. In fact the result of a computation is send to the device. This is
in contrast to the solution in this work. Here the secret key is stored hidden in compare units.
But the effort for the authentication based solution is enormous. The required area is very large,
especially in case that an ECC is not needed for the design itself. Furthermore it is very tricky
to fulfill the requirements for levels 3 and 4 of FIPS 140-3 [57]. In this document of security
requirements for cryptographic modules an exhaustive test of every module is stipulated. But in
[18] the ECC module is part of the test infrastructure and a test of this module is not covered. A
self-test in operation mode does not fulfill the requirements to get a FIPS 140-3 certificate.
A complex solution with several components often requires a high implementation effort.
Every component for the protection mechanism has to be implemented and every additional line
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of code requires an extensive test. Otherwise the protected design can get in risk, due to an
implementation error.
A public-private key authentication scheme, allowing for the conclusion that the data trans-
ferred on the scan interface is encrypted and verified with integrity check. But this protection
mechanism is only useful for secured scan interface, which are always on. An interface which is
deactivated after the scan chain test and the scan data input and scan data output port are discon-
nected, does not need such an additional protection. Furthermore an interface, which is enabled
during the lifetime of the device, allows a brute-force attack.
The properties of the [19] are similar to the SSCI. The required time for enabling the interface
and the area are less and the security is on the same level. The difference between both solutions
is the initial phase before testing. For the solution in [19] an enrollment phase is required and
PUF value is read of from the device and stored in a database. Further read access to the PUF
is prevented by blowing one fuse bit. This means a “raw” device is not protected against access
from other users. In contrast to this, the SSCI of a “raw” device cannot be used until the secret
key is written into it. This reduces the danger of the misuse of the devices.
Even a very strong authentication based solution or any other protection mechanisms can has
a single weak point. Maybe a glitch attack or the modification of a signal wire with a FIB can
enable the scan chain interface. A solution with an encrypted scan channel offers more security
because a simple bit flip is not enough to establish a data exchange via scan interface. To prevent
an attack with a FIB or a needle attack, the solution in this work uses an approach of distributed
and connected modules. The required area is much smaller and even the implementation effort
is low.
The solution, proposed in this work, is secure against attacker of level 1 and 2 and against
attacker of the business type (type 3) until a certain investment. Only with the use of reverse
engineering equipment an attack is possible. More secure as this solution is the authentication
based system with an encrypted scan channel from [63]. But this solution comes with expensive
additional area and very high implementation effort. This increases the cost for the protection
mechanism clearly. The higher the cost for a secure scan chain the lower is the probability for
its integration.
4.11 Patent Situation
Due to the fact, that the proposed solution in this work is innovative, two patents are pending.
Under application number 102014226602.5 and 102014226606.8 both patents are submitted in
Germany. One of them describes the compare units and in the second the complete protection
scheme is covered.
Different patents exist with respect to OTP memory. E.g. in patent [36] every OTP memory
cell has an additional protection cell. Once the protection cell was set, the value of the memory
cell cannot be changed anymore. The SSCI uses a secure mechanism for the memory cell too.
In contrast to [36] the SSCI has only one protection cell for one data word and it is not fully
protected against write access. One type of write access is possible, the deletion of all bits of a
data word.
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4.12 Conclusion
In this section a secure solution for the scan chain test was shown. It is highly secure and it
allows a full scan chain test without any restrictions. Programs like TetraMax can be used as
before to generate scan patterns. The scan test itself has to be enhanced by a setup phase, which
writes the secret key in an OTP before the scan test and a delete phase, which deletes the key in
the OTP after the scan test. Due to the fact that the OTP for the protection contains many bits
and a special compare structure is used, it is almost impossible to attack the device successfully.
The developed schematic and layout for the protection mechanism is one possible implemen-
tation. If another set of digital standard cells is available, the circuit would differ. In the end two
different logic structures are required which have the functionality of comparing the input with
an internal reference value, one for logic “0” and one for logic “1”. To avoid an attack by reverse
engineering the appearance of both unit types should be the same. Here this problem was solved
by using a MIM structure and this is a secure storage of the golden key. The combination of
the distributed golden key and the modified scan_enable signal prevents a simple needle or
probing attack.
Even if some solutions for secure test approaches like an online BIST are simple to implement
in RTL, they are not useful for any design. In contrast to this solution, the SSCI requires more
changes on different stages in the design flow. Every step is straightforward and the additional
work is limited and can be verified. As result a very secure and design-independent protection
mechanism with a small area overhead and a small influence on the timing is integrated into the
device.
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5 Secure Debug Interface
5.1 Requirements
The main requirement of a secure debug interface is that the debug and programming interface
cannot be used by attackers. Especially after the programming of the final software release the
interface should be fully blocked.
Since scan chains have more or less the same design, the design of the debug interface differs
from the once of the scan chain depending of the type of the processor, range of function set
or the type of the internal connection between the debug interface and the processor core. It
means that the approach for the secure debug interface has to consider these facts. Besides the
obvious requirement that the access protection is highly secure, the debug interface should offer
full access to the device internals. Even a restricted access, e.g. for a code update without
debugging, would be a useful feature of a secure debug interface.
The use of the processor for the authentication protocol to enable the debug functionality is
not an option. In case of a trap is required to perform the software-based authentication protocol
at the processor. A reset is executed to leave the trap state, but afterwards the register file does
not contain the data, which caused the trap, anymore. So, an analysis what was the reason for
the trap is not possible.
The software development for sensor nodes is divided in three different stages. The first stage
is the development of the software at the desk. The main characteristic is that the device is
reprogrammed very often and the debug interface is used extensively. So the additional time
for the log-in procedure to enable the programming and debugging should as low as possible.
In the next step the devices are in field test. Even in field test a reprogramming and debugging
is required to eliminate bugs. In the last step, the final program has to be written into the non-
volatile memory. A further reprogramming or debugging should not be possible to ensure that
the device is useless for a thief.
A scan chain is used once after fabrication and this is done by the ASIC manufacturer. If all
devices have the same secret key, it causes not a problem. But for
In case that all devices have the same secret key to enable the debug interface means that each
customer can get access to the devices of all other customers. A group-wise or a device-specific
secret key is required to solve this problem. Finally the solution should be resistant against
reverse engineering or simple attacks like glitch attacks to prevent non-authorized access to the
device.
The requirements for a secure debug interface are:
• Preventing unauthorized use
• Full access to device internals
• Fast access without tedious log-in procedure
• Independent of device reset
• Support of multiple log-in
• Limited access for selected memory areas
• Resistant against reverse engineering
• Group-wise key management
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Figure 77: Wrapper for the debug interface, which contains the SDI.
5.2 Secure Debug Interface Concept
In this thesis the proposed approach for the Secure Debug Interface (SDI) bases on an access
control as already introduced for the scan chain in Chapter 4. A secret key has to be written
into an OTP. For accessing to the debug interface this key has to be identical to the golden key
which is stored into the device in compare units. The SDI is adapted to the specific requirements
of a debug interface. The SSCI is a wrapper around the whole protected core, for the SDI the
wrapper is around the debug component only as shown in Figure 77. The second modification
is related to the OTP. The memory gets several entries for the secret key and additional bits for
right management.
5.3 Description of the System
In the initial state, it means that the debug interface of the device is never used; the access to the
device internals is blocked. To enable the debug interface the user interface of the SDI controller
is used to set the access level and the secret key. At first the user chooses the access level. The
different access levels are defined by the vendor. For example a full access to the device or
programming of the NVM or read access to the processor registers and so on. It is written into
the OTP to defined section. Afterwards the secret key is written. Equal to the SSCI every bit of
OTP has to have same value as the corresponding CMP unit. In case of one wrong bit value the
access to the debug interface is fully blocked. If the secret key is correct the compare units and
the following AND module enable the access to the internals of the processor core via the debug
unit. Therefore the communication interface of the debug unit and the access to the memory
bus of the processor are enabled. To switch off the debug interface a command is sent to the
controller of the SDI. This command deletes the secret key and from now on the access to the
debug interface is not possible anymore.
The debug unit is not modified during the integration of the SDI and there is no connection
to the security mechanism itself. For programming the OTP a second interface is used to isolate
the debug functionality and the SDI. This isolation allows an easier integration and increases the
security. In the following the SDI is explained in detail.
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5.3.1 Wrapper Component
The wrapper combines the user interface, the controller, the OTP and the compare units into a
simple module. Furthermore it is designed in such a way that the debug unit is embedded into
this unit. It has the advantage that all inputs and outputs of the debug unit can be controlled. In
fact the debug unit is a component which has access to the internal memory bus. To implement
the protection mechanism all inputs to the debug unit, except clock and reset signal are
blocked and all inputs and outputs to the memory bus are disabled.
5.3.2 Interface
The controller has its own interface to establish the authorization which is fully independent of
the debug interface itself. Otherwise a sharing of the resources can cause a security leakage in
case of an implementation error. In the example implementation in this thesis an SPI is used.
Clearly any other type of interface can be used, e.g. UART, IIC or even 1_wire. An interface
with a low pin count is recommended to reduce the additional area.
5.3.3 Compare Units
To secure the debug interface the same type of compare units as described in Section 4 is used.
Both types of compare units, CMP0 and CMP1, have the same structure and wiring. The differ-
ence is in the placement of the MIM structure. This prevents a fast reverse engineering. To offer
a sufficient security a number of 128 compare units are used which is equal to a key length of
128 bit.
5.3.4 Access Level
A very simple approach for an SDI allows an unrestricted access to all registers. In this case
no additional bits are required in the OTP for the configuration. If the device vendor supports
different access level this information has to be stored in the non-volatile memory. The solution
in [61] for a secure scan chain offers an access monitor for different address spaces too. Thus
requires an NVM which contains the different addresses to grant the access. A user is able to
update this list. From a security point of view this type of protection mechanism seems not to be
very secure. An inexperienced user can set the list in a wrong manner. As result the device is not
protected any more. An indirect access to all other memory ranges might be possible because a
instruction is executable, which copies the data from any address space to another one.
In Figure 78 the solution of this work for SDI with different access levels is shown. The wrap-
per is located between debug unit and memory bus and the different access levels are defined
by different address spaces. In Table 16 an example for the definition of access levels is given.
To prevent an attack as described above, the vendor of the processor defines different specific
address spaces as access levels. These address spaces are well selected and it is proven that an
unrestricted access to other memory ranges is not possible. For example a write-only access to
the program memory allows a reprogramming of the device, but inhibits a memory dump or a
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Figure 78: Access level mechanism for SDI. The LUT contains the mapping between access
level and allowed address spaces for access. In case of an allowed access the
granted_access signal enables the connection between debug unit and core. For
each request via debug interface the access level is checked.
Table 16: Definition of different access levels on example of the openMSP430.
Access level Address range Description
00 0x0000 - 0xffff Full access to every address
01 0x0018 - 0x4000 Full access to peripheral only
10 0x8000 - 0xffff Full access to flash memory only
11 0x8000 - 0xffff Write access to flash memory only
debugging. Beside this advantage the required area is much smaller. The waiver of an updat-
able list reduces the silicon area. A small look-up table implemented in combinatorial logic is
sufficient and even secure against modification.
5.3.5 OTP
The used type of OTP is similar to the on for the SSCI. The memory block has two interfaces.
The typical memory interface is used for writing data. The second one is a full parallel output
of the secret key and the corresponding control signals. To support all three stages of software
development for a sensor node (desk, field test, final operation), the OTP has three entries for
the secret key and the control signals.
In Figure 79 a block diagram of the OTP and the controller is shown. The key_set and
key_deleted signals are used to select the current entry of the secret key. Furthermore the
key_set, key_deleted and access_level are status information which is readable via
the programming interface of the SDI. It is helpful to know the current state of the SDI but no
secret information is forwarded by this read operation.
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Figure 79: OTP for the SDI. The programming interface on the left side is connected to the
controller. The parallel data output on the right side is the input for the compare units
and the signals Access_level, Key_deleted and Key_set are forwarded to
the controller.
The structure and the usage of the OTP are shown in Tables 17 to 20. The first column “OTP#”
specifies the number of the row used in the memory. The key_set bit is set after the complete
secret key is written into the OTP. Without this bit the secret key is not checked to prevent an
attack as described in Section 4.4.3. The key_deleted bit allows a fast check whether the
secret key is deleted or not. In the access_level in this example two bits are stored. One
access level defines a full access to the device and the second allows a reprogramming of the
flash memory only.
In Table 17 the content of the OTP is given for the first debug session. As long as the key is
set the device can be reprogrammed and debugged as many times as needed on the desk. After
debugging and programming, the secret key is destroyed by sending the “delete key” command
to the SDI controller. The controller deletes the secret key and sets the key_deleted bit.
Table 18 shows this state after deleting the secret key. In the following Table, Table 19 the
content of the memory is shown in case of a further debug session. Finally in Table 20 the OTP
is completely filled with logical “1” and a further programming or debugging is not possible.
5.3.6 AND Module
Similar to the SSCI the compare units are connected to an AND module. It ensures that already
one wrong bit of the secret key which comes from the OTP causes a blocking of the debug
interface. Furthermore the AND module has the task to enable the debug interface for the user
in case the correct secret key is provided but to prevent an access to the core if the user does not
have access rights for the specific address.
Since the number of inputs of the AND module is fixed, the number of outputs of the unit is
flexible. It depends of the number of the signals to protect. At this point the implementation has
to be adapted by the user.
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Table 17: OTP with programmed first key. The access level is defined
with “00”, so that a full access is enabled.
OTP# Key_set Key_deleted Access level Key
1 1 0 00 1010...1011
2 0 0 00 0000...0000
3 0 0 00 0000...0000
Table 18: OTP with deleted first key
OTP# Key_set Key_deleted Access level Key
1 1 1 00 1111...1111
2 0 0 00 0000...0000
3 0 0 00 0000...0000
Table 19: OTP with programmed second key. Only reprogramming
of flash memory is allowed, because the access level is de-
fined with “01”.
OTP# Key_set Key_deleted Access level Key
1 1 1 00 1111...1111
2 1 0 01 1010...1011
3 0 0 00 0000...0000
Table 20: OTP all keys are deleted. A further reprogramming or de-
bugging is not possible anymore.
OTP# Key_set Key_deleted Access level Key
1 1 1 00 1111...1111
2 1 1 00 1111...1111
3 1 1 01 1111...1111
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Figure 80: Schematic of the debug interface and protection mechanism. Every signal of the
memory bus between the debug unit and the processor core is controlled by an AND
gate. Only in the case that the secret key is correct, the communication on the memory
bus is possible.
To illustrate this mechanism in the following an example is given. The communication inter-
face (e.g. UART) of the debug unit requires 2 signals. The memory bus of a 16 bit processor has
a 16 bit address output, 16 bit data in and 16 bit data out bus and control signals like read enable
and write enable, in sum 50 signals. As result to block the 52 signals, the AND module has a 52
bit output as shown in Figure 80. Although the number of outputs of the AND module is less
than 128, the length of the secret key is 128 bit. This key length guarantees a high security.
5.4 Evaluation
This section provides the evaluation of the SDI, regarding area, timing and power, bases on the
0.25 µm IHP technology.
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Table 21: Area of SDI after synthesis and estimated
area for layout.
Component Area (synthesis) Area (layout)1
Controller 0.008 mm2 0.011 mm2
SPI slave 0.011 mm2 0.014 mm2
Compare cells 0.013 mm2 0.017 mm2
OTP - 2 0.130 mm2
Sum 0.172 mm2
1Estimated
2Hard macro, layout only
5.4.1 Area
The SDI has a final layout area of 0.172 mm2. This is corresponding to 6,771 gate equivalents.
A debug unit of the openMSP430 requires 0.089 mm2 in 0.25 µm IHP technology. It means that
the SDI has the double size of the debug unit. The whole system design of the openMSP430
requires 15.8 mm2. So the additional area for this security mechanism is less than 1 % of the
protected core.
In Table 21 the controller requires a little bit more silicon area as the controller for the SSCI.
It supports the different access levels and the check is implemented in the controller. Four addi-
tional if clauses, each for every access level, have to be implemented. The estimated overhead
in silicon is small. Furthermore the several entries in the OTP require additional area. The given
area for the OTP is an estimated value. The memory is built within a memory generator. In the
current version it is not possible to generate an OTP as required for an SDI with several entries.
The estimation was done on basis of an OTP with one entry plus some area for the additional
fuse bits and multiplexers. Compared to the existing components, like address multiplexer for
the memory interface and read and write amplifier, the further fuse bits and multiplexers require
a small amount of area only.
5.4.2 Timing
The insertion of the security component for the debug interface influences the timing of the
system slightly. The speed of the processor core is not influenced. Figure 77 shows that the
communication interface and the memory interface of the debug unit are connected to the SDI.
Both interfaces can be disconnected with the inserted AND gates as shown in Figure 80. These
AND gates influence the timing. For the communication interface a slow serial protocol is used,
which is independent of the system clock. The additional delay of 0.09 ns in the signal path
is negligible. For the memory interface the additional delay has more influence. This bus runs
at the system clock speed and a significant delay would influence the clock speed. But the
additional delay of 0.09 ns is negligible, too. It can be expected that this has no influence on the
system speed, because the openMSP430 is designed as slow and power efficient processor for
sensor nodes.
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5.4.3 Power
Power in Debug and Programming Mode To enable the debug interface a certain amount
of energy is required. The communication interface, the controller and especially the setting and
deleting of the secret key in OTP are responsible for that. This step is often performed at the
desk. Here the device is powered with a power supply unit.
Power in Operation Mode In the operation mode, i.e. when devices work without any
debugging functionality, the SDI consumes a small amount of energy only. The synthesis tools
allows an automatic insertion of clock gating, so that a non-used component consumes the leak-
age current only. For the SSCI component without the OTP a leakage of 24.4 nW is given.
For the OTP the data sheet does not give any information regarding leakage. Compared to the
leakage of the openMSP430, i.e. 4.3 µW, the leakage of the SDI is negligible.
For a very power sensitive device the debug unit as well as the SDI including OTP can be
placed in a separate power island. If these components are not used, they can be disconnected
from the power supply and no leakage current floats.
5.5 Adaptation
Different types of debug interfaces and different requirements make it difficult to offer a generic
implementation for a secure debug interface. The approach introduced above is an example for
a debug unit, which has access to a 16 bit memory bus and the AND module is able to block
52 input and output signals. For another type of memory bus only the AND module has to be
adapted to the number of bits to block. Any other component of the SDI can be used unchanged.
This simplifies the adaption and increases the security because the controller and the compare
units are untouched.
In general the number of entries in the OTP can be adapted to specific requirements. For
example for a cost-sensitive mass product it might be sufficient to have one entry in the OTP.
This reduces the required area and the cost. Even the different address ranges should be adapted
depending on the target. Every processor has its specific registers, different address spaces for
volatile and non-volatile memory and so on.
5.6 Security Analysis
From a security point of view, there are two differences between SDI and SSCI. The first one is,
that a device unused entries in the OTP for the secret key, e.g. sensor nodes which are distributed
in the field. The free entries in the OTP allow an attacker to test so many secret keys as free
entries in the OTP are available. Since the number of possible secret keys is 2128 (≈ 3.4 ∗ 1038)
it is nearly impossible that an attacker find the correct secret key with a brute-force attack, even
with a high number of devices.
The second difference is regarding the deletion of the secret key. For the SSCI the deletion of
the secret key is part of the test sequence. For the SDI the user is free to delete the secret key after
a programming and debug session and distribution in field for a test. In case that the secret key
is not deleted, it is possibly to use the debug interface as it is fixed in the access level definition.
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At this point the developer has to consider this fact and possible to delete the secret key before
the device is tested in an environment where access to the device is no longer restricted.
The security analysis in the following is identical to the security analysis for the SSCI. This
includes recovering the secret key from the OTP and the golden key from the compare units.
Even the re-enabling of the interface with a FIB is very time consuming and risky.
5.7 Discussion and Comparison
In Table 22 a comparison of the developed secure debug interface to other solutions is given.
Design and technology independence describe the possibility to transfer the protection mecha-
nism to a new processor and for a new technology. This is important to avoid high cost in a price
sensitive area. Afterward the properties for the usage followed by the properties for the security
are evaluated. Finally the attacker level for the proposed security mechanism summarizes the
table.
Like most of other protection mechanism for the debug interface, the SDI is design indepen-
dent. If the number of inputs and outputs is changed, a small modification in the AND module
has to be done. E.g. the BSL is not design independent, so that for each design a certain imple-
mentation effort exists. The core of the SDI is written in HDL and this allows an easy port to a
new technology. Only the compare units have to be redesigned. This step has to be done once
for a technology and the required effort is low.
A destroyed pad is a solution, which is does not require any additional area and it is dangerous
to use as described in Section 3.6.3. Simple fuse bits have a small footprint, but a single element
is easy to repair with a FIB. For the additional area overhead to secure the debug interface, the
OTP is the dominating factor. Nevertheless compared to the get security the area overhead of
rough 1 % to protect the openMSP430 is negligible. The most expensive solution regarding the
area overhead is the module based debug unit. The device has to be fabricated twice. The first
ASIC contains the debug unit; the second does not contain it.
The access to the internals of an ASIC which is protected with the SDI does not require an
software-based authentication scheme, which would interrupt the software execution. For exam-
ple the boot loader mechanism needs a reset to execute software which contains the authorization
mechanism. A disadvantage of this mechanism is, that after a reset the software routine has to
be executed again. Since the SDI stores the secret key in an NVM, the access to the debug
interface is enabled after a reset or even power-off. Independent how often the SDI is used, as
long as the secret key is not deleted, the SDI is enabled all the time. It is useful for longer debug
sessions without frequent input of the secret key. In case of the feature of a permanently on
debug interface is not desired, the OTP can be replaced by a volatile memory. To support the
different development steps, the SDI can be re-enabled for a predefined number. In case of a
blown fuse bit or destroyed pad, such an update is not possible. The RFID based solution and
the BSL allows an update at any time. It is not possible to prevent a general access to the device.
The support of different access levels allows an access to the full device or to selected address
spaces. This simplifies the maintenance of the device. E.g. for a software update a write access
to the flash memory is sufficient and an direct access to processor registers is not possible. This
feature is not support by the other protection mechanisms reported in Table 22.
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The controller of SDI is not protected against reverse engineering and it would be possible
to extract the netlist from the layout. But the controller does not contain secret information so
that a reverse engineering of this component is useless. The secret key is stored in the compare
units, and as long as the debug interface is enabled, the secret key is stored in the OTP too. The
reverse engineering of these components is very time-consuming and expensive. Even the other
protection mechanisms for the debug interface are resistant against reverse engineering. For
example a blown fuse bit does not allow an access to the device internals. A reverse engineering
shows the type of the protection mechanism, but an attacker does not earn secret information
from a reverse engineering.
The most important fact of the SDI is the resistance against attacker level 3. It means that even
for business attackers the effort for an successful attack is potentially to high. The assumption is
under the condition that a very time consuming, and expensive, attack with a FIB is performed.
Known attacks, like glitch attacks, are not successful to this protection mechanism. This high
protection level offers the SDI and the module based debug unit only. But the module based
debug unit has the disadvantage, that a debugging of the final device is not possible. The final
device does not contain the debug unit anymore, which makes an update of the program memory
impossible. The high security level of the SDI can be supposed because different types of attacks
are not successful. For the duration of a probing attack a small needle is connected to an internal
wire of the die. E.g. destroyed fuse bit can be bypassed with such a needle. Even a glitch attack
is not an option. The protection mechanism for the SDI is independent of the clock signal, so
that a clock glitch does not influence the gates.
5.8 Conclusion
The developed protection mechanism for the debug interface in this thesis bases on purposeful
destruction of transistors. A 128 bit secret key, stored in an OTP has to be identical to the golden
key which is stored in so called “compare units”. These compare units, and even the OTP are
resistant against optical reverse engineering. The solution offers a mixture of temporary enabled
interface and permanently blocked interface. The different access levels allow a kind of right
management. This is sufficient for differentiation of users which have full access to the device
and users with a restricted access, e.g. for updating the program memory only.
To enable the debug interface the access level followed by the secret key is written into the
device at a separate communication interface. The 128 bit secret key offers a high security and
once the interface is fully disabled, only with a very high effort, regarding time and technique,
the access to the device can be re-enabled. To disable the interface a “delete command” is sent
to the controller and all bits in the OTP are set to “logic 1” in the current entry. A set of entries
in the OTP allows a multiple enabling of the debug interface. If all entries in the OTP are deleted
an access to the device internals is not possible any more.
The area overhead for the additional component is negligible and the timing of the protected
core is influence slightly. Even the additional power consumption is very small and in conjunc-
tion with the very high security, the SDI is a smart solution to protect the debug interface of any
kinds of microcontrollers.
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Table 22: Countermeasures for debug and programming interface and their features and proper-
ties. The evaluation based on estimation of the author of this thesis.
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Boot loader (BSL) no yes – - yes yes no yes yes no no no yes yes 1
Authentication (RFID) yes yes – – yes no no yes yes no no no no no 1
Pad destroying yes yes ++ ++ no no yes yes no no no yes no no 1
Fuse bits yes no ++ ++ no no yes yes no no no yes no no 1
Electronic fuse bit yes no ++ ++ no no yes yes yes no no yes no no 1
Module debug unit no yes ++ –3 no no yes no no no no no no no 3
SDI yes4 no ++ + no no yes yes yes yes no no no yes5 3
Legend: ++ very good + good o average - bad – very bad
1Influence system with needle probe, e.g. force a logic “1” on a specific wire.
2One key is valid for many devices and many developers know the secret key.
3ASIC has to be fabricated twice. Once with debug unit, once without.
4Independent of processor and debug unit. Only a changed debug interface requires an adaption.
5If all entries in the OTP are deleted, this is not a risk.
126
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Recent events have shown that attacks via scan chains or debug interfaces are a common ap-
proach to get internal secrets of an ASIC. So countermeasures are indispensable to restrict the
access at these interfaces. If a whole sensor network was successfully attacked because the hard-
ware has weak points, all devices have to be replaced causing significant financial effort. Thus
in this thesis a secure protection mechanism for scan chain interfaces as well as debug interfaces
has been developed.
The security mechanism bases on an authorization scheme with a matching key pair. The user
who wants to use the scan chain or debug interface has to know this key and has to write it into
the OTP of the ASIC before the device can be tested or debugged. In case that the golden key and
the secret key are matching, the access to device internals is enabled. After the post-production
test or programming and debugging session the secret key is deleted and the interface is not
usable anymore.
The core components developed in this thesis i.e. the adapted logic gates in combination with
OTP can be used to secure both types of interfaces. A golden key is stored in the device in a
hidden way. A set of 3 digital standard cells are combined in one unit, called CMP. This unit
provides one bit of the golden key, either a logical “0” or a “1”, and the compare logic. In sum
128 of these units are built in a device and this is representing the golden. The permanent storage
for the golden key is typically a weak point due to reverse engineering. In this work, a secure
way of storing the key is presented. The approach is to store the golden key in the wiring level
of the ASIC. The placement, or even not the placement, of a MIM structure under a via is used
to implement a conductive or non-conductive connection between two metal layers. The MIM
structure is very tiny and it cannot be seen in a microscope. So the CMP units can store “0” or
“1” and optical reverse engineering is prevented.
The properties of the SSCI as well as the SDI regarding area, timing and power consumption
are in a range that they can be used for any type of ASIC. Even in the area of wireless sensor
nodes, which is a very cost sensitive area, the approach can be used very well. The additional
area overhead is less than 1 % for a typical microcontroller and the power consumption is re-
stricted to the additional leakage of 0.2 %. An advantage of this solution is that it is ready to
use and it is a generic solution, completely independent of the type of the system. The solution
is simply to integrate, which reduces implementation errors and the scan chain or the debug
interface can be used without any limitations. Furthermore it is fully compatible to all design
tools, from synthesis, simulation to layout and layout verification, and finally to production. The
selected circuits (MIM and OTP memory) are available in many technologies and a device can
be fabricated without any further circuit development.
A difference between the scan chain and the debug interface is the point of time of its use. The
scan chain is used once after production to check the device for fabrication errors. In contrast
to this the debug interface is used for the software development and the programming of the
device. The debug interface can be used until the secret key is deleted. The OTP is enhanced to
support several entries for the secret key. Each entry can be used to enable the debug interface
again. Furthermore a simple access level control is built into the SDI. It grants e.g. full access
to all areas in the device or write access to the NVM only.
127
The security concept is all-encompassing. Once the secret key is deleted, no data can be
transferred into or from the core via the protected interfaces. The deletion process uses a physical
effect and all 128 anti-fuses are destroyed. This process is not reversible usually. With a FIB
it is possible to repair a single element but for 128 elements it is impossible. Furthermore it is
not sufficient to repair all anti-fuses. Moreover it has to be set to the correct secret key with a
key length of 128 bit. The system is safe against reverse engineering. The units, which contain
the golden key, are constructed with digital standard cells. In a digital design it is very difficult
to identify these units because they are distributed in the area with all other digital components.
The key is stored within the wiring level with a very thin isolation under selected vias. In a
typical reverse engineering process with optical inspection the isolation cannot be seen. Finally
the mechanism is resistant against micro probing. A dependency between all 128 CMP units
causes that only with the correct secret key the interface is enabled. So it is not possible to
enable the interface with a single needle. This novel approach is covered by two patents 3.
3One patent is granted, one patent is pending.
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6.1 Future Work
The approach of this thesis, a mechanism for secure scan chain and debug interface, is well
developed. Nevertheless, there are some open issues on system and circuit level and even in
technology.
At system level a solution is missing, which supports a secure key programming of a JTAG
chain with several devices. All devices in the JTAG chain receive the secret key without encryp-
tion. If one ASIC in the chain is owned by an attacker, he has access to the secret key. A type of
an encrypted communication channel, from the test environment to every JTAG device, should
solve this problem. An asymmetric encryption scheme with a public private key infrastructure
for every ASIC is very secure, but the effort regarding additional silicon area is enormous.
The OTP is used in SSCI and SDI and it is clearly to identify during a reverse engineering
step. This might be a weak point. In a reverse engineering step the outputs of the OTP can be
followed to the connected compare units. An improvement on circuit level would be a single cell
for each bit of the OTP. The element has to have the same layout structure as a digital standard
cell. This means it can be placed and routed like a digital standard cell. Such an anti-fuse cell
is programmed by applying a high programming voltage which is above the breakdown voltage.
This voltage is around 6 volts during the typical power supply is around 2.5 volts. The problem
comes up that the programming voltage has to be distributed to every OTP cell. This fact has to
be solved satisfactory.
Many technologies offer MIM structures, which are used as isolator in this thesis. An optical
reverse engineering is possible down to 0.18 µm. To extract the schematic for ASICs in smaller
technologies equipment like a TEM is necessary. Using this equipment increases the risk that
the MIM structures are identified and the golden key can be extracted. Thus a new mechanism
for storage of the golden key is required. The functionality should be same which means a small
isolation layer but implemented in a way which prevents reverse engineering even with the use
of TEM. Especially this point offers high potential for research.
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